State v. Caro
| Decision Date | 15 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 2 CA-CR 2019-0232,2 CA-CR 2019-0232 |
| Parties | THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. RAMON CABELLO CARO, Appellant. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(e).
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
The Honorable Christopher C. Browning, Judge
AFFIRMED
Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General
Michael T. O'Toole, Chief Counsel
By Jillian B. Francis, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix
Counsel for Appellee
Robert A. Kerry, Tucson
Counsel for Appellant
Chief Judge Vásquez authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Staring and Judge Eppich concurred.
¶1 After two jury trials, Ramon Caro was convicted of manslaughter, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, aggravated assault causing serious physical injury, driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), and aggravated driving with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of .20 or more.1 The trial court sentenced him to concurrent prison terms, the longest of which is 10.5 years, to be followed by concurrent periods of probation totaling five years. On appeal, Caro argues the court erred by denying his motion to suppress, improperly admitting other-act evidence, and denying his request for a Willits2 instruction as well as his motion for a judgment of acquittal made pursuant to Rule 20, Ariz. R. Crim. P. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶2 We view the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to affirming Caro's convictions. See State v. Molina, 211 Ariz. 130, ¶ 2 (App. 2005). Early in the morning on January 21, 2017, Pima County Deputy Sheriff Jeff Knerr was dispatched to a collision involving a vehicle and a bicycle in Pima County on Flowing Wells Road and Wetmore Road. When he arrived, Knerr saw a man, later identified as D.M., lying face down on top of a bike. D.M. had a pulse and was breathing, but was not verbally responsive and exhaled blood with each breath.
¶3 A witness to the collision identified Caro as the driver of the vehicle and when Knerr asked Caro what had happened, Caro responded that "he was unsure" but "might have possibly struck a pedestrian." Another deputy, Ryan Goss, encountered a "language barrier" when hespoke with Caro. He testified that he could not recall specifically if he placed Caro in his patrol vehicle to wait for Deputy Jorge Rodriguez to arrive "because [Rodriguez] spoke Spanish, or if he was just the traffic investigator." When Rodriguez arrived and opened the door to the patrol vehicle, he and Goss smelled "a strong odor of intoxicants" and Rodriguez noticed Caro had "[r]ed, watery eyes." Caro agreed to provide a breath sample that confirmed the presence of alcohol. Rodriguez then obtained a search warrant to conduct blood draws for three samples, to be drawn in one-hour increments. When Caro was moved from the passenger's side of the patrol vehicle to the driver's side, the deputies noticed small pieces of glass on his clothing and on the back seat, likely from the shattered windshield of Caro's vehicle.
¶4 An ambulance transported D.M. to University Medical Center (UMC), where he was treated for a "significant traumatic injury," including admission to the intensive care unit. D.M. remained at UMC until February 2017, when he died from complications arising from the injuries he had sustained in the collision one month earlier.
¶5 A grand jury indicted Caro for manslaughter, DUI, aggravated DUI, and two counts of aggravated assault. He was convicted and sentenced as described above. This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A)(1).
¶6 Caro argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because his initial detention was illegal. Specifically, he maintains that when he was placed in the back of a patrol vehicle for almost an hour while awaiting the arrival of a Spanish-speaking deputy, "he was detained [and] seized, in violation of his rights under the United States and Arizona [C]onstitutions." He thus claims that "all the evidence of impairment, the deputies' observations and the blood draws, were a result of [his] unlawful detention and should have been suppressed."
¶7 We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion but review constitutional and purely legal issues de novo, State v. Gay, 214 Ariz. 214, ¶ 4 (App. 2007), including whether the duration of an investigative detention was reasonable, State v. Teagle, 217 Ariz. 17, ¶ 19 (App. 2007). "In reviewing a motion to suppress, we consider only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and view it in thelight most favorable to upholding the trial court's factual findings." State v. Fornof, 218 Ariz. 74, ¶ 8 (App. 2008).
