State v. Hauck

• Decision Date: 28 December 1976
• Citation: 172 Conn. 140,374 A.2d 150
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Richard HAUCK.

Page 150

374 A.2d 150

172 Conn. 140

STATE of Connecticut v. Richard HAUCK.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 6, 1976.

Decided Dec. 28, 1976.

Walter R. Budney, Old Saybrook, for appellant (defendant).

Ernest J. Diette, Jr., Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were Arnold Markle, State's Atty., and John T. Redway, Asst. State's Atty., for the appellee (state).

Before HOUSE, C. J., and LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, BARBER and MacDONALD, JJ.

MacDONALD, Associate Justice.

On a trial to a jury, the defendant was found guilty of two counts of injury or risk of injury to a minor child in violation of § 53-21 of the General Statutes. On appeal, four of the issues covered by the defendant's preliminary statement are being pursued, namely: (1) whether the court erred in allowing the state to present evidence of other crimes allegedly committed by the defendant; (2) whether the court improperly limited the defendant in his cross-examination of the complaining witness; (3) whether the court erred in allowing the jury to hear tape recordings of conversations between the defendant and the complainant; and (4) whether the court erred in denying the defendant's motion for a supplemental bill of particulars. In order adequately to consider these claimed errors, it is necessary to summarize only the following facts as to which the state produced evidence as set forth in the statements of facts printed in the briefs.

The complaining witness, a minor under the age of sixteen years who shall be referred to simply as Janet, while attending the seventh and eighth grades at the John F. Kennedy Junior High School in Milford, had the defendant, Richard Hauck, as a science teacher. In November, 1971, while discussing her work and grades with her, the defendant told Janet he would give her a "C" in science if she would allow him to photograph her. As a result of this conversation, at various times during the school year ending in 1972, sometimes once or twice a week, the defendant took Janet into the science storage room at the school, locked the door, closed the blinds, instructed her to disrobe and photographed her. On one of these occasions, the defendant touched her private parts and on another occasion took her to a room in a motel and took nude or seminude pictures of her. At the end of the school year, Janet received a "C" in science and told the defendant that she would not pose for any more pictures. During the following school year, some of the pictures turned up at the school and the assistant principal showed some of them, which had come into her possession, to Janet's mother. As a result, Janet related the foregoing story to her mother and, thereafter, to the Milford police.

Pursuant to a plan arranged by the police, Janet, with a microphone concealed on her person, had a conversation with the defendant in the school parking lot during which they discussed the pictures. A portion of that conversation was recorded by the police on tapes which were later played during the trial to the jury. Many parts of the conversation reproduced on the tape recording tended to corroborate Janet's story, as did portions of a telephone conversation between Janet and the defendant recorded by the police and played to the jury. When the defendant was arrested during a meeting with Janet, also arranged by the police, a search of his car disclosed a polaroid camera and some nude photographs, and a search of his home in Old Saybrook, made pursuant to a search warrant, turned up approximately fifty photographs of Janet posed while partially unclothed in the science classroom of the defendant, together with several similar photographs taken in a motel room.

The first claim of error arises from the court's permitting the state to present evidence of other crimes allegedly committed by the defendant with which he was not charged in this case but which the state claimed to show "a common scheme, design or innate peculiarity" in the crime under consideration. The evidence here under attack was testimony elicited from another girl under the age of sixteen years to the effect that during the same school year and the same period of time covered by the information the defendant had been her science teacher at the John F. Kennedy Junior High School in Milford; that during that period, the defendant, on at least five occasions, having requested her to come to his desk to look at some papers, had placed his leg between her legs and that on one such occasion he had placed his hand on her thigh; that at the end of her seventh-grade year he told her that if she stayed after school every day he would give her a passing grade as long as she consented to his touching her in that manner. Timely objection was made to the introduction of this testimony.

