State v. Castillo-Alvarez, No. 9-324/08-0868 (Iowa App. 9/2/2009)

• Decision Date: 02 September 2009
• Docket Number: No. 9-324/08-0868.,9-324/08-0868.
• Parties: STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUAN HUMBERTO CASTILLO-ALVAREZ, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Court of Appeals

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STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUAN HUMBERTO CASTILLO-ALVAREZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 9-324/08-0868.

Court of Appeals of Iowa.

Filed September 2, 2009

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clay County, Don E. Courtney, Judge.

Defendant appeals the district court's ruling denying his motion to dismiss. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Patrick Thomas Parry of Forker and Parry, Sioux City, for appellant.

Juan Humberto Castillo-Alvarez, Newton, pro se.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon K. Hall, Assistant Attorney General, Charles N. Thoman, Assistant Attorney General, and Michael J. Houchins, County Attorney, for appellee.

Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel and Potterfield, JJ., and Huitink, S.J.^*

SACKETT, C.J.

Defendant, Juan Humberto Castillo-Alvarez, appeals from his convictions of murder in the second degree, kidnapping in the second degree, and conspiracy to commit a forcible felony following the kidnapping and death of Gregory "Sky" Erickson in June of 1997.¹ Defendant raises a number of challenges to his convictions including a claim that the district court erred in overruling his motion to dismiss based on the State's failure to comply with its responsibility to guarantee his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article one section ten of the Iowa Constitution, and provided for by the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure. We find that the State failed to meet its burden to show good cause for failing to comply with the speedy trial requirement. We reverse on this issue and remand to the district court to enter an order dismissing the case.

SPEEDY TRIAL CHALLENGE.

The defendant contends that his speedy trial rights were violated by the lengthy time between the filing of the trial information and his arrest. The State contends that the district court exercised its discretion in finding the delay was attributable to defendant and there was a good cause for delaying his trial beyond the speedy trial requirement.

The following relevant facts are not disputed. A trial information charging defendant with the crimes for which he was convicted was filed in Clay County, Iowa on September 20, 2004, and defendant was arrested in Mexico on October 24, 2005, some 399 days after the filing of the information.

Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)(b),² directs that the State has to bring a defendant to trial within ninety days after he or she has been indicted. The State is bound by this rule even if it files charges by trial information rather than by indictment, State v. Clark, 351 N.W.2d 532, 534 (Iowa 1984), and even if the formal charges precede the arrest, as in this case. See State v. Olson, 528 N.W.2d 651, 654 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). Failure to comply with the ninety-day rule requires dismissal unless, (1) the defendant has waived speedy trial, (2) the delay is attributable to the defendant, or (3) other good cause explains the delay. State v. Campbell, 714 N.W.2d 622, 627-28 (Iowa 2006); State v. Miller, 637 N.W.2d 201, 204 (Iowa 2001); State v. Orte, 541 N.W.2d 895, 898 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995).

In addressing this narrow issue we only look to evidence of delay attributable to the defendant and of other good cause to explain the delay. We review a trial court's ruling on the motion to dismiss based on speedy-trial grounds for an abuse of discretion. Campbell, 714 N.W.2d at 627; State v. Nelson, 600 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Iowa 1999). This discretion is circumscribed though and the court may only refuse to dismiss the case when the State carries its burden of proving good cause for the delay. State v. Winters, 690 N.W.2d 903, 907-08 (Iowa 2005); State v. Bond, 340 N.W.2d 276, 279 (Iowa 1983). The State's burden is a heavy one. State v. Miller, 311 N.W.2d 81, 84 (Iowa 1981). We will reverse a finding of good cause if no reasonable basis in the record supports the trial court's finding. State v. Albertsen, 228 N.W.2d 94, 98 (Iowa 1975).

