State v. Patterson

• Decision Date: 17 December 1975
• Docket Number: No. 76,76
• Citation: 288 N.C. 553,220 S.E.2d 600
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. George James PATTERSON, Jr.

Page 600

220 S.E.2d 600

288 N.C. 553

STATE of North Carolina v. George James PATTERSON, Jr.

No. 76.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Dec. 17, 1975.

Atty. Gen. Robert Morgan and Asst. Atty. Gen. Ralf F. Haskell, Raleigh, for the State.

Eddie C. Mitchell, Winston-Salem, for defendant-appellant.

MOORE, Justice.

Defendant strenuously urges there was insufficient evidence to carry the case to the jury on the issues of premeditation and deliberation and the trial court erred in not allowing his motion for a nonsuit on the first degree murder charge. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find sufficient evidence to permit a jury to find premeditation and deliberation. These elements of first degree murder are not usually susceptible to direct proof, but must be established, if at all, from the circumstances surrounding the homicide. State v. Buchanan,287 N.C. 408, 215 S.E.2d 80 (1975); State v. Sanders, 276 N.C. 598, 174 S.E.2d 487 (1970), Rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 948, 91 S.Ct. 2290, 29 L.Ed.2d 860 (1971); State v. Faust, 254 N.C. 101, 118 S.E.2d 769 (1961), Cert. den., 368 U.S. 851, 82 S.Ct. 85, 7 L.Ed.2d 49 (1961). Previously existing hostile feelings between defendant and deceased, State v. Moore,275 N.C. 198, 166 S.E.2d 652 (1969); a prior assault upon the deceased by defendant, State v. Gales, 240 N.C. 319, 82 S.E.2d 80 (1954); the use of grossly excessive force, State v. Buchanan, supra, and killing in an unusually brutal way, State v. Watson, 222 N.C. 672, 24 S.E.2d 540 (1943), have all been held to be circumstances tending to show premeditation and deliberation. There was evidence here of these circumstances and, in addition, evidence of revenge as a probable motive.

Murder in the first degree is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice, premeditation and deliberation. State v. Moore, supra; State v. Faust, supra. If defendant resolved in his mind a fixed purpose to kill his daughter and thereafter, because of that previously formed intent and not because of any legal provocation on her part, deliberately and intentionally killed her with a meat cleaver, a deadly weapon, the three essential elements of murder in the first degree--premeditation, deliberation, and malice--occurred. 'Malice is not only hatred, ill will or spite, as it is ordinarily understood--to be sure that is malice--but it also means that condition of mind which prompts a person to take the life of another intentionally without just cause, excuse, or justification.' State v. Benson, 183 N.C. 795, 799, 111 S.E. 869, 871 (1922). Malice exists as a matter of law 'whenever there has been an unlawful and intentional homicide without excuse or mitigating circumstance.' State v. Baldwin, 152 N.C. 822, 829, 68 S.E. 148, 151 (1910).

The record here contains plenary evidence from which the jury could find that defendant, motivated by ill will and express malice toward his daughter because of her prosecution of him in district court, intentionally killed her. All the following evidence--that he gave her fifteen minutes to leave the house, that he went into the kitchen and got the meat cleaver, and that at the expiration of fifteen minutes struck her numerous blows so that her head was 'partially off. There was a very deep laceration about her neck . . . others under her chin and about her face'--tended to show premeditation and deliberation as well as malice. Hence, defendant's motions for nonsuit were properly overruled.

Defendant next contends it was error to admit into evidence his 17 June confession. Pertinent evidence on this question was as follows:

Sergeant Parker first attempted to question defendant at the Forsyth County Jail on 15 June 1973. He advised defendant fully of his rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Before the jury, Sergeant Parker testified that defendant 'indicated' that he understood his rights. Parker said:

'. . . After we advised him, he wanted to call his attorney, Mr. Braddy. He talked with someone on the phone and told us he would tell us what we wanted to know, but not then. The next time we attempted to question him was on the seventeenth at the county jail, then at the detective office.'

Sergeant Parker and Sergeant Brown at the jail on 17 June 1973 again asked defendant if he wanted to talk. Parker testified:

'He said he wanted to talk to us, so we took him across the street. We again advised him of his Constitutional Rights on June 17, 1973.'

In response to a question as to whether in his opinion defendant then understood his rights, Sergeant Parker testified over objection:

'In my opinion, he understood them. He indicated that he did. We did not threaten him. We simply asked him if he wanted to tell us what happened, and he said he did. He said he wanted to call his daughter. He used the phone.'

