State v. Carder

• Citation: 9 Ohio St.2d 1,222 N.E.2d 620
• Decision Date: 28 December 1966
• Docket Number: No. 39902,39902
• Parties: , 38 O.O.2d 1 The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. CARDER, Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Ohio

Page 1

9 Ohio St.2d 1

222 N.E.2d 620, 38 O.O.2d 1

The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. CARDER, Appellant.

No. 39902.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Dec. 28, 1966.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882, holds that the decision in Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977, is applicable only to trials begun after the date of that decision, to wit, June 22, 1964, and that the decision in Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, applies only to trials begun after the date of that decision, to wit June 13, 1966.

2. A case tried after Escobedo but prior to Miranda is subject only to the specific rules in relation to counsel during in-custody interrogation prescribed by Escobedo.

3. Two elements of the rule in relation to in-custody interrogation prescribed by Escobedo are, one, the person being interrogated must request and be denied the right to consult with counsel, and, two, the interrogators must have failed to effectively warn him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent.

4. In the present case, which was tried after Escobedo but prior to Miranda, the accused made no request for counsel and was informed of his right to remain silent. Thus, his statement which was taken in the absence of counsel but which was otherwise voluntary in nature was properly admitted into evidence.

On the night of April 6, 1964, one Richard Mattox discovered the body of Vanetta Brucker lying on the floor of her delicatessen. Some time prior to this, on the night in question, the deceased, while talking to Mattox on the telephone, told him that someone with a white crash-helmet was entering the store. Mattox informed the sheriff of this fact. The defendant, age sixteen and three-fourths years, was known to the juvenile authorities and was known to wear a white crash-helmet when riding his motorbike, and in the meantime defendant reported to the police that his clothes had been stolen. The sheriff sent deputies to the defendant's home where they were admitted by defendant's father. After a short conversation with defendant, during which time the deputies saw a white crash-helmet on a chair, the officers left taking with them the crash-helmet. A preliminary examination of the helmet showed three spots on it, at least one of which was human blood. The deputies returned to defendant's home about 1:45 a. m. and asked and were allowed to see defendant's clothes and motorbike. After further investigation, the officers returned to defendant's home and he was taken to the sheriff's office and was placed in a cell until the following morning. Defendant was not questioned at that time.

About seven o'clock the following morning, defendant's father came to see him and administered an insulin shot. Shortly after this, an attorney was admitted to see the defendant but, inasmuch as he was representing the estate of Mrs. Brucker, the deceased, he refused to take the case, but he did say that he would send another lawyer. At about eight o'clock defendant's employer was allowed to talk to him. During the conversation with his employer defendant told him where his bloody clothing and the money taken from the deceased could be found. The authorities, from an independent source, had already received information which had led to the discovery of defendant's clothing.

About nine o'clock in the morning, defendant's interrogation began and continued until around 12:15 p. m. when defendant confessed to the crime. At no time during this period did defendant ask to see a lawyer. His employer and a probation officer for the Juvenile Court were present in the room during the questioning. The record shows that defendant was told several times that he did not have to talk to his questions if he did not want to. The record shows also that defendant's parents and an attorney were present outside the room during the questioning. Defendant when asked whether he wished to see them said, 'No.'

Defendant was indicted on two counts of murder in the first degree, premeditated murder and murder during the commission of a robbery. He was tried and found guilty with a recommendation of mercy on both counts by a jury. His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The cause is before this court on an appeal as of right and pursuant to the allowance of a motion for leave to appeal.

E. Raymond Morehart, Pros. Atty., for appellee.

Richard C. Gerken and Forrest P. Moore, Logan, for appellant.

MATTHIAS, Judge.

This case was argued before this court last spring. However, since a question was raised as to the applicability of the doctrine of Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 to this case, the court decided to delay its decision until the determinations by the Supreme Court of the United States of the cases of Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, and Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882. The case was reassigned for further argument this fall in the light of the Miranda and Johnson decisions.

Defendant's primary contention relates to the admissibility of his confession. It is his contention that the confession was barred from admission into evidence under the doctrines enunciated in Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977.

This case was tried during that gray area between Escobedo and Miranda v. State of Arizona. Although the actual ruling in Escobedo was specific, the ruling and the broad implications created by it and the opinion in support thereof left law-enforcement officials and the judiciary hanging on a limb. Escobedo created a labyrinth in which the law-enforcement authorities were required to grope, seeking without direction the rules of conduct which would be held to accord an accused his constitutional rights in relation to in-custody interrogation. It was not until Miranda v. State of Arizona, some two years later, that the paths were marked. This was the very purpose of Miranda, as was stated, as follows, in the opinion:

'This case (Escobedo v. State of Illinois) has been the subject of judicial interpretation and spirited legal debate since it was decided two years ago. Both state and federal courts, in assessing its implications, have arrived at varying conclusions. A wealth of scholarly material has been written tracing its ramifications and underpinnings. Police and prosecutor have speculated on its range and desirability. We granted certiorari in these cases, 382 U.S. 924, 925, 937, 86 S.Ct. 318, 320, 395, 15 L.Ed.2d 338, 339, 348, in order further to explore some facets of the problems, thus exposed, of applying the privilege against self-incrimination to in-custody interrogation, and to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow.'

The burden of Escobedo, not only on law-enforcement authorities but also upon reviewing courts, was recognized in Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882.

The specific holding in Johnson recognized the dilemma when it held that the decision in Escobedo v. State of Illinois is applicable only to trials begun after the date of that decision, to wit, June 22, 1964, and that the decision in Miranda v. State of Arizona applied only to trials begun after the date of that decision, to wit, June 13, 1966.

In determining that those cases were neither retroactive nor even applicable to cases pending on direct appeal, the court said:

'All of the reasons set forth above for making Escobedo and Miranda nonretroactive suggest that these decisions should apply only to trials begun after the decisions were announced. Future defendants will benefit fully from our new standards governing in-custody interrogation, while past defendants may still avail themselves of the voluntariness test. Law enforcement officers annd trial courts will have fair notice that statements taken in violation of these standards may not be used against an accused. Prospective application only to trials begun after the standards were announced is particularly appropriate here. Authorities attempting to protect the privilege have not been apprised heretofore of the specific safeguards which are now obligatory. Consequently they have adopted devices which, although below the constitutional minimum, were not intentional evasions of the requirements of the privilege. In these circumstances, to upset all of the convictions still pending on direct appeal which were obtained in trials preceding Escobedo and Miranda would impose an unjustifiable burden on the administration of justice.

'* * *

'As for the standards laid down one week ago in Miranda, if we were persuaded that they had been fully anticipated by the holding in Escobedo, we would measure their prospectivity from the same date. Defendants still to be tried at that time would be entitled to strict observance of constitutional doctrines already clearly foreshadowed. The disagreements among other courts concerning the implications of Escobedo, however, have impelled us to lay down additional guidelines for situations not presented by that case. This we have done in Miranda, and these guidelines are therefore available only to persons whose trials had not begun as of June 13, 1966. See Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, at 409, 86 S.Ct. 459, at 461, 15 L.Ed.2d 453 * * *.'

The court in the Johnson case also pinpointed the actual rules laid down in Escobedo, when it said:

'Apart from its broad implications, the precise holding of Escobedo was that statements elicited by the police during an interrogation may not be used against the accused at a criminal trial, '(where) the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into...