State v. Carpenter

• Decision Date: 27 January 1891
• Citation: 22 A. 497,60 Conn. 97
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. CARPENTER.

22 A. 497

60 Conn. 97

STATE

v. CARPENTER.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Jan. 27, 1891.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Fairfield county; Walsh, J.

John D. Carpenter was convicted under a city ordinance of the offense of policy playing, and he appeals. Reversed.

D. B. Lock wood, for appellant.

J. C. Chamberlain and W. B. Glover, for the State.

LOOMIS, J. The appellant is defendant in two complaints for a violation of a city ordinance prohibiting, under penalty of a fine, the keeping of a place for policy playing within the limits of the city of Bridgeport. The complaints were originally presented by the prosecuting attorney of the city to the city court, and were appealed by the defendant to the criminal court of common pleas for the county of Fairfield, where the defendant filed general demurrers to the complaints, which were overruled by the court. The questions for review, as presented by the reasons for the appeal to this court, are preprecisely the same in both cases, and have reference to the validity of the complaints, and to the validity of the ordinance upon which they are founded. The ordinance is styled "An ordinance relative to policy playing," and is as follows: "Section 1. Every person, whether as principal, agent, or servant, who shall keep or manage, or have any interest in the keeping or managing of, any room, place, or shop for the purpose, in whole or in part, of playing, conducting, or carrying on, or of allowing any other person or persons to play, conduct, or carry on, the game, business, or scheme commonly known as 'policy;' or who shall write, transfer, sell, deliver, or buy, in whole or in part, any of the slips, tickets, tokens, numbers, or chances used in or connected with such game, business, or scheme of policy; or who shall in any other way knowingly take any part whatever in such game, business, or scheme of policy, or in any part thereof,—shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars. Sec. 2. Every person owning or controlling any building, room, or place, who shall knowingly let, lease, or permit the same to be occupied, used, or resorted to for the purpose of playing, conducting, or carrying on, in whole or in part, the game, business, or scheme commonly known as 'policy,' shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars. Sec. 3. No person summoned as a witness on the part of the city, in any prosecution under either of the two preceding sections, shall be excused from testifying by reason that the evidence he may give will tend to disgrace or criminate him; nor shall he thereafter be prosecuted for anything connected with the transaction about which he shall so testify."

The defendant alleges in his reasons of appeal, and argues in his brief, that the ordinance is of no effect, because it does not set out fully and precisely the necessary ingredients which constitute the offense charged. There are many offenses created by statute that could not stand such a test, for it would seem to require that all general words used to indicate the offense to be punished should be particularly denned. Take, for illustration, section 283 of the Genera Statutes, which makes it a crime to keep a place resorted to for the purpose of selling or buying pools upon the result of any election. There is no definition given of "pools," and the ingredients of the offense are not mentioned, but it would require some hardihood to claim that the act on that account would be of no effect. The objection overlooks the fact that the prohibited acts may have a general name to characterize them, as well understood without, as with, adefinition. We think this is true of the act in question. It may be that the term "policy playing" is of recent origin, but we may properly take notice of the fact that it was in current use when the ordinance in question was enacted, and in Webster's Imperial Dictionary the third definition of the word "policy," used as a noun, is: "A method of gambling by betting as to what numbers will be drawn in a lottery; as, to play policy."

But, if the ordinance is sufficiently certain as to the acts prohibited, it is claimed to be unconstitutional, in that the statute authorizing the city to pass such an ordinance violates the fundamental maxim of constitutional law, that legislative power cannot be delegated. But this maxim cannot be applied in the unlimited manner asserted, for, if it could, it would invalidate every city charter and every ordinance, for the municipality has no life or power at all except as delegated to it by the legislature, either through its charter or by means of statutes. The maxim therefore, which is cited in behalf of the defendant, must be understood in the light of the immemorial practice of this country and of England, which has always recognized the propriety of vesting in municipal organizations certain powers of local regulation in respect to which the parties immediately concerned may fairly be supposed more competent to judge of their needs than the sovereign power of the state. It is now generally conceded by the courts of this country and of Eng. land that powers of local legislation may be granted to cities, towns, and other municipal corporations. Cooley, Const. Lim. (4th Ed.) top page 230; and see authorities cited in note 1. The case of State v. Tryon, 39 Conn. 183, decided by this court, contains a sufficient answer to this objection.

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