State v. Simmonds
Decision Date | 21 December 1973 |
Citation | 313 A.2d 120 |
Parties | STATE of Maine v. Gary Wayne SIMMONDS. |
Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Henry N. Berry, III, Cumberland County Atty., Peter Ballou, Asst. County Atty., Portland, for plaintiff.
Cram & Dalton by Edward C. Dalton, Jr., Falmouth, for defendant.
Before DUFRESNE, C. J., and WEATHERBEE, WERNICK and ARCHIBALD, JJ.
After a trial on June 14, 1972 a Superior Court (Cumberland County) jury found defendant, Gary Wayne Simmonds, guilty of having, in the nighttime of April 9, 1972, committed the offense of breaking and entering a building of Circus Time, Inc., situated at 265 Western Avenue in South Portland, Maine, with the intent to commit larceny therein (17 M.R.S.A. § 754). From the judgment of conviction entered on the jury verdict defendant has appealed to this Court.
We deny the appeal.
Defendant was indicted for the offense on May 5, 1972. On May 23, 1972 the Court, satisfied that defendant was indigent, appointed counsel to represent him at public expense. Defendant was arraigned on the same day and, with his appointed counsel present and participating, entered a plea of 'not guilty.'
On June 13, 1972, assisted by counsel, defendant sought to retract his plea of 'not guilty' and simultaneously tendered a plea of 'guilty.' After a 'Rule 11' (M.R.Crim.P.) inquiry, the presiding Justice declined to accept defendant's 'guilty' plea. The plea of 'not guilty' was kept in effect.
Subsequently, at approximately 3:00 p. m. the same day, the office of the County Attorney notified counsel that the case would go to trial the next day, June 14, 1972, at 9:30 a. m.
The next morning, as trial was about to commence (the jury having been impanelled but not yet sworn), counsel for the defendant requested a bench conference. His request was granted and at the bench, out of the hearing of the persons impanelled to be the jurors the following colloquy occurred:
'MR. MacNICHOL: In the file.
The jury was then sworn as a panel, and the trial proceeded.
Defendant asserts, as a comprehensive first ground of appeal, that the denial of his motion for continuance was error because: (1) in all the circumstances it was an abuse of judicial discretion and (2) it required the defendant to be in the presence of the jury as an unclean, unkempt and inappropriately attired person, thereby prejudicing defendant by having him look guilty before the jury in violation of defendant's right to be deemed innocent throughout the trial until the evidence had proved him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
A presiding Justice has a broad latitute of discretion concerning the granting, or denial, of a continuance. State v. Carll, 161 Me. 210, 210 A.2d 680 (1965); State v. Curtis, Me., 295 A.2d 252 (1972); State v. Carey, Me., 303 A.2d 446 (1973); and an abuse of discretion will be found only if 'palpable error' or 'apparent injustice' is established by the party charging the abuse. State v. Hume, 146 Me. 129, 78 A.2d 496 (1951); State v. Curtis, supra.
Measured by these criteria defendant's claim of abuse of discretion in the instant situation fails.
The 'discovery' problem mentioned during the bench colloquy was shown by the bench colloquy itself to have been unreal. After the prosecuting attorney had given his explanation to the presiding Justice, counsel for the defendant neither disputed the prosecutor's version of the facts nor persisted in a claim that a continuing problem of 'discovery' remained. If defendant's trial counsel had some initial reservations about the State's compliance with his 'discovery' requests, a fair reading of the record is that by the conclusion of the bench colloquy his doubts were resolved and the matter of 'discovery' was closed.
In describing his inability to speak with a witness as a ground for continuance, counsel for defendant said only: 'I have not been able to locate a witness that is critical to the State's case.' He indicated nothing further concerning the extent of his efforts to 'locate' the witness or the time when his efforts had been initiated. He gave no supporting information as to the identity of the witness or the particular respects in which his testimony would be 'critical' (or even relevant, material or competent). So bare a conclusory recital as to 'witness unavailability' cannot be allowed effectiveness, either by itself or as a 'makeweight' operating in conjunction with other factors, to require appellate reversal of a discretionary trial-level ruling denying a continuance. State v. Curtis, supra; State v. Carey, supra.
We find defendant's grooming and attire, as described in the record by defendant's counsel, an insufficient factor to justify reversal of the judgment of conviction because of an alleged abuse of judicial discretion.
The jury would not be inclined to suspect that defendant was serving a sixty day jail term for another offense and had come from the jail to the courtroom for trial merely because defendant appeared without a jacket or tie 'looking like he just finished sweeping the streets.' The present situation, therefore, is markedly distinguishable from the circumstances of two cases upon which defendant heavily relies-Hernandez v. Beto, 443 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1971) and Eaddy v. People, 115 Colo. 488, 174 P.2d 717 (1946). In Hernandez, the defendant was tried while wearing actual jail garb (a white T-shirt with 'Harris County Jail' stamped on the front and dungarees bearing the same inscription on front and back). In Eaddy, the defendant was tried while wearing a placard attached about his neck on which were the words 'County Jail.'
Further, that defendant was in the custody and control of government officials for the penal purposes of being confined in a jail did not, per se, divest defendant, as an adult otherwise competent, of the responsibility which every adult has for the care and grooming of his own person. Neither does it create an affirmative obligation that the governmental officials who have the custody and control of defendant's body must ensure that defendant will be personally clean and appropriately groomed and attired for a Court appearance. Such responsibility remains with the defendant; and so long as the government officials who had the custody and control of his body for penal purposes did not deprive defendant of reasonable opportunity, and means, for his discharge of his own responsibility to himself for his personal cleanliness, grooming and dress, defendant has no basis for complaint. See: State v. Carver, 94 Idaho 677, 496 P.2d 676 (1972); Collins v. State, 70 Okl.Cr. 340, 106 P.2d 273 (1940).
The present record contains not the slightest suggestion that government officials had deprived defendant of reasonable opportunity, or means, to have his grooming and manner of dress other than it was. It is consistent with the record before us that it could have been defendant's wish to appear in the courtroom as he did. In any event, especially since counsel for defendant never intimated to the presiding Justice that he would be satisfied with a short delay to permit counsel to arrange for defendant to appear before the jury in the manner he (defendant's counsel) thought proper, there was no abuse of...
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