State v. Maciel

• Decision Date: 29 July 2016
• Docket Number: No. CR–15–0346–PR,CR–15–0346–PR
• Citation: 375 P.3d 938,240 Ariz. 46
• Parties: State of Arizona, Appellee, v. Carlos Andres Maciel, Appellant.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

240 Ariz. 46

375 P.3d 938

State of Arizona, Appellee

v.Carlos Andres Maciel, Appellant.

No. CR–15–0346–PR

Supreme Court of Arizona.

Filed July 29, 2016

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General, John R. Lopez IV, Solicitor General, Joseph T. Maziarz (argued), Chief Counsel, Criminal Appeals Section, Phoenix, Attorneys for State of Arizona.

Michael A. Breeze, Yuma County Public Defender, Edward F. McGee (argued), Deputy Public Defender, Yuma, Attorneys for Carlos Andres Maciel.

CHIEF JUSTICE BALES authored the opinion of the Court, in which VICE CHIEF JUSTICE PELANDER and JUSTICES BRUTINEL, TIMMER, and BOLICK joined.

CHIEF JUSTICE BALES, opinion of the Court:

¶ 1 Statements a person makes in response to “in custody” interrogation cannot be used to establish the person's guilt if they are not preceded by the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). We here hold that Carlos Andres Maciel's statements are admissible because he was not in custody for Miranda purposes when police detained him outside a vacant building and questioned him about a suspected burglary.

I.

¶ 2 A motorist saw Maciel seated on a curb outside a vacant building that had a broken window. The building belonged to a church located on the same property. Noting a board that had covered the window was missing, and knowing about previous break-ins, the motorist called the police. Officer Christopher Huntley was dispatched to investigate.

¶ 3 Officer Huntley parked his patrol car in the church's parking lot next to the vacant building. After speaking with the motorist, Officer Huntley approached Maciel, who was still seated a few feet from the broken window. Nearby, Maciel had his personal possessions in a shopping cart. At the officer's request, Maciel provided identification and agreed to submit to a pat-down search for weapons. After confirming that Maciel was unarmed and had no outstanding warrants, Officer Huntley asked “what he was doing” and if he knew “how the board got removed from the window.” Maciel said he was just sitting down and denied knowing anything about the board's removal. Because Officer Huntley did not know whether anyone was inside the building, he asked Maciel to sit in the patrol car until another officer arrived. Within minutes, a second officer arrived and Maciel was then asked to sit on a curb in the parking lot while the second officer stood nearby. Maciel complied.

¶ 4 About that same time, a third officer arrived and helped Officer Huntley check the building's perimeter for unsecured doors. While the officers spent a few minutes doing so, the church pastor arrived. He told Officer Huntley that three days earlier a board had covered the broken window. The pastor also said he would be willing to pursue charges if a suspect was identified. Officer Huntley returned to Maciel and again asked him about the window. Maciel admitted removing the board the day before and entering the building to look for money. Maciel was then arrested, handcuffed, and placed in the patrol car.

¶ 5 After arresting Maciel, Officer Huntley and the third officer searched the vacant building. Apart from the broken window, there was no evidence of entry, and the pastor could not identify anything missing. Officer Huntley returned to his patrol car, advised Maciel of his Miranda rights, and again asked him about entering the building. Maciel again said that he had removed the board and gone inside. From the time Huntley arrived at the scene, the entire investigation lasted about an hour.

¶ 6 Before his trial for burglary, Maciel moved to suppress his statements to the police. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court applied the test enunciated in State v. Cruz–Mata , 138 Ariz. 370, 373, 674 P.2d 1368, 1371 (1983), and denied the motion, reasoning that when Maciel was sitting on the curb he was not in custody for Miranda purposes. A jury subsequently found Maciel guilty of third-degree burglary. The trial court suspended the sentence, placed Maciel on intensive probation for thirty-six months, and ordered him to serve thirty days in jail as a condition of probation.

¶ 7 The court of appeals, in a split decision, affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress. State v. Maciel , 238 Ariz. 200, 206 ¶¶ 25–26, 207 ¶ 31, 358 P.3d 621, 627, 628 (App.2015). The majority agreed with the trial court that Maciel was not in custody when questioned on the curb. Id. at 204 ¶ 16, 205 ¶ 20, 358 P.3d at 625, 626. The dissent reasoned that Maciel was in custody because he was not free to terminate the encounter with the police. Id. at 209 ¶41, 210 ¶ 47, 358 P.3d at 630, 631 (Swann, J., dissenting).

