State v. Carrasquillo
| Decision Date | 22 January 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-438.,00-438. |
| Citation | 795 A.2d 1141 |
| Parties | STATE of Vermont v. Edward CARRASQUILLO. |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
Present: AMESTOY, C.J., DOOLEY, MORSE, JOHNSON, SKOGLUND, JJ.
This is an appeal by defendant Carrasquillo from the trial court's limitation of Carrasquillo's cross-examination of a State's witness who had allegedly assaulted Carrasquillo subsequent to the events underlying this appeal. Defendant also argues on appeal that the evidence presented at trial was quantitatively insufficient, as a matter of law, to satisfy the "substantial period" element of Vermont's kidnapping statute, 13 V.S.A. § 2404(3)(C). We affirm.
Defendant Carrasquillo was an inmate at the South Burlington Correctional Facility when he was charged, under a four-count information, with aggravated assault on Corrections Officer Charnley, aggravated assault with intent to prevent said law enforcement officer from performing a lawful duty, attempted escape, and kidnapping. The charges against Carrasquillo arose from an altercation involving himself, another inmate, Officer Charnley and a Nurse Brannagan who worked at the facility. The altercation began when Nurse Brannagan, accompanied by Officer Charnley, began dispensing medication to inmate Carrasquillo at his cell in the facility's "lockdown" unit. Carrasquillo was acting strangely: taking his medicine slowly, asking a lot of questions, stepping out of his cell, and insisting that he be allowed to go up the hall to look for a pair of sneakers he claimed was missing. He then stated he did not feel well and fell towards the hallway. As Officer Charnley attempted to close the cell door, Carrasquillo pulled a sharpened toothbrush, commonly referred to as a "shank," from his pocket and ordered the officer into the cell. A physical struggle between Officer Charnley and Carrasquillo ensued during which Carrasquillo's cellmate, on Carrasquillo's orders, grabbed Nurse Brannagan by the neck, restraining her. Other officers arrived at the scene as Officer Charnley and Carrasquillo continued to struggle and Nurse Brannagan was held "in a hostage situation position." Carrasquillo then stabbed Officer Charnley in the head with the shank. Both Carrasquillo and the other inmate were ultimately returned to the cell. Soon thereafter, Carrasquillo was moved to a more secure facility. During the transfer, while Carrasquillo was in restraints, Officer Charnley approached Carrasquillo and struck him. Officer Charnley was subsequently discharged from employment by the facility, and criminal charges were filed against him based on this incident.
At trial on the four-count information against Carrasquillo, Officer Charnley served as a witness for the State. As a preliminary matter, the State brought a motion in limine to preclude Carrasquillo from introducing evidence that witness Officer Charnley: "(1) has a pending charge of simple assault in which defendant is the alleged victim, and (2) was recently terminated from the Department of Corrections following an internal investigation into that alleged simple assault, and (3) any reference to any civil suit that may or may not be pending regarding the alleged assault." Carrasquillo objected to the State's motion, arguing that the alleged assault demonstrates the witness' bias and motive for testifying. He noted, however, that he did not intend to "get into the facts" of the assault. The State conceded that Carrasquillo would be permitted to question Officer Charnley about "all the sources of bias and his anger towards Mr. Carrasquillo" for having stabbed him with the shank. The court granted the motion in part, and denied it in part, ruling that defense counsel could inquire on the issue of bias, "without getting into the facts of the subsequent incident," and that defense counsel could ask Officer Charnley "whether or not it's true that Mr. Carrasquillo has made allegations against him regarding a subsequent incident" which could subject him to civil and criminal liability.
During trial Carrasquillo was able to fully cross-examine Officer Charnley on issues of any bias or animosity he may have had towards him. Carrasquillo did question Officer Charnley as to whether he was exposed to any criminal and civil liability as a result of the allegations made by Carrasquillo. At the close of evidence, Carrasquillo moved for a judgment of acquittal on both the kidnapping and attempted escape charge, which was denied. The jury found Carrasquillo guilty of three out of four charges: aggravated assault, kidnapping, and attempted escape.
Carrasquillo argues on appeal that the trial court erred in granting the State's motion in limine and thereby refusing to allow defense counsel to cross-examine Officer Charnley about the circumstances surrounding Officer Charnley's purported assault on Carrasquillo. Carrasquillo cites V.R.E. 608(b), which allows the introduction, on cross-examination, of probative evidence of specific instances of the conduct of a witness to prove the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, for support of the proposition that evidence of Officer Charnley's assault on Carrasquillo would be probative of Officer Charnley's character for untruthfulness. Regardless of the validity of Carrasquillo's assertion that evidence of animosity is probative of one's character for truthfulness, we do not reach the merits of that claim as we hold that Carrasquillo failed to preserve for appellate review his claim that the trial court erred by limiting his cross-examination of Officer Charnley.
"To properly preserve an issue for appeal a party must present the issue with specificity and clarity in a manner which gives the trial court a fair opportunity to rule on it." State v. Ben-Mont Corp., 163 Vt. 53, 61, 652 A.2d 1004, 1009 (1994). We have recently held that requests by counsel to the court, during a preliminary hearing, on the scope and extent of allowable cross-examination are not "sufficiently concrete for appellate review." State v. Koveos, 169 Vt. 62, 71, 732 A.2d 722, 728 (1999). And that where defendant is "[e]ssentially... asking to be able to administer a test of hypothetical questions to the trial judge, with the consequence of any erroneous answer being that his conviction is reversed because defendant might have offered the evidence described in the hypothetical," defendant's hypothetical questions are neither an offer of proof nor a ruling on specific evidence for purposes of appellate review. Id. (emphasis in original). Failure to make an offer of proof to permit excluded evidence on this basis at trial precludes us from reaching this issue on appeal. See id.
At the hearing on the motion in limine defendant Carrasquillo engaged in a colloquy with the court on the scope of allowable cross-examination. Defense counsel argued that the subsequent assault on defendant by the witness was evidence of the degree of animosity and bias held by the witness against defendant and, for that reason, he should be allowed to develop this evidence during cross-examination of the witness. The court ruled that defendant would be allowed to inquire on the issue of bias, but without getting into the facts of the subsequent incident. Defense counsel then proceeded to inquire whether certain questions could be pursued, specifically, if he could ask the witness if he'd been charged with a crime as a result of the alleged assault or whether he'd been dismissed from employment. The court ruled he could not. Counsel made no objections to these limitations. Although counsel initially objected to the motion in limine, the court ruled that it would be granted only in part, and defendant failed to object to the limitations the court actually imposed. As we said in Koveos, questions to the court about the scope of its ruling are not objections. Because defendant never sought permission to develop the facts of the alleged assault, and was granted permission to question the witness as to the existence and potential consequences of allegations made against him, and because defendant never objected to the court's ruling on the two hypothetical questions posed, he has not preserved these rulings...
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