¶8 At the suppression hearing, Knerr testified that he had been the first to arrive on scene shortly after 7:00 a.m. and that Caro had stated that "he possibly had struck a pedestrian." Although Knerr stated he did not have any difficulty communicating with Caro, Deputy Georgina Houston testified that when she spoke with Caro "he was more Spanish speaking" and indicated by gesture or in Spanish that he spoke a little bit of English.3 Houston then requested a Spanish-speaking deputy, and Rodriguez arrived thereafter. Goss testified that he had placed Caro in his patrol vehicle and had done his "best to advise [Caro] that he[ was] not under arrest, but he was being detained as [the deputies] investigated the collision" because, as Goss understood, Caro "mostly sp[oke] Spanish."
¶9 Rodriguez testified that shortly after he had arrived on scene at 7:55 a.m., he went to Goss's patrol vehicle to speak with Caro who was in the backseat. Rodriguez explained that after opening the door he noticed Caro had "red, watery, bloodshot eyes" and Rodriguez smelled "a strong odor of intoxicants coming from him, as well as slurred, mumbled speech." Rodriguez communicated with Caro entirely in Spanish and requested Caro to undergo a field sobriety test, but Caro "asked [him] if it would be easier [to do] a blood draw." Rodriguez had Caro sign a consent form, drew his blood around 8:20 a.m., and then conducted a preliminary breath test (PBT). The PBT showed a BAC of .216 and Rodriguez placed Caro under arrest at 8:30 a.m.
¶10 After taking the matter under advisement, as relevant to the issues raised on appeal, the trial court denied Caro's motion to suppress, concluding that the length of the detention was reasonable under the circumstances and not for the purpose of delay.4 The court noted that it didnot find the deputies' testimony regarding Caro's understanding of English contradictory because Goss, Houston, and Rodriguez had "more interaction with [Caro]" and "[t]he fact that [Caro] may or may not have spoken English goes to the weight rather than the admissibility of . . . Knerr's testimony" and "it is for the trier of fact to determine who or what to believe regarding [Caro's] ability to speak and understand English." Additionally, the court found the deputies "had several different issues that had to be immediately addressed" once they arrived on scene including "to assist the victim, direct traffic, and . . . secure the scene to preserve evidence" as well as wait for a Spanish-speaking officer that "was necessary to speak to [Caro]."
¶11 "The ultimate question is whether the police engaged in unreasonable delay during the investigation to gain an advantage over the subject." State v. Maciel, 240 Ariz. 46, ¶ 20 (2016). In Maciel, our supreme court concluded that an investigative detention where officers were "responding to a dispatch for a suspected burglary" that was approximately an hour long was not unreasonable under the circumstances because "[s]uch an investigation might reasonably require a slightly longer investigative detention than a typical traffic or Terry stop" and "officers acted reasonably and efficiently in the unfolding burglary investigation." Id. ¶¶ 23, 25; see also State v. Spreitz, 190 Ariz. 129, 143 (1997) ().
¶12 In this case, we agree with the trial court's determination that the investigative detention was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and not for the purpose of delay. See State v. Boteo-Flores, 230 Ariz. 105, ¶ 14 (2012); State v. Kinney, 225 Ariz. 550, ¶ 14 (App. 2010). Because Knerr had reasonable suspicion to believe that Caro had been involved in a collision involving serious physical injury, Caro was properly detained for the purposes of the investigation. See Kinney, 225 Ariz. 550, ¶ 14. Once Houston determined Caro primarily spoke Spanish, the investigative detention wasprolonged no longer than necessary so that a Spanish-speaking deputy could arrive at the scene to effectively communicate with Caro. See Boteo-Flores, 230 Ariz. 105, ¶ 14. The duration was neither unreasonable nor for the purpose of gaining an advantage. See Maciel, 240 Ariz. 46, ¶ 20. The court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying Caro's motion to suppress on the basis of the delay in waiting for a Spanish-speaking deputy to arrive on the scene. See Gay, 214 Ariz. 214, ¶ 4.
¶13 Caro also contends "the trial court erred when it ruled the search warrant was legal despite the errors in the supporting affidavit about what the witnesses [had] said." In denying Caro's motion, the court explained that although the initial blood draw "via Caro's consent" was inadmissible, the three blood draws pursuant to the search warrant were admissible because there was "independent probable cause to uphold the search...
To continue reading
Request your trial