¶ 8 We granted review because the proper standard for determining if someone is in custody for Miranda purposes is a recurring issue of statewide importance. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5(3), of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12–120.24.

II.

¶ 9 In reviewing rulings on motions to suppress, we consider only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court's ruling. State v. Wilson , 237 Ariz. 296, 298 ¶ 7, 350 P.3d 800, 802 (2015) ; State v. Dean , 206 Ariz. 158, 161 ¶ 9, 76 P.3d 429, 432 (2003). We will not disturb the trial court's ruling absent an abuse of discretion. Dean , 206 Ariz. at 161 ¶ 9, 76 P.3d at 432. An error of law constitutes an abuse of discretion. State v. Bernstein , 237 Ariz. 226, 228 ¶ 9, 349 P.3d 200, 202 (2015).

A.

¶ 10 The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution shields all persons from compulsory self-incrimination. To safeguard this privilege, law enforcement officers must provide the well-known Miranda warnings before interrogating a person in custody. Miranda , 384 U.S. at 478–79, 86 S.Ct. 1602. These warnings are deemed necessary because “without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.” Id . at 467, 86 S.Ct. 1602 ; see also Dickerson v. United States , 530 U.S. 428, 438–40, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000) (holding that Miranda established a constitutional rule).

¶ 11 We have previously held that whether a person is “in custody” for Miranda purposes ultimately depends on whether there is a “formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Cruz–Mata , 138 Ariz. at 373–74, 674 P.2d at 1371–72 (quoting California v. Beheler , 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983) ); see also State v. Perea , 142 Ariz. 352, 354, 690 P.2d 71, 73 (1984) (noting that Miranda custody is “determined by an objective test of whether a reasonable person would feel deprived of his freedom in a significant way”). Our cases analyzed three factors when considering Miranda custody: the site of the questioning, the presence of objective indicia of arrest, and the length and form of the interrogation. State v. Fulminante , 161 Ariz. 237, 243, 778 P.2d 602, 608 (1988) (quoting Cruz–Mata , 138 Ariz. at 373, 674 P.2d at 1371 ).

¶ 12 Since our decisions in Cruz–Mata, Perea, and Fulminante, the United States Supreme Court has made clear that restraint on freedom of movement alone does not establish Miranda custody. Howes v. Fields , ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 1189–90, 182 L.Ed.2d 17 (2012) ; Maryland v. Shatzer , 559 U.S. 98, 112–13, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2010) ; see also Berkemer v. McCarty , 468 U.S. 420, 436–37, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (declining to “accord talismanic power” to the phrase “freedom of action”). “Custody” for Miranda purposes “is a term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious danger of coercion.” Howes , 132 S.Ct. at 1189. Miranda custody requires not only curtailment of an individual's freedom of action, but also an environment that “presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.” Id. at 1189–90. For this reason, the Court has held that individuals are not in Miranda custody when they are subjected to traffic stops and investigative detentions—sometimes referred to as “Terry stops.” Shatzer , 559 U.S. at 113, 130 S.Ct. 1213 (citing Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ); United States v. Sharpe , 470 U.S. 675, 677–78, 685–87, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985).

¶ 13 Consistent with Supreme Court precedent, we must consider both whether Maciel's freedom of action was significantly curtailed and, if so, whether the environment in which he was questioned presented inherently coercive pressures similar to a station house interrogation.

B.

¶ 14 A person's freedom of movement has been significantly curtailed if “a reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Howes , 132 S.Ct. at 1189 (quoting Thompson v. Keohane , 516 U.S. 99, 112, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995) ). To determine how a suspect would have gauged his or her freedom of movement, we must evaluate “all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation,” not just the three factors identified in Cruz–Mata. See id. (quoting Stansbury v. California , 511 U.S. 318, 322, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) ).

¶ 15 Under the circumstances here, a reasonable person would not have felt he or she was at liberty to end the encounter with Officer Huntley and leave—a point conceded by the State and confirmed by the record. After asking Maciel for identification and to submit to a pat-down search for weapons, Officer Huntley asked Maciel to sit in the back of the patrol car. The officer did not recall if the door was opened or closed, but he remained nearby while Maciel was inside. After a couple of minutes, Officer Huntley asked...