State v. Cash
| Decision Date | 14 June 1941 |
| Docket Number | 726. |
| Citation | 15 S.E.2d 277,219 N.C. 818 |
| Parties | STATE v. CASH. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Criminal prosecution tried upon indictment charging the defendant with the murder of his wife, Ruth Copley Cash.
Verdict Guilty of murder in the first degree whereof he stands indicted.
Judgment Death by asphyxiation.
The prisoner appeals, assigning errors.
Harry McMullan, Atty. Gen., and T. W. Bruton and G. B. Patton Asst. Attys. Gen., for the State.
E C. Brooks, Jr., of Durham, for defendant.
The record discloses that on the morning of 17 September, 1940, the defendant fired three shots at his wife as she was fleeing from him, crying for help, and he in pursuit. The shots proved fatal. It was about 7:00 A. M. The deceased had started to her work. She was crossing the street in front of her house when she first saw the defendant and began to run, at the same time calling for help. As the defendant gave pursuit, their little girl was jumping up and down and screaming, "Don't let him kill my mother". The race continued for about 167 steps when the first shot was fired. . The evidence shows a clear case of murder in the first degree, and the jury has so found. State v. Keaton, 205 N.C. 607, 172 S.E. 179.
The defendant pleaded that he was insane at the time of the homicide, due to the continued use of liquor, morphine and other opiates, and that he had no recollection of the killing. State v. Lee, 196 N.C. 714, 146 S.E. 858. The jury rejected his plea of insanity or mental irresponsibility. State v. Jones, 203 N.C. 374, 166 S.E. 163.
The principal exceptions taken during the trial are those addressed (1) to comments made by the judge on the competency of evidence, (2) to the admission and exclusion of testimony, and (3) to portions of the charge.
First. The remark made by the judge to counsel for defendant in answer to his argument directed to the competency of certain evidence, "I am against you on that", amounted to no more than a ruling upon the evidence. Such was its purpose and intent. It is not perceived how the remark could have been hurtful to the defendant. State v. Puett, 210 N.C. 633, 188 S.E. 75. There are other exceptions of similar import, not necessary to be set out. They fall in the same category. It is conceded that any intimation of the presiding judge, made in the presence of the jury, that a disputed fact in the case has been fully or sufficiently established, is reversible error. State v. Kline, 190 N.C. 177, 129 S.E. 417. The remarks here challenged are not of such character.
Second. Numerous exceptions were taken to the admission and exclusion of evidence. The defendant chiefly complains in this respect that while he was in jail specimens of his blood and urine were taken for chemical analyses to determine the presence or absence of alcohol and morphine in his system. In this way, the defendant contends, he was compelled to give evidence against himself in violation of the constitutional inhibition against compulsory self-incrimination. Const. Art. I, Sec. 11.
Both sides have directed their attention to this question in thorough fashion, but the record fails to disclose any compulsion on the part of the officers in obtaining specimens of the defendant's blood and urine. The exceptions are therefore feckless. State v. Eccles, 205 N.C. 825 172 S.E. 415. They are not sustained. It is the rule in this jurisdiction that physical facts discovered by witnesses on information furnished by the defendant may be given in evidence, even where knowledge of such facts is obtained in a privileged manner, State v. Garrett, 71 N.C. 85, 17 Am.Rep. 1 (examination by physician), by force, State v. Graham, 74 N.C. 646, 21 Am.Rep. 493 (), by intimidation, duress, etc. Factual information thus brought to light is competent evidence, though the declarations of the accused made at the time, if obtained by improper influence, are to be excluded. State...
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