At this point the jury was excused and a Voir dire hearing conducted to determine the admissibility of the confession. During this hearing Sergeant Parker again testified that in his opinion defendant understood his rights. With regard to the statement itself, Sergeant Parker said:

'. . . We wrote it down, read it back to him, had him read it, and he signed it. He made two corrections; one on page two adding 'in my room' and on page three adding 'my,' my house, then he signed it. Sergeant Brown and myself witnessed his signature on each page. When he corrected it, I read it to him--he read it himself. There were no promises made or threats made while we took the statement by anyone.'

Sergeant Parker, on cross-examination, admitted that on 17 June defendant 'refused to sign the waiver of rights after we had advised him of his rights. . . . He said he did not want a lawyer, but wanted to call his daughter. He then made a voluntary statement, and didn't ask us to stop at any time.' When asked whether defendant refused to sign the waiver because he didn't understand it, Sergeant Parker said he would not deny this but that he did not remember exactly defendant's reason for refusing. He testified that they read and reread the written waiver to defendant and 'when we asked him did he understand it, he said, 'Yes.' We asked him to sign it, and he refused.'

Sergeant G. D. Brown also testified on Voir dire that on 17 June 1973 Sergeant Parker advised defendant of all of his rights as required by Miranda, fully detailing them. When asked on direct examination whether in his opinion defendant understood his rights, Sergeant Brown testified:

'I believe he understood. He didn't want an attorney, but he wanted to call his daughter. He said he understood the rights. I was present while Sergeant Parker did the interrogating and wrote it down. After it was completed, Sergeant Parker read the statement back to Mr. Patterson, then Mr. Patterson read it and made a couple of corrections. Then he signed it. We witnessed his signature. There were no threats or promises made at any time.

'The interrogation lasted about an hour. It does not contain everything that Mr. Patterson said, just the general basis of it.'

During cross-examination the court asked Sergeant Brown, 'Did he say he wanted to go ahead and make a statement?' Brown replied, 'Yes, sir, he did. He made the phone call and after he did, he sat back down and said he was ready to talk to us.'

Defendant's evidence on Voir dire was to this effect: Jim Moore, a deputy clerk of court, testified that he was present at defendant's preliminary hearing on 26 July 1973, and that Mr. George Braddy appeared then on behalf of the defendant as his attorney and presented an order to send defendant for a mental examination. Mr. Reginald Moore, official court reporter in Forsyth County, testified that he reported defendant's trial before Judge Armstrong in January 1974. His official record of the trial proceeding indicated that Sergeant D. B. Parker had testified as follows:

'Q. Mr. Patterson didn't sign a waiver of rights, did he?

'A. No, sir. He refused to sign one.

'Q. Isn't the reason he refused to sign it because you refused to give him the attorney he wanted?

'A. No, sir. He said he just wouldn't sign anything.

'Q. He wouldn't sign anything?

'A. Not unless he knew what it was.'

Mr. Curtis Todd, an attorney practicing in Winston-Salem, testified that he had represented defendant in the past and that he talked with defendant 'shortly after the alleged occurrence by telephone from City Hall or the jail. He wanted me to come down there and talk to him but I told him I could not.'

Defendant testified essentially that after being 'questioned' about his constitutional rights he did not make a statement because he wanted an attorney present. The asked for lawyer George W. Braddy 'but Sergeant Parker said he didn't know him, so I asked for another lawyer.' Sergeant Parker wouldn't let him call another one because Parker wanted him to sign the rights waiver. Two or three days later, the officers took him across the street where he then refused to sign the waiver because he didn't have a lawyer present, stating, 'I wanted Attorney Braddy present before I signed anything.' Braddy had represented him in his assault trial on 14 June and visited him at the jail on 18 June for the purpose of collecting a balance due on Braddy's fee. On Sunday morning, 17 June, Sergeant Parker asked him if he wanted any other lawyer and he replied that he would like to call Curtis Todd who had handled a civil matter for him earlier and whose number he knew. Sergeant Parker called and talked with Todd, and then allowed defendant to talk with Todd. Defendant testified, 'They forced a statement out of me,' and that he, in fact, did not sign the statement.

Curtis Todd, being recalled, testified defendant called him twice and one time could have been on a Sunday when defendant was in custody. Todd said, 'I know he was in custody because the officer did get me and put him on the phone.'

Defendant offered...