State v. Canton

• Decision Date: 13 June 1912
• Docket Number: 19,448
• Citation: 131 La. 255,59 So. 202
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. CANTON et al

59 So. 202

131 La. 255

STATE v. CANTON et al

No. 19,448

Supreme Court of Louisiana

June 13, 1912

Rehearing Denied June 28, 1912.

Appeal from Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans; Frank D Chretien, Judge.

Rene Canton and another were accused of murder, and, from a verdict finding defendant Rene Canton guilty, he appeals.

Affirmed.

H. N Gautier, for appellant.

St Clair Adams, Dist. Atty., and Warren Doyle, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the State.

OPINION

SOMMERVILLE, J.

Defendant Rene Canton appeals from a verdict finding him guilty of murder, and sentence condemning him to death. Lucian Canton was acquitted.

There are four bills of exceptions in the record; but two of them were abandoned in open court.

The first bill of exceptions to be considered is taken to the ruling of the trial judge in admitting in evidence the written confession of Rene Canton made to the district attorney. It is claimed on defendant's behalf that the confession was not voluntarily made by him, and that he had not been warned in advance that said confession might be used against him.

The state introduced in evidence the testimony of four reputable witnesses to prove that the confession of defendant was voluntarily made, and signed by him. On cross-examination, these witnesses testified to the negative facts that the district attorney did not browbeat or threaten defendant, or make any promises to him, or advise him; and that the former was not guilty of any misconduct towards the latter. Defendant did not call any witnesses to contradict the testimony given on this point, and he did not take the witness stand himself for that purpose.

We have carefully read the confession, in the form of questions and answers, and also the testimony of the witnesses introduced on behalf of the state, which went to show the voluntariness of the confession, and we concur with the district judge in his finding to the effect that:

"The state introduced, as part of its case, the confession of the defendant. Before admitting the confession, witnesses were called to the stand, who swore to its being free and voluntary. Their statements were not contradicted by any witnesses, and the witnesses to the confession were men of character.

"I therefore admitted them (the confessions of both defendants), and they were read to the jury. No one could read the confession itself, and the intrinsic evidence of its voluntary character, without being thoroughly convinced of its voluntariness."

It was objected that the district attorney had no authority to examine the accused. Of course, the district attorney could not compel the accused to be a witness against himself at any time whatever, whether during the course of a regular trial, or preliminary to such trial, as was held by us in the Besancon Case, 128 La. 85, 54 So. 480. We say there:

"Any official or citizen may receive a voluntary confession of crime, and it is the peculiar duty of the district attorney to investigate the truth of all criminal charges or accusations. In the instant case, in order to perpetuate the statements of the accused, they were taken down in the form of questions and answers by the official stenographer. The notes were then transcribed and read to the accused for the purposes of verification and correction. No fairer mode of perpetuating oral statements has ever been devised.

"The further objection, not made in the court below, is urged that the accused were not cautioned that their statements might be used against them. It was not necessary for the state to show that the accused were so warned. State v. Howard, 127 La. 435, 53 So. 677."

What we said in the Besancon Case is entirely applicable to the case at bar.

"The rule of law demands that the confession shall have been made voluntarily, without the appliances of hope or fear by any other person." Greenleaf on Evidence, § 219.

"And whether it was so made or not is to be determined upon consideration of the age, situation, and character of the person and the circumstances under which it was made. It must not be obtained by the exertion of any improper influence." State v. Auguste, 50 La.Ann. 491, 23 So. 613.

And, in the case cited, we held that the statements made by the defendant, Auguste, were made under peculiar influences, which might have had their effect upon the voluntariness of the confession, and were therefore improperly admitted in evidence. We refused to look into the measure of the force or influence used, simply deciding that where it appears that any influence whatever has been used that the confession was not voluntary, and could not go to the jury.

We are referred to the case of Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568. In that case it appears that the accused, Bram, had been stripped of his clothing by an official, and was then told by him that he (the accused) had been seen while in the act of committing the murder of which he was charged. The prisoner denied having committed the murder, but he was betrayed into making a negative admission, by saying that the person who said that he had seen him (Bram) commit the murder was in such a position that he could not have seen him at that time. The court held the said alleged negative confession to fall within the rule excluding statements made under inducements improperly operating to influence the mind of an accused person. The court there held that:

"The impression is irresistibly produced that it (the confession) must necessarily have been the result of either hope or fear operating on the mind."

In fact, the so-called confession was not a confession. It was a positive denial of guilt by the accused. But it had been used by the prosecution as a confession on the trial, and the court continued to give it that effect. The accused there did not intend to make a confession, did not know that he had made one, and the court held that it had not been voluntarily made. No such conditions exist in connection with this case.

The court in the Bram Case laid down the general doctrine to this effect:

"In this court the general rule that confessions must be free and voluntary, that is, not produced by inducement engendering either hope or fear, is settled by the authorities referred to at the outset. * * * In this court, also, it has been settled that the mere fact that the confession is made to a police officer, while the accused was under arrest, in or out of prison, or was drawn out by his questions, does not necessarily render a confession involuntary, but, as one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether or not the statements of the prisoner were voluntary."

The ruling of the trial court is in conformity with the law applied in the Bram and Auguste Cases, and it is in line with the decision in State v. Besancon, 128 La. 85, 54 So. 480.

Complaint is specially urged against the action of the district attorney in having the police officers bring to his office all persons charged with serious crimes, instead of having them taken to the nearest police jail. Defendant brings his complaint under Act No. 11 of 1906, and Act No. 109 of 1908. The former act is one "granting to judges and recorders jurisdiction over all persons arrested and charged with any crime, misdemeanor or offense, and defining their authority to grant bail in such cases." There is a provision made that the police or other arresting officers shall conduct the accused to the nearest jail or police precinct station; but the act nowhere takes from the district attorney the right to investigate all criminal charges or accusations. The law makes it his duty to do so, and it is also his duty, as it is that of any other citizen, to accept any confession voluntarily made by an accused person. The other act relied upon, No. 109 of 1908, makes it a...