State v. Carter

• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Writing for the Court: Before PETERS; SHEA
• Citation: 198 Conn. 386,503 A.2d 576
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. George C. CARTER.
• Decision Date: 21 January 1986

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503 A.2d 576 198 Conn. 386 STATE of Connecticut
v.
George C. CARTER. Supreme Court of Connecticut. Argued Nov. 13, 1985.
Decided Jan. 21, 1986.

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[198 Conn. 387] Richard N. Palmer, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was Robert N. Chatigny, Hartford, for appellant (defendant).

Julia D. Dewey, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were Arnold Markle, State's Atty., Michael Dearington, Chief Asst. State's Atty., and David Teitelman, legal intern, for appellee (state).

Before [198 Conn. 386] PETERS, C.J., and ARTHUR H. HEALEY, SHEA, DANNEHY and CALLAHAN, JJ.

[198 Conn. 387] SHEA, Associate Justice.

On March 3, 1975, the defendant, George Carter, was indicted by a grand jury for felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c. After several competency hearings, where he was found incompetent to stand trial, the defendant eventually was found competent. At the ensuing trial he was convicted by a jury of felony murder on October 5, 1977. This court, however, subsequently set aside the defendant's conviction in State v. Carter, 182 Conn. 580, 438 A.2d 778 (1980). ¹ In a second trial, the defendant was again convicted of felony murder after a trial to a jury. From this judgment the defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred (1) in admitting evidence of the defendant's prior conviction for another murder, and (2) in charging the jury concerning the definition of insanity. ² We find no error.

[198 Conn. 388] On November 4, 1974, at approximately 6:20 p.m., the defendant registered as a guest at a Holiday Inn in New Haven. Later that evening, the defendant was seen in the lobby and the hotel bar adjacent to it. At about the same time the victim, Robert Roth, was seen in the hotel dining room. The victim had been residing at the hotel for several years. Because the dining room was closed by the time the victim

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had finished eating, he was required to exit through the hotel bar. There was no testimony that anyone had seen the defendant and the victim together. Some time after 10 p.m. that evening, Roth was robbed and murdered. Several items of jewelry and other personal possessions were taken from him, including a University of New Haven class ring bearing his initials. Although the victim did not smoke, a "Kool" cigarette was found in his room.

Later the same evening, the defendant illegally entered an apartment in close proximity to the Holiday Inn, where he attacked and sexually assaulted its female occupant. The defendant then fell asleep, whereupon the woman left the apartment and called the police. The police apprehended the defendant, still asleep, at the apartment. When the defendant was arrested, he had in his possession a package of "Kool" cigarettes, a class ring engraved with the initials "R.I.R." and other items belonging to Roth. The defendant was then transported to police headquarters, where, the following day, he consented to the search of his hotel room. A search of the room uncovered only a single, unsmoked "Kool" cigarette. Blood stains on the clothing worn by the defendant at the time of his arrest were found to be of the same blood type as that of Roth.

The police conducted a routine computer check which revealed that the defendant had been charged with a homicide in Richmond, Virginia, and had fled that state with the charge still pending. Subsequent to the defendant's[198 Conn. 389] first conviction for the murder of Roth, he was extradited to Virginia where he was convicted of the murder in Richmond and sentenced accordingly. The defendant returned to Connecticut pursuant to a judicial order in order to be present at his second trial.

The defendant did not testify at trial, nor did he concede that he had murdered Roth. Most of the defendant's case consisted of psychiatric testimony concerning his mental illness. Two expert witnesses testified that, at the time of the murder, the defendant was suffering from acute schizophrenia that seriously affected his ability to function and substantially limited his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. See General Statutes § 53a-13. In rebuttal, the state offered one expert who was unable to state conclusively whether or not the defendant was legally sane at the time the murder was committed. The jury was instructed correctly that the state had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt not only the essential elements of the felony murder charge, but also the defendant's sanity at the time of the murder.

I

The defendant claims that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his prior conviction for a murder in Virginia. Prior to trial, the state had disclosed that it intended to introduce various instances of prior misconduct of the defendant, including his Virginia murder conviction. Before the defendant called his first expert witness on insanity, he requested an advance ruling barring the state from cross-examining his witnesses concerning his prior convictions, including the Virginia murder conviction. The court did not rule on the matter at that time, postponing a resolution until the substance of the psychiatrist's testimony had been heard. After the defendant concluded his direct examination[198 Conn. 390] of the expert witness, he renewed his motion to bar evidence of the prior convictions, claiming irrelevance and undue prejudice. ³ The court ruled that the state could

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inquire into the Virginia murder, stating that "when one gets into the question of insanity his entire life opens up, so to speak...." On cross-examination the prosecutor attempted to elicit from the psychiatrist the effect the Virginia murder would have upon his conclusion that the defendant was criminally insane at the time of the murder of Roth. ⁴ The defendant objected to the prosecutor's mention of the detailed circumstances of the Virginia murder because there was no evidence of those facts. On the basis of the prosecutor's improper reference to these facts, the defendant made a motion for a mistrial. The court denied the motion but did instruct the prosecutor to limit his questions to the defendant's conviction for the robbery and murder of a guest at a Holiday Inn in Virginia and to refrain from discussing the facts underlying that conviction. The jury was then instructed to disregard any references to the circumstances of that [198 Conn. 391] crime previously made by the prosecutor. ⁵ The prosecutor resumed cross-examination and the witness testified that the existence of a conviction for a prior similar act was not inconsistent with his conclusion that the defendant was a schizophrenic.

The defendant claims that the trial court should not have admitted evidence of the Virginia murder conviction because its prejudicial effect greatly exceeded its probative value. The basis for the trial court's admission of the defendant's prior murder conviction was that evidence of other crimes, especially those similar to the charged offense, is admissible because "a plea of insanity opens wide the door to all evidence relating to the defendant and his environment." Wilson v. State, 247 Ind. 454, 461, 217 N.E.2d 147 (1966). Recognizing that a plea of insanity triggers a broad inquiry into the defendant's entire life, courts have admitted evidence of prior misconduct because of its significance in showing the mental condition of the defendant, when such evidence would ordinarily be excluded. See Thomason v. State, 46 Ala.App. 10, 237 So.2d 121 (1970); Burgunder v. Arizona, 55 Ariz. 411, 103 P.2d 256 (1940); People v. Vanda, 111 Ill.App.3d 551, 67 Ill.Dec. 373, 444 N.E.2d 609 (1982); Fulmer v. State, 249 Ind. 261, 230 N.E.2d 307 (1967); Wilson v. State, supra; State v. James, 394 So.2d 1197 (La.1981); People v. Wood, 12 N.Y.2d 69, 236 N.Y.S.2d 44, 187 N.E.2d 116 (1962); State v. Johnson, 69 Wash.2d 264,...