State v. Carter
| Decision Date | 02 August 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 7210SC487,7210SC487 |
| Citation | 190 S.E.2d 241,15 N.C.App. 391 |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Manuel C. CARTER, Jr. |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Atty. Gen. Robert Morgan by Associate Atty. Gen. William Lewis Sauls for the State.
Kirk & Ewell by Clarence M. Kirk, Wendell, for defendant appellant.
The sole question presented is whether the evidence was sufficient to withstand defendant's motion for nonsuit.
At the time of defedant's arrest, G.S. § 20--138 made it unlawful for a person under the influence of intoxicating liquor 'to drive any vehicle upon the highways within this State.' By amendment, effective 1 October 1971, this section was rewritten. It now provides: 'It is unlawful . . . for any person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor to drive Or operate any vehicle upon any highway or Any public vehicular area within this State.' (Emphasis added.) Operator, as defined by the Uniform Driver's License Act, includes a person in the driver's seat of a motor vehicle when the engine is running. G.S. § 20--6.
We are not concerned here with the question of whether, in sitting in the driver's seat of his automobile with the engine running, defendant was operating the vehicle within the meaning of G.S. § 20--138 as amended. The statute, as written at the time of the alleged offense, required the State to prove that defendant (1) drove a vehicle, (2) upon a highway of this State, (3) while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. State v. Kellum, 273 N.C. 348, 160 S.E.2d 76.
The word 'driving', when used in statutes prohibiting the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, is almost universally construed as requiring that the vehicle be in motion. Annot., Driving While Drunk, 47 A.L.R.2d 570. Our Supreme Court has held that the term 'operate', when used in connection with an automobile, clearly imports motion and that holding an automobile motionless by putting one's foot on a brake pedal is not operating the automobile. State v. Hatcher, 210 N.C. 55, 185 S.E. 435. In the instant case the arresting officer never saw defendant's car in motion. The only evidence that defendant drove his car while under the influence of intoxicating liquor was circumstantial.
The test of the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to withstand nonsuit is whether a reasonable inference of defendant's guilt may be drawn from the evidence. If so, it is for the jury to decide whether the facts, taken singly or in combination, satisfy them beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. State v. Cutler, 271 N.C. 379, 156 S.E.2d 679. Put another way, the question here is whether it may be fairly and logically inferred from the circumstantial evidence offered by the State that defendant drove his vehicle on the highway and that he did so while he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. We hold that it may.
Defendant stated to the officer that he had gone to Zebulon earlier that night and was on his way home. This statement, when considered together with evidence that defendant was sitting in the driver's seat of his car while the engine was running; that the car was stopped in its proper lane at a stop sign, and that no one else was in or near the car, would permit the jury logically to infer that defendant drove the car to the intersection where he was found by the officer.
We are of the further opinion that a reasonable inference arises from the evidence that defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor when he drove the car to where it was found. He was highly intoxicated when found by the officer. There was no evidence that he was otherwise physically disabled or that his car was disabled. An open container of beer was within his easy reach. Surely, if defendant had been in full control of his physical and mental faculties, he would not have parked his car, with the lights out and the engine running, on the traveled portion of the road, and then proceeded to get drunk and fall asleep. The most logical conclusion that can be drawn from the circumstances is...
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