Iowa's rule is more stringent than its constitutional counterpart recognized in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972). Miller, 637 N.W.2d at 204-05; Nelson, 600 N.W.2d at 600; Bond, 340 N.W.2d at 278; State v. Petersen, 288 N.W.2d 332, 335 (Iowa 1980). We, in determining whether there is good cause for the delay, are directed to focus on one factor: the reason for the delay. Miller, 637 N.W.2d at 205. The surrounding circumstances are evaluated only to the extent that they relate to the sufficiency of the reason for delay. Campbell, 714 N.W.2d at 628. If the delay has been a long one, as it was here, a stronger reason is necessary to constitute good cause. Miller, 637 N.W.2d at 205. The decisive inquiry is whether events that impeded the progress of the case and were attributable to the defendant or to some other good cause for delay served as a matter of practical necessity to move the trial date beyond the initial ninety-day period. Campbell, 714 N.W.2d at 628. The rule is clear and recent cases reflect that Iowa appellate courts have enforced it where good cause or defendant's actions were not responsible for the delay. Winters, 690 N.W.2d at 908-09 (finding a six-week delay and that State provided no good cause for the delay); Miller, 637 N.W.2d at 204-06 (finding a one-day delay and that State provided no good cause for the delay); Nelson, 600 N.W.2d at 600 (finding a 137-day delay and that court congestion did not furnish good cause for the delay); State v. Smith, 573 N.W.2d 14, 18 (Iowa 1997) (finding a thirty-five day delay but determining that State supplied good cause when delay was due to the fact that defendant had trial on other related charges within ninety-day period and had requested the charges be tried separately); State v. Hart, 703 N.W.2d 768, 772-73 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005) (finding a one-day delay and that court congestion did not furnish good cause).

The following history is relevant to understanding the district court's ruling. Erickson's body was found on June 14, 1997. Shortly thereafter a trial information, not at issue here, charging defendant and others with crimes connected with Erickson's death was filed in Clay County. Defendant was also indicted with others on federal charges and a federal warrant was issued for his arrest. The State charges were dismissed in July of 1997 without prejudice. Defendant, who is not a United States citizen, was at the time of Erickson's death living in Estherville, Iowa, under an assumed name. Defendant subsequently went to Mexico. He was located in Matamoros, Mexico, and arrested by Mexican police in November of 1997. At that time authorities learned that he was a Mexican citizen who had been living in the United States under an assumed name. The federal charges were ultimately dismissed after it was determined that defendant could not be extradited³ and he was released in 1998 and continued to live in Mexico. Reports indicated he continued to generally stay in Matamoros and was frequently at his father's home.

On July 19, 2004, United States authorities requested that Mexican authorities arrest defendant on the dismissed federal charges and told them that State charges would be forthcoming. A provisional warrant for defendant's arrest was issued in Mexico on July 21, 2004. On September 20, 2004, the Clay County attorney filed a trial information charging defendant with the crimes for which he was convicted. It was not until October 24, 2005, that defendant was arrested on these charges in Mexico. The record is silent as to where or how he was arrested. Nor does the record reveal that Mexican authorities had difficulty locating him or whether U.S. authorities took any action to encourage an earlier arrest by Mexican authorities. He was extradited to this country on September 20, 2006.⁴

Defendant correctly argues that his speedy trial rights were violated unless the State can prove good cause exists for the delay. The State claims the delay is attributable to the defendant and for other good cause because (1) Castillo lived in Iowa under a false name and fled the state after learning of the investigation, and (2) the State acted diligently in seeking Castillo's arrest between September 20, 2004, and October 24, 2005, but arrest was delayed because the State was dependent on Mexican authorities to execute the arrest warrant. The district court concluded the State met its burden of proving good cause, finding

Although it was known, or at least strongly suspected, that Defendant was in Mexico, it cannot fairly be said that the State was ever privy to Defendant's exact location. In addition, Defendant was attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution by seeking refuge in a foreign country precisely at the time when he became a suspect in Erickson's murder. Finally, there is little question that the State exercised due diligence in attempting to find Defendant. It remained in contact with federal authorities, as well as the U.S. Department of State, in order to discover Defendant's whereabouts and, ultimately, secure his release back to the United States. The length of time required by this endeavor does not reflect a lack of effort on the part of the State, but rather the combination of Defendant's skill at evading arrest and the considerable procedural requirements that must be met for extradition to be granted.

"Ordinarily the absence of defendant may constitute `good cause' for delay." State v. Brandt, 253 N.W.2d 253, 258 (Iowa 1977). Although the State, not the defendant, is obligated to bring a defendant to trial, delay caused by the defendant may constitute good cause preventing the State from carrying out its obligation. State v. Lyles, 225 N.W.2d 124, 126 (Iowa 1975). "[A] defendant may not actively, or passively, participate in the events which delay his or her trial and then later take advantage of that delay to terminate the prosecution." State v. Ruiz, 496 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992). Nonetheless,...