State v. Castaneda
| Decision Date | 13 December 1999 |
| Docket Number | 98-835 |
| Parties | NOTICE! No decision has been made on publication of this opinion. The opinion is subject to modification or correction by the court and is not final until the time for rehearing or further review has passed. An unpublished opinion of the court of appeals MAY NOT BE CITED by a court or by a party in any other action. The official published opinions of the Iowa Court of Appeals are those published in the North Western Reporter published by West Group. STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JOHN CASTANEDA, Defendant-Appellant./ 98-835 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA Filed |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Dewie J. Gaul (motions), Michael S. Walsh (motions and first trial), and Phillip S. Dandos (second trial and sentencing), Judges.
John Castaneda appeals from the judgment and sentence entered after a jury convicted him of the crime of second-degree sexual abuse. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan J. Japuntich, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas S. Tauber, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas S. Mullin, County Attorney, and Paul E. Kittredge, Jr., Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by Streit, P.J., and Vogel and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
A. Error Preservation 5
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 6
1. Standard of Review 6
2. The Prejudice Prong under Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 6
3. Castaneda Suffered No Prejudice as the Videotape
Was Admissible under Iowa Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5) 7
a. Sara was unavailable under Iowa Rule of Evidence 804(a)(4) 8
b. Sara's videotaped statement was trustworthy 11
c. The statement was material, necessary, and in the interest of justice 12
d. That Castaneda suffered no prejudice the evidence was admissible 12
4. Because Admission of the Videotape Did Not Violate the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment, Castaneda Suffered No Prejudice 13
5. Castaneda Suffered No Prejudice as the Videotape Did Not
Violate Iowa Rule of Evidence 404; Nor Was It Overly
Prejudicial under Iowa Rule of Evidence 40315
A. Standard of Review18
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Finding the Evidence Relevant
as to Intent 18
A. Standard of Review 19
B. The Evidence Supports Castaneda's Conviction.19
The tender bond between parent and child may be unmendably snapped by the by the weight of sexual abuse. John Castaneda's daughter made such an allegation of abuse, and her descriptive words were memorialized on videotape. Castaneda was convicted of sexual abuse and now appeals, claiming the trial court erred in (1) admitting into evidence the videotaped statement of his daughter contrary to Iowa Rules of Evidence 803(24), 804(b)(5), 403, and 404, as well as his constitutional rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) admitting the testimony of his ex-wife; and (3) not granting his motions for judgment of acquittal and new trial. Finding no merit to his claims, we affirm.
On June 3, 1996, the State filed a four-count trial information charging John Castaneda with three counts of sexual abuse in the second degree and one count of indecent contact with a child. A videotaped interview between the victim, Castaneda's adopted daughter Sara, and a social worker with the Child Protection Center in Sioux City supported the charges. During the course of the interview, the social worker asked numerous questions designed to ensure Sara's ability to discern between true and false statements and to recognize the consequences for lying. The social worker also stressed the need for honesty no matter the subject matter. Sara detailed a number of individual instances of sexual abuse perpetrated by Castaneda.
The State sought admission of the videotaped statement under Iowa Rules of Evidence 803(24) and 804(b)(5) and Iowa Code section 910A.14(3) (1997). The court ruled the videotape admissible under rule 804(b)(5), if Sara was unavailable for trial. Immediately before trial the court ruled Sara unavailable based on a doctor's report finding Sara suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder, that forcing her to testify would exacerbate her condition thus causing further psychological harm, and her current mental condition would prevent her from communicating the events surrounding the abuse. The trial ended with a hung jury, and the court granted a mistrial.
