State v. Jones

• Decision Date: 26 October 1932
• Docket Number: 241.
• Citation: 166 S.E. 163,203 N.C. 374
• Parties: STATE v. JONES.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

166 S.E. 163

203 N.C. 374

STATE v. JONES.

No. 241.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

October 26, 1932

Appeal from Superior Court, Wake County; Devin, Judge.

Jake Jones was convicted of murder in the first degree, and he appeals.

No error.

Where there was no duress, threat, or inducement, confession made while accused was under arrest held competent.

Criminal prosecution tried upon an indictment charging the prisoner with the murder of one J. H. Poole.

Verdict Guilty of murder in the first degree.

Judgment Death by electrocution.

The prisoner appeals, assigning errors.

W. Y Bickett, of Raleigh, and W. T. Hatch, of Millbrook, for appellant.

D. G Brummitt, Atty. Gen., and A. A. F. Seawell, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

STACY C.J.

The evidence on behalf of the state tends to show that on the night of October 26, 1931, the prisoner, a colored boy 18 or 19 years of age, went out on the Milbournie road to Circle Filling Station No. 2, about one-half mile from the city of Raleigh, for the purpose of robbing said filling station. He was armed with a 32-caliber Smith & Wesson revolver. As he approached the station, he saw J. M. Jackson, the manager, and J. H. Poole, the night watchman, standing by an open fire in the yard. It was a cold night. After waiting a few minutes, while a number of cars were passing along the highway, the prisoner fired from ambush in the direction of the two men, hitting the night watchman who fell to the ground before reaching the door of the filling station. The prisoner then approached his victim and shot him again while he was down. He entered the filling station and robbed the cash register of part of its contents, retreating just in time to escape the return fire of the manager, J. M. Jackson. The injured watchman was rushed to the hospital where he died shortly thereafter.

The prisoner was arrested at the home of George Garner with whom he lived. At the time of his arrest he had a Smith & Wesson pistol under his pillow. He informed the officers that George Garner needed some money to pay his house rent, and had told him to go to the filling station, which place he had robbed before, and get the money; that he undertook to do so, arming himself with his Smith & Wesson pistol; that he did not intend to shoot Mr. Poole, but did intend to shoot Mr. Jackson as the latter had shot him in the arm about a month before while he was robbing the filling station; and that he divided the money he got on the night of the homicide with George Garner.

The principal question presented by the appeal is the competency of the prisoner's confession made to the officers while under arrest. State v. Livingston, 202 N.C. 809, 164 S.E. 337; State v. Myers, 202 N.C. 351, 162 S.E. 764; and State v. Davis, 125 N.C. 612, 34 S.E. 198, are cited as authorities for its exclusion.

Voluntary confessions are admissible in evidence against the party making them; involuntary confessions are not. A confession is voluntary in law when, and only when, it was in fact voluntarily made. State v. Newsome, 195 N.C. 552, 143 S.E. 187.

It has been held in a number of cases that, where there is no duress, threat, or inducement, and the judge finds there was none here, State v. Whitener, 191 N.C. 659, 132 S.E. 603, the fact of arrest or incarceration of the defendant when the confession is made does not ipso facto render it incompetent. State v. Newsome, supra; State v. Drakeford, 162 N.C. 667, 78 S.E. 308; State v. Lance, 166 N.C. 411, 81 S.E. 1092; State v. Jones, 145 N.C. 466, 59 S.E. 353; State v. Bohanon, 142 N.C. 695, 55 S.E. 797; State v. Horner, 139 N.C. 603, 52 S.E. 136, 4 Ann. Cas. 841; State v. Exum, 138 N.C. 599, 50 S.E. 283; State v. Flemming, 130 N.C. 688, 41 S.E. 549. "We are not aware of any decision which holds a confession, otherwise voluntary, inadmissible because of the number of officers present at the time it was made; nor has the diligence of counsel discovered any." State v. Gray, 192 N.C. 594, 135 S.E. 535.

Speaking to the subject in Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 207, 28 L.Ed. 262, Mr. Justice Harlan, delivering the opinion of the court, said: "While some of the adjudged cases indicate distrust of confessions which are not judicial, it is certain, as observed by Baron Parke in Regina v. Baldry, 2 Den. Cr. Cas. 430, 445, that the rule against their admissibility has been sometimes carried too far, and in its application justice and common sense have too frequently been sacrificed at the shrine of mercy. A confession, if freely and voluntarily made, is evidence of the most satisfactory character. Such a confession, said Eyre, C. B., King v. Warickshall, 1 Leach, 263, 'is deserving of the highest credit, because it is presumed to flow from the strongest sense of guilt, and, therefore, it is admitted as proof of the crime to which it refers."'

And in State v. Patrick, 48 N.C. 443, Nash, C.J., animadverted on the subject as follows:

"Baron Eyre, in Rex v. Hearne, 4 Car. & Payne, 215, (19 E. C. L. 350,) observes, a free and voluntary confession is deserving of the highest credit, because it is presumed to flow from the strongest sense of guilt, and, therefore, it is admitted as proof of the crime to which it refers; but a confession wrung from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear,

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