State v. Carll
| Decision Date | 07 June 1965 |
| Citation | 210 A.2d 680,161 Me. 210 |
| Parties | STATE v. Peter F. CARLL. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Bernard R. Cratty, County Atty. for Kennebec County, Augusta, for plaintiff.
Philip Bird, Waterville, for defendant.
Before WILLIAMSON, C. J., and WEBBER, TAPLEY, SULLIVAN, MARDEN and RUDMAN, JJ.
The respondent, having been found guilty by a jury of the crime of breaking, entering and larceny in the nighttime, brings this case forward for review on exceptions.
The first four exceptions deal with the appointment of counsel for respondent, the denial of respondent's request for continuance and with related matters which may all be considered together. A review of the material facts is required in order to determine whether or not there was any abuse of discretion on the part of the justice below. In the early part of June, 1964 the grand jury returned an indictment against the respondent who was then in Massachusetts. On June 11, 1964 a Massachusetts attorney entered a special appearance for the respondent in the Kennebec County Superior Court. On June 30, 1964 the respondent was arraigned and was admitted to bail pending trial. On this occasion his Massachusetts counsel was present in court and requested a continuance of the case to the term of court to be held in the following October. This attorney represented to the court that local counsel would be employed. After further discussion with the court it was stipulated and agreed that the request for continuance to the next term was withdrawn, that the Massachusetts counsel would not be representing the respondent at trial, and that the latter 'was obtaining local counsel.' The respondent did in fact employ and consult with a Waterville attorney within ten days subsequent to July 1, 1964. On July 23, 1964 this attorney informed the court that he had advised the respondent of his 'rights and opportunities' but the respondent 'apparently feels he would be more satisfied if he were represented by other counsel, so he has informed me that he would like to have me disassociate myself from the case.' The court then interrogated the respondent and elicited from him the information that he had requested that the attorney move for a continuance of the case to the 'fall term', and upon being informed by him that such a request would not be granted was no longer interested in retaining him as counsel. The court then inquired directly why the respondent felt that the case should be continued. The respondent replied only that he lacked confidence in himself, that he did not feel able at this time to go to trial, that he had not had the proper amount of time with his counsel, that he had not had a chance to consult with another attorney, and that he had financial problems. The court then reviewed the circumstances at length, reminding the respondent that he had already had more than three weeks to obtain counsel and prepare his defense and that he offered no proper justification for not having done so. The respondent then disclosed that on the previous day he had called Mr. Stanley Bird, also an attorney in Waterville. He stated, however, that Mr. Bird did not represent him 'as yet.' The court thereupon permitted the respondent's then counsel to withdraw and offered the respondent an additional period of six days in which to consult new counsel and prepare for trial. The court warned the respondent that no further delays would be granted. Respondent agreed to employ counsel that day and the court instructed him either to have his new counsel enter an appearance on the following day or to present himself in court in order that counsel might be appointed to represent him. On the following day, July 24, 1964, the respondent again appeared but without an attorney and filed with the court a formal written motion for continuance setting forth that the firm of Bird & Bird would not be able to represent the respondent at the pending trial because of prior commitments and lack of time for adequate preparation. Mr. Philip Bird of that firm was present in the court room but took no part in the proceedings on the motion. The motion was then denied and the court proceeded to interrogate the respondent as to his financial ability to pay counsel. The respondent disclosed that he had no funds available for that purpose and that he owned no property except an automobile of undisclosed value in Massachusetts. The court then stated that he would appoint counsel, to which the respondent objected on the ground that he 'would like to have' his own attorney. At this point the following colloquy occurred which, since it reveals the unyielding attitude of the respondent, is reproduced in its entirety:
The court then appointed Mr. Richard J. Dubord to...
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...1976); United States v. Vallejo, 496 F.2d 960 (1st Cir. 1974); Johnson v. State, 139 Ga.App. 829, 229 S.E.2d 772 (1976); State v. Carll, 161 Me. 210, 210 A.2d 680 (1965); People v. Willis, 6 Ill.App.3d 980, 286 N.E.2d 72 The law is equally well settled that a defendant cannot, by a last min......
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State v. Rastrom
...rests in the sound discretion of the presiding justice.' State v. Wardwell (1962) 158 Me. 307, 310, 183 A.2d 896. In State v. Carll (1965) 161 Me. 210, 214, 210 A.2d 680 we had occasion to consider some of the factors which make for a proper exercise of discretion. There we 'A presiding jus......
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State v. Simmonds
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State v. Chapman
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