We had occasion recently to discuss at length the general rule that prior criminal misconduct may not be shown to prove the bad character of an accused or his tendency to commit criminal acts, together with the well recognized exceptions to that rule, and to review the pertinent authorities. "This court has long recognized the danger of prejudice against the defendant which may result from the admission of such evidence. State v. Gilligan, 92 Conn. 526, 530, 103 A. 649. 'As a general rule, evidence of guilt of other crimes is inadmissible to prove that a defendant is guilty of the crime charged against him.' State v. Holliday, 159 Conn. 169, 172, 268 A.2d 368, quoting from State v. Harris, 147 Conn. 589, 599, 164 A.2d 399. Such evidence is admissible for a variety of other purposes, however, such as 'when it is particularly probative in showing such things as intent, an element in the crime, identity, malice, motive, a system of criminal activity . . ..' (Citations omitted.) 'THAT EVIDENCE TENDS TO PROVE THE COMMISSion of other crimes by the accused does not render it inadmissible if it is otherwise relevant and material; State v. Marshall, 166 Conn. 593, 600, 353 A.2d 756; State v. Holliday, 159 Conn. 169, 172, 268 A.2d 368; see State v. Jenkins, 158 Conn. 149, 152-53, 157, 256 A.2d 223; and if the trial judge determines in the exercise of judicial discretion that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial tendency. State v. Moynahan, 164 Conn. 560, 597, 325 A.2d 199 (cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976, 94 S.Ct. 291, 38 L.Ed.2d 219); State v. Holliday, supra, 159 Conn. 173, 268 A.2d 368.' State v. Ralls, 167 Conn. 408, 417, 356 A.2d 147. . . . In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the correctness of the court's ruling. DiPalma v. Wiesen, 163 Conn. 293, 298, 303 A.2d 709. Reversal is required only where an abuse of discretion is manifest or where injustice appears to have been done. Thomas v. Thomas, 159 Conn. 477, 480, 271 A.2d 62; 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (13th Ed.) § 241. In balancing the grounds advanced by the state for the admission of the evidence against the grounds advanced by the defendant for excluding it, we cannot say that as a matter of law the court abused its discretion in allowing the question to be answered." State v. Brown, 169 Conn. 692, 700-702, 364 A.2d 186, 192.

An examination of recent decisions in other jurisdictions indicates a greater liberality in admitting evidence of other criminal acts to show a common scheme, pattern or design in sex-related crimes. In People v. Mendoza, 37 Cal.App.3d 717, 112 Cal.Rptr. 565, where a man was charged with committing a lewd attack on a thirteen-year-old boy, evidence of a similar sexual offense under similar circumstances against another thirteen-year-old boy was ruled admissible, the court stating (p. 723, 112 Cal.Rptr. p. 568): "Evidence of another sex offense is admissible to show a common scheme or plan if the offense is proximate in time, similar to the offense charged, and committed with persons similar to the prosecuting witness. . . . Admissibility lies within the sound discretion of the trial court . . . and we see no abuse of discretion here. The prior act is not too remote in time." See State v. Thomas, 110 Ariz. 106, 108, 515 P.2d 851; Fields v. State, 255 Ark. 540, 554-55, 502 S.W.2d 480; Thompson v. State, Ind.App., 319 N.E.2d 670, 671; State v. Hampton, 215 Kan. 907, 529 P.2d 127; Hendrickson v. State, 61 Wis.2d 275, 212 N.W.2d 481.

While not previously called upon to decide the precise issue raised here, this court did indicate, in a case having many similarities to the one now before us, that it would consider the introduction of other crime evidence in a sex-related case if properly presented on appeal. In State v. Manning, 162 Conn. 112, 291 A.2d 750, a teacher of a junior high school was charged with four counts of risk of injury to a minor child in committing unspecified indecent assaults upon one of his students. The trial court admitted testimony of two former pupils of the defendant as to similar acts to show, inter alia, a common design in the manner in which the acts were committed. On appeal, the defendant claimed, as here, that such evidence violated the other crimes rule, but since he had not raised that specific objection during the trial, it was not ruled upon. We did, however, observe (p. 119, 291 A.2d p. 754) that "(t) he defendant's brief claims that the testimony of the two girls should not have been admitted because it contained evidence of unrelated criminal acts which may not be admitted to prove the commission of the one charged. The defendant did not object on this ground. The first statement of the court quoted above indicates that it was well aware of the general rule that such evidence was not admissible, but it is also apparent that the court was concerned with whether the offered testimony might fall within an exception to the general rule. See State v. Holliday, 159 Conn. 169, 172, 268 A.2d 368; State v. Jenkins, 158 Conn. 149, 157, 256 A.2d 223; United States v. Deaton, 381 F.2d 114 (2d Cir.). The...