State v. Case, 147

Decision Date12 October 1960
Docket NumberNo. 147,147
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE, v. Robert Lee CASE.

T. W. Bruton, Atty. Gen., Glenn L. Hooper, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

O. A. Warren, Gastonia, for defendant Case.

DENNY, Justice.

The appellant's first assignment of error is to the admission of testimony of the State's witness Palmer as to what Mrs. Black told him after he picked her up and while they were on the way to the Lowell police station; and, that the court further erred in stating to the jury that 'Corroborate means to bolster up or to strengthen. It is not substantive testimony--that is, testimony proving any fact within itself.'

Mr. Palmer testified that Mrs. Black stated to him 'that she had been tied up to a tree, and had been given fifteen seconds to live or to get loose--if she didn't they'd come back and kill her.'

Slight variances in corroborating testimony do not render such testimony inadmissible. State v. Walker, 226 N.C. 458, 38 S.E.2d 531; State v. Litteral, 227 N.C. 527, 43 S.E.2d 84. As to the meaning or effect of corroborating testimony, the definition of the word 'corroborate' is given in Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd Edition, at page 444, as meaning 'To strengthen; to add weight or credibility to a thing by additional and confirming facts or evidence,' citing Lassiter v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 171 N.C. 283, 88 S.E. 335, 337.

In the last cited case our Court said: 'The approved definition of the verb 'corroborate' is: '(1) To make strong or to give additional strength to; to strengthen. (2) To make more certain; to confirm; to strengthen."

In the instant case, while the court did instruct the jury at the time the above evidence was admitted that this evidence was offered only as corroborating the testimony of Mrs. Black, the court did not add the usual instruction, to wit, 'if it does so corroborate her testimony.' On the other hand, there was no intimation by the court as to whether or not in its opinion the testimony of the witness did corroborate the testimony of Mrs. Black. It is always a question for the jury to determine whether or not the testimony of one witness does corroborate the testimony of another witness. Lassiter v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., supra. This assignment of error is overruled.

Assignment of error No. 2 is based on exceptions Nos. 13 and 14. These exceptions are directed to the testimony of H. J. Auten as to the statements made by the defendant Shedd in the presence of the defendant appellant, Robert Lee Case, without first determining whether the defendant Case had denied or admitted the statements of the defendant Shedd.

It appears from the record that the only statement Shedd made to Auten while Shedd and Case were together, was that 'he (Shedd) was with Case.'

In the case of State v. Bryant, 235 N.C. 420, 70 S.E.2d 186, 188, this Court, speaking through Winborne, J., now C. J., said: '* * * statements made in the presence and hearing of the accused implicating him in the commission of a crime, to which he makes no reply, are competent against him as implied admissions. State v. Suggs, 89 N.C. 527; State v. Wilson, 205 N.C. 376, 171 S.E. 338; State v. Hawkins, 214 N.C. 326, 199 S.E. 284; State v. Gentry, 228 N.C. 643, 46 S.E.2d 863; State v. Sawyer, 230 N.C. 713, 55 S.E.2d 464; State v. Hendrick, 232 N.C. 447, 61 S.E.2d 349.' This assignment of error is overruled.

These defendants were sent to Dorothea Dix Hospital in Raleigh for examination, as provided by law, to determine whether or not they were mentally competent to stand trial upon the charge on which they had been indicted.

Assignment of error No. 3 is based on exception No. 28 which challenges the testimony of Dr. Andrew L. Laczko, a psychiatrist on the staff of the Dorothea Dix Hospital, on the ground that the testimony about to be offered would not be admissible as substantive evidence. Thereafter, Dr. Laczko, without further objection, testified that in the course of his examination of the defendant Shedd that Shedd told him, "I am being charged with rape, kidnapping and possibly highway robbery.' As for the events that took place, he stated that on a Sunday--he did not specify the date--that he and his uncle, whose name was mentioned as Mr. Case--proceeded to a woman's house, claiming he did not know the location of the house as far as the postal address is concerned. He said without applying any force all three of them, he, Mr. Case, and this lady returned to the car; and Shedd stated to me that he had sexual intercourse with this lady without forcing her to do so.'

The above statements appear to have been made voluntarily by Shedd, and no objection having been interposed to the admission thereof, when admitted they were competent as against him. Where testimony incompetent as to one defendant is admitted without objection and without request that its admission be limited, an exception thereto will not be sustained. State v. Summerlin, 232 N.C. 333, 60 S.E.2d 322; State v. Hendricks, 207 N.C. 873, 178 S.E. 557; Rules of Practice in the Supreme Court, Rule 21, 221 N.C. at page 558.

No objection or exception was interposed to the admission of Dr. Laczko's testimony with respect to what Shedd told him, by either defendant; neither was there any request by the defendant Case that such evidence be admitted only as against Shedd. It would have been error to admit Shedd's statement or statements against Case, had he requested that they be limited as against Shedd only.

Dr. Laczko and Dr. Walter A. Sykes were offered as witnesses by the State with respect to the mental capacity of each of the defendants. It was stipulated by counsel for Shedd and counsel for the appellant Case that these physicians were experts in the field of psychiatry. Both of them testified that they examined the defendants and that Shedd was on the borderline of intelligence; that Case had an I.Q. of 82, 'which is within the range of a dull, normal intelligence.' Each of these doctors testified he had an opinion satisfactory to himself as to whether or not each of the defendants knows the difference between right and wrong, and that in his opinion each of the defendants knew the difference between right and wrong. Evidence with respect to...

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