State v. Carson

• Decision Date: 28 February 1925
• Docket Number: 11703.
• Parties: STATE v. CARSON.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

126 S.E. 757

131 S.C. 42

STATE v. CARSON.

No. 11703.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

February 28, 1925

Appeal from General Sessions Circuit Court of Colleton County; J. K Henry, Judge.

Fred Carson was convicted of manufacturing whisky, and he appeals. Affirmed.

The court stated, before jurors were placed on their voir dire that:

"I am going to ask each juror, ask each juror, if he is opposed to it (regarding the enforcement of the prohibition law), because I want a man who could come honestly, and mighty hard for a man who appears to be friendly to a fellow that deals in it--and I want to be fair, and I want to be fair to them, and I want each man to be fair, and I do not want to put him in an awkward position, and, if they do not want to sit on one of these kind of cases, let them say so."

A sheriff, a constable, and another witness who had testified that he had purchased liquor from defendant, testified for the state that they followed a trail from defendant's house to a number of barrels of mash and a furnace in which there had been a fire, in defendant's field; that such mash, still, and furnace, in a direct line, were not more than 100 yards from defendant's house; that defendant stated he had operated a still at such place and had thrown still in the river.

R. M Jefferies, of Walterboro, for appellant.

Randolph Murdaugh, of Hampton, for the State.

MARION J.

Convicted of manufacturing whisky, the defendant appeals. His nine exceptions will be considered in order.

(1) It is assigned as error that the trial court permitted jurors to be questioned on their voir dire as to their views on the prohibition law. The contention, in substance, is that the inference from such questions was "that the court desired only such men as would convict to sit on the jury." The scope and limits of the interrogation of the juror, under the broad powers conferred on the circuit judge by the statute (section 577, Code Civ. Proc. 1922), are within the sound discretion of the circuit judge. " The presiding Judge must determine on the character of the questions proposed and when the examination shall cease." State v. Coleman, 8 S. C. 239; State v. Nance, 25 S.C. 168. The questions objected to in this case were propounded by the solicitor apparently for the purpose of obtaining information upon which to exercise intelligently the state's right of peremptory challenge. No attempt was made to use the answers of jurors as a ground of challenge for cause. The examination as to the attitude and prejudices of the jurors with respect to enforcing the prohibition law inured to the benefit of defendant as well as of the state in the exercise of the peremptory challenge. The suggestion that the line of interrogation so permitted was an indication of a desire on the part of the presiding judge to "convict," is obviously without merit. The first exception is overruled.

(2) The second exception is directed to the same contention as to error committed in the examination of the jurors, on the ground that "such questions could be construed as an insult to law-abiding citizens," etc. The connection between the wounding of the sensibilities of the jurors and the conviction of the defendant is not apparent. The exception is overruled.

(3) The third exception charges error in that the presiding judge made certain prejudicial remarks as to the reluctance of jurors to convict in whisky cases "before the jurors were placed on their voir dire." The record furnishes no basis for this assignment of error and the exception is not argued in appellant's printed brief. For the reason indicated the exception is overruled.

(4) The fourth exception assigns error in the admission of evidence "to the effect that the defendant sold liquor two days before the alleged charge of manufacturing arose." The theory of the state in establishing by circumstantial evidence the charge of manufacturing on May 17th, was that the defendant's possession and sale of whisky on May 15th was the circumstance which led to the discovery that defendant was engaged in manufacturing and was a fact so closely interwoven with the circumstances tending to prove guilt of the charge laid that it was impossible to disconnect it. Whisky is ordinarily manufactured for purposes of sale. Time was not of the essence of the offense of manufacturing charged (State v. Rush [S. C.] 123 S.E. 765). That the sale of whisky on a date so near to that laid in the indictment was a relevant circumstance tending to establish defendant's implication in the crime of manufacturing charged, we think is clear. If so, evidence of that fact was not inadmissible because it tended to prove the commission of another offense. The acid test is relevancy; or, as said in Com. v. Robinson, 146 Mass. 571, 16 N.E. 452; "Such preliminary acts are not competent because they are criminal, but because they are relevant to the issue on trial; and the fact that they are criminal...