State v. Campbell
| Decision Date | 18 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 2019 CA 00055,2019 CA 00055 |
| Citation | 157 N.E.3d 373,2020 Ohio 4119 |
| Parties | STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Daniel J. CAMPBELL, Defendant - Appellant |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
R. KYLE WITT, Fairfield County Prosecutor, By: CHRISTOPHER REAMER, Assistant County Prosecutor, 239 West Main Street, Suite 101, Lancaster, Ohio 43130, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
SCOTT P. WOOD, Conrad/Wood, 120 East Main Street, Suite 200, Lancaster, Ohio 43130, for Defendant-Appellant.
{¶1} Appellant, Daniel J. Campbell appeals the decision of the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas denying his motion to suppress evidence discovered by his probation officer during a random search. Appellee is the State of Ohio.
{¶2} Daniel Campbell was granted judicial release in State v. Campbell, Fairfield County Common Pleas Case No. 2012 CR 00193 and placed on community control. His probation officer, Kelsey Conn, decided that Campbell was doing well enough that his level of supervision should be reduced and that his case should be transferred to a new probation officer. Conn thought that a "home check" would be appropriate prior to the transfer, so she and several other members of the probation office visited Campbell's residence and conducted a search. The probation officers discovered what appeared to be child pornography on Campbell's cell phone and that discovery resulted in Campbell's conviction and incarceration.
{¶3} Campbell was indicted for two counts of robbery in May 2012 and he entered a guilty plea to one count in December 2012. Campbell pursued and exhausted his appellate rights and in December 2015 he began serving his three year sentence. The trial court granted his request for judicial release in December 2017 and placed him on community control. Campbell signed a document captioned Acknowledgement, Agreement, & Additional Terms & Conditions of Community Control and that document contains a term regarding questioning and searches that states as follows:
{¶4} C. I consent to being questioned by any Community Control Officer. I consent to searches of my person, my property, my vehicle, and my residence at any time without a warrant. I understand this includes common areas and areas that are exclusive to me.
{¶5} Campbell was compliant with the terms of his community control order. His probation officer decided he was entitled to a reduced level of supervision but planned to search his home, a process she described as a "home check," prior to changing his status. The probation officer relied upon the community control conditions for authority to complete a search of Campbell's residence and cell phone without probable cause, reasonable grounds, or any other justification for the search.
{¶6} Probation Officer Conn conducted the "home check" on August 1, 2018 accompanied by other members of the probation office. Her colleagues secured the back door of the residence while she and other officers approached the front door and knocked. She was admitted by Campbell and she explained her purpose. He did not object and she entered the home with the other officers and instructed Campbell to have a seat at the kitchen table while they conducted the search.
{¶7} During the search of Campbell's bedroom a cell phone was discovered. The cell phone was brought to Probation Officer Conn and she reviewed text messages on the phone to ensure that it was Mr. Campbell's phone. She continued her search of data accessible on the phone until she found what appeared to be pornographic images of minors. Conn conferred with Senior Probation Officer Casey Jones regarding how to proceed and Jones asked Campbell to confirm he owned this phone. Campbell affirmed it was his cell phone. The search was postponed until search warrants could be obtained for that phone and other electronic devices. The affidavit requesting the search warrant relied upon the images discovered by Ms. Conn when she looked through the cell phone.
{¶8} As a result of the discovery of pornographic images found on several electronic devices owned by Mr. Campbell, he was charged with nine felony offenses. Campbell filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered by probation officer Conn contending that the search was not based on reasonable grounds to believe he had violated the terms of his community control and was unlawful. Appellee filed a memorandum contra contending that Campbell "knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived any of the limited Fourth Amendment protected possessed in exchange for his release from prison."
{¶9} The trial court conducted an oral hearing on the matter and heard testimony from the probation officer, Kelsey Conn. Conn explained that she had been a probation officer for five years and completed the probation officer training required by the Supreme Court of Ohio. She described the process of reviewing the terms of the conditions of community control with each of her probationers, which includes a consent "to search any time without a warrant." When asked about the home visits, she confirmed that they are unannounced and the purpose was to confirm that the probationers were residing at their stated address and that there were no additional violations of terms of probation such as firearms or drugs. Ms. Conn also confirmed that the Fairfield County Probation Department conducts random searches even if the probationer has not aroused any suspicion that they might be in violation of the terms and conditions of their probation. She agreed that they commonly search probationers who have complied with all of the terms of their community control order.
{¶10} She confirmed that it was her common practice to do a home check when she is considering reducing the probationer's level of supervision to ensure complete compliance before the transfer, and she had planned to complete such a home check on Campbell prior to reassigning his case and lowering his level of supervision. Up to the date of this home check, Campbell had been compliant with all the terms and conditions of his probation, had not tested positive for drugs, and had attended all of his mental health counseling as ordered. Conn confirmed that Campbell had not violated the terms and conditions of probation prior to August 1, 2018, and she had no suspicion nor had she received information that he had committed any violation prior to the inspection. Conn expressed her belief that this fieldwork, or home check, was lawful or constitutional at the time it was conducted and she claimed that she reviews the policies and procedures of her department on an annual basis to ensure that she is complying with the law.
{¶11} The trial court denied the motion to suppress finding that Campbell executed a valid consent to search his property and that the law enforcement officer was acting in good faith reliance upon a judicial order that the officer believed authorized her to act.
{¶12} Campbell changed his plea to no contest to counts one through nine and he was sentenced to an aggregate term of eighty-four months and ordered to register as a Tier I and a Tier II sexual offender. Campbell filed a notice of appeal and submitted one assignment of error:
{¶13}
{¶14} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. When ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to evaluate witness credibility. See State v. Dunlap , 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 314, 652 N.E.2d 988 (1995) ; State v. Fanning , 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982). Accordingly, a reviewing court must defer to the trial court's factual findings if competent, credible evidence exists to support those findings. See Burnside, supra ; Dunlap, supra. However, once this Court has accepted those facts as true, it must independently determine as a matter of law whether the trial court met the applicable legal standard. See Burnside , supra, quoting State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706, 707 N.E.2d 539 (4th Dist. 1997) ; See, generally, United States v. Arvizu , 534 U.S. 266, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) ; Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). That is, the application of the law to the trial court's findings of fact is subject to a de novo standard of review Ornelas, supra .
{¶15} Campbell contends that the trial court erred by failing to apply the correct law to the facts and thereafter incorrectly decided that his Fourth Amendment rights were not violated, so we review the trial court's decision de novo.
{¶16} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution provide "[t]he right of the people to be secure * * * against unreasonable searches and seizures * * *." A warrantless search or seizure is per se unreasonable under these constitutional provisions, subject to a few specific and well-delineated exceptions. California v. Acevedo (1991), 500 U.S. 565, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 114 L.Ed.2d 619 ; State v. Kessler ( 1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 204, 207, 373 N.E.2d 1252. The prosecution has the burden of establishing the application of one of the exceptions to this rule designating warrantless searches as per se unreasonable. Id. Generally evidence obtained from searches and seizures conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in court. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). The purpose of this exclusionary rule is to remove any incentive to violate the Fourth Amendment and, thereby, deter police from unlawful conduct. United States v. Leon (1984), 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct....
To continue reading
Request your trial