State v. Carpenter

Decision Date12 November 1901
PartiesTHE STATE, Appellant, v. CARPENTER
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Appeal from Douglas Circuit Court. -- Hon. W. N. Evans, Judge.

Affirmed.

Edward C. Crow, Attorney-General, and Sam B. Jeffries, Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.

(1) An examination of the information shows every essential allegation to charge the crime of perjury. State v Jennings, 98 Mo. 493; State v. Horman, 106 Mo 635; State v. Smith, 63 Vt. 201; State v Massey, 5 Tex.App. 81; State v. Hucksby, 87 Mo. 414; State v. Cave; 81 Mo. 454; Kelly's Criminal Law, sec. 821; State v. Pratt, 98 Mo. 482; State v. Mattingly, 8 Tex.App. 345; Com. v. Seargeant, 129 Mass. 115; Com. v. McCarty, 152 Mass. 577. The statute (sec. 2033, R. S. 1899), does not confine the offense to some court or falsely swearing in some court, but provides that it may be committed as well before some officer who, of course, must be legally authorized to administer the oath. (3) There can be no question as to the right of the recorder to administer oaths and affirmations in the usual manner. He has such authority by virtue of his office. Nor can it be questioned that he has authority to administer oaths and take acknowledgments in connection with any transaction affecting his office and official duties. The responsibility that rested upon those who performed the marital obligation prior to the Act of 1881, requiring licenses to be first obtained, now rests upon the various recorders. Beckham v. Nocke, 56 Mo. 548; State v. Griffith, 67 Mo. 287; Donahue v. Dougherty, 5 Rawle 124; State v. Billick, 103 Mo. 183. Certainly it can not be said that such an officer is not authorized to require the applicant to verify, by oath or affirmation, the correctness of the representations made in order to obtain the license. The spirit of the law authorizes it, and necessity, as well as public policy, demands it. (4) The information also properly avers the perjury as taking place in a certain matter, fully describing the officer before whom pending, as well as the manner of the oath and by whom administered. Com. v. Reyburn, 89 Ky. 147; State v. Mace, 86 N.C. 668; State v. Knight, 84 N.C. 789; People v. White, 102 Cal. 251. While the facts set out are sufficient to show materiality of the matter falsely sworn to by defendant, yet, under our statutes and the decisions of our courts, it is unnecessary, such facts showing materiality so long as the information contains averments that such facts so falsely sworn to concerned matters material to the question to be determined. State v. Gancey, 23 Neb. 436; Ditcher v. State, 39 Oh. St. 130; State v. Williamson, 68 Ala. 551; Russell on Crimes, 639; 2 Chitty's Crim. Law, 307; State v. Doris, 69 N.C. 496.

D. M. Coleman and J. C. West for respondent.

OPINION

SHERWOOD, P. J.

The State appeals because the court below quashed the information.

The defendant was prosecuted for perjury, the information being bottomed on section 2033, Unrevised Statutes 1899, and is couched in this language:

"J S. Clark, prosecuting attorney within and for the county of Douglas, in the State of Missouri, informs the court that Marshall Carpenter on the fourteenth day of May, 1900, in the said county of Douglas, did then and there before John A Spurlock, recorder of deeds within and for Douglas county, Missouri, in a certain cause, matter and proceeding wherein the said Marshall Carpenter had made application before the said John A. Spurlock, recorder of deeds, for a marriage license for himself and one Laura Cochran, the said John A. Spurlock then and there having competent authority in that behalf, the said issues were then and there submitted to and tried by John A. Spurlock, recorder of deeds, upon which said issue the said Marshall Carpenter then and there appeared as a witness for the purpose of obtaining a marriage license for himself and Laura Cochran, and was then and there duly sworn and took his oath before the said recorder of deeds, which said oath was then and there administered to the said Marshall Carpenter by John A. Spurlock, who was then and there recorder of deeds of Douglas county, Missouri, having full power and competent authority to administer the said oath to the said Marshall Carpenter in that behalf, that the evidence which he, the said Marshall Carpenter, should give to the recorder of deeds aforesaid, and the statement which he, the said Marshall Carpenter, should make before the said recorder of deeds should be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, and that upon the application for said marriage license for said Marshall Carpenter and Laura Cochran aforesaid, it then and there became and was a material question whether J. L. Cochran, the father of Laura Cochran, had given his consent, in writing, for the said Laura Cochran, she the said Laura Cochran being then and there under the age of eighteen years, to marry the said Marshall Carpenter, and that the said Marshall Carpenter then and there on the application for said marriage license, upon his oath as aforesaid, feloniously, willfully, corruptly, and falsely, before the recorder of deeds aforesaid, did depose and swear in substance and to the effect following, that is to say, that on the twelfth day of May, 1900, J. L. Cochran, father of said Laura Cochran, gave his consent for him the said Marshall Carpenter to marry the said Laura Cochran, who was under the age of eighteen years, and that the said J. L. Cochran, father of the said Laura Cochran, signed a certain instrument of writing which he, the said Marshall Carpenter, presented to the said recorder of deeds, a more particular description of which said instrument of writing this prosecuting attorney is unable to give, whereas, in truth and in fact the said J. L. Cochran on the fourteenth day of May, nor at any other time never gave his consent, in writing, for the said Laura Cochran to marry the said Marshall Carpenter, and the said J. L. Cochran never signed the aforesaid...

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