Prior to the second trial Castaneda renewed his challenge regarding Sara's availability and additionally challenged the testimony of his ex-wife, Patricia Johnson. Johnson was to testify that on two separate instances she had performed oral sex on Castaneda while he watched children play on a school playground. The State, offering the testimony as evidence of Castaneda's intent, linked this behavior to the alleged criminal conduct through expert testimony. The State's expert testified sex offenders often begin by fantasizing and then progress toward physically acting on their desires. The court continued to find Sara unavailable based on updated medical documentation and ruled Johnson's testimony, based on the expert's testimonial foundation, relevant as to intent. Castaneda's trial counsel affirmatively stated there was no objection to the videotape at trial but did renew his objection regarding Johnson's testimony. The jury convicted Castaneda on one count of second-degree sexual abuse and acquitted him of all other charges. The court sentenced Castaneda to a term of imprisonment not to exceed twenty-five years.
Castaneda appeals contending the trial court erred in (1) admitting into evidence the videotaped statement of Sara contrary to Iowa Rules of Evidence 803(24), 804(b)(5), 403, and 404, as well as his constitutional rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) admitting the testimony of Patricia Johnson; and (3) not granting his motions for judgment of acquittal and new trial. He further contends ineffective assistance of trial counsel if error was not preserved as to any issue.
Castaneda claims admission of the videotape was contrary to Iowa Rules of Evidence 803(24), 804(b)(5), 403, and 404, as well as his constitutional rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.1
A. Error Preservation.
Castaneda objected to the admission of the videotape numerous times throughout the course of both proceedings. Normally, "an adverse ruling on a pretrial suppression motion will suffice to preserve error for appellate review even though there is no attendant trial objection to the controverted material when offered in evidence." State v. Wright, 441 N.W.2d 364, 366 (Iowa 1989). Castaneda, however, did not simply fail to renew his pretrial objection at the second trial; his counsel affirmatively stated there was "no objection" to the videotape. An affirmative statement claiming no objection to evidence previously litigated in pretrial hearings waives all prior objections. State v. Terry, 569 N.W.2d 364, 368-69 (Iowa 1997); State v. Schmidt, 312 N.W.2d 517, 517-18 (Iowa 1981). Castaneda's claims of evidentiary and constitutional error are not preserved for review strictly on the merits. We nevertheless consider his evidentiary and constitutional arguments under the rubric of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. State v. Johnson, 534 N.W.2d 118, 127 (Iowa App. 1995).
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
1. Standard of Review.
Normally, "we preserve claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised on direct appeal for postconviction proceedings to allow full development of the facts surrounding counsel's conduct." State v. Query, 594 N.W.2d 438, 444 (Iowa App. 1999). Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel may be resolved on direct appeal "when the record is adequate to decide the issue." Id. We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. State v. Brooks, 555 N.W.2d 446, 448 (Iowa 1996).2
2. The Prejudice Prong under Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
Our ultimate concern in claims of ineffective assistance is with the "'fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged.'" State v. Risdal, 404 N.W.2d 130, 131 (Iowa 1987) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984)). The burden is on the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted. Risdal, 404 N.W.2d at 131-32. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim may be disposed of if the defendant fails to prove either prong. State v. Cook, 565 N.W.2d 611, 614 (Iowa 1997). Therefore, we may affirm Castaneda's conviction based on his failure to prove prejudice without deciding whether his counsel failed to perform an essential duty. See State v. Hoeck, 547 N.W.2d 852, 863 (Iowa App. 1996). The test for prejudice is whether counsel's failure worked to the defendant's actual and substantial disadvantage to the extent a reasonable probability exists that but for the trial attorney's unprofessional errors, the resulting conviction would have been different. Johnson, 534 N.W.2d at 128. A reasonable probability is one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. State v. Kone, 557 N.W.2d 97, 102 (Iowa App. 1996).
3. Castaneda Suffered No Prejudice as the Videotape Was Admissible under
Iowa Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5).
For Castaneda to establish prejudice on hearsay grounds, he must show the trial court would have ruled the videotape inadmissible had trial counsel not remained silent or renewed the objection. Because the evidence was admissible under the residual hearsay exception prescribed in Iowa Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5), Castaneda cannot, by a preponderance of the evidence, carry his...
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