State v. Castleman
| Citation | 969 N.W.2d 169 |
| Decision Date | 06 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | No. 20210011,20210011 |
| Parties | STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Brent Allen CASTLEMAN, Defendant and Appellant |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of North Dakota |
Christopher W. Nelson, Assistant State's Attorney, Minot, N.D., for plaintiff and appellee.
Kyle R. Craig, Minot, N.D., for defendant and appellant.
[¶1] Brent Castleman appeals from a criminal judgment after a jury convicted him of child abuse. He argues there was insufficient evidence to establish a mental injury. We reverse.
[¶2] Castleman was charged with four counts of child neglect and six counts of child abuse. After the preliminary hearing, the district court dismissed the child neglect charges for a lack of probable cause. Castleman moved to dismiss the remaining charges, and the court dismissed three of the child abuse counts. Castleman went to trial on the remaining three counts of child abuse, including abuse of a child under the age of six by willfully inflicting mental injury to the child, a class B felony. This count alleged he had caused the child mental injury by assaulting the child's mother in view of the child.
[¶3] At trial, the mother testified she was in her daughter's bedroom when Castleman entered the room, screamed at her, held her by the neck, and pushed her face into a pillow. Castleman said to his wife, "I'll rip your fucking head off your fucking torso." Their daughter was on the bed with the mother during the incident. The mother testified her daughter was "really scared," "shaking," and "cr[ied] a little bit." The mother recorded audio of the incident using her phone, which was hidden under a pillow. The recording was played for the jury. The recording includes Castleman threatening, arguing with, and yelling at his wife. The daughter can be heard crying for a few seconds during the recording.
[¶4] At the close of the State's case, Castleman moved for a judgment of acquittal on all counts. The district court granted the motion for one count, allowing the jury to decide the two remaining counts. During deliberations, the jury submitted a question asking for the definition of mental injury. The court's response simply referred the jury back to the instructions already given and directed them to apply their collective understanding. The jury returned a guilty verdict on count 1, child abuse by mental injury, and a not guilty verdict on count 2, which alleged Castleman had inflicted bodily injury on another child by punching him in the face.
[¶5] The State argues Castleman failed to preserve any issue regarding a definition of mental injury by not objecting to jury instructions or offering a definition to be included in the instructions. Castleman preserved the issue of sufficiency of the evidence for review on appeal by moving for judgment of acquittal under N.D.R.Crim.P. 29. State v. O'Toole , 2009 ND 174, ¶ 8, 773 N.W.2d 201. Where a claim of insufficient evidence is preserved for appeal, related issues of statutory interpretation are also preserved for appeal. Id. at ¶¶ 10-12.
[¶6] When reviewing the record to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction, we do not weigh conflicting evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. O'Toole , 2009 ND 174, ¶ 8, 773 N.W.2d 201. We reverse a conviction for insufficient evidence "only when, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and giving the prosecution the benefit of all inferences reasonably to be drawn in its favor, no rational fact finder could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
[¶7] A person is guilty of child abuse if the person is "a parent ... who willfully inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon the child mental injury or bodily injury, substantial bodily injury, or serious bodily injury as defined by section 12.1-01-04 ...." N.D.C.C. § 14-09-22(1). At issue here is whether there was sufficient evidence of "mental injury" to support the conviction. Whether there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction first requires us to interpret "mental injury."
[¶8] We review issues of statutory interpretation as follows:
Statutory interpretation is a question of law. Statutes must be construed as a whole and harmonized to give meaning to related provisions, and are interpreted in context to give meaning and effect to every word, phrase, and sentence. In construing statutes, we consider the context of the statutes and the purposes for which they were enacted. When a general statutory provision conflicts with a specific provision in the same or another statute, the two must be construed, if possible, so that effect may be given to both provisions. When statutes relate to the same subject matter, this Court makes every effort to harmonize and give meaningful effect to each statute.
State v. Nupdal , 2021 ND 200, ¶ 5, 966 N.W.2d 547.
[¶9] Unless defined or explained in the code, a word in a statute is "understood in [its] ordinary sense, unless a contrary intention plainly appears." N.D.C.C. § 1-02-02 ; O'Toole , 2009 ND 174, ¶ 11, 773 N.W.2d 201. Although the code defines the three variations of "bodily injury" in § 14-09-22(1), it provides no corresponding definition for "mental injury." Castleman urges the Court to apply Minnesota's statutory definition of mental injury, which is "an injury to the psychological capacity or emotional stability of a child as evidenced by an observable or substantial impairment in the child's ability to function within a normal range of performance and behavior with due regard to the child's culture." Minn. Stat. § 260E.03, subd. 13 (2020) ; see also Minn. Stat. § 626.556, subd. 2(f) (repealed 2020) (same). The State argues the words are to be understood in their ordinary sense, but offers no definition.
[¶10] During the trial, neither party proposed a definition to include in the jury instructions. The district court did not define "mental injury" in the jury instructions. In response to a question during deliberations about the meaning of "mental injury," the court simply referred the jurors back to the instructions already provided and directed them to apply "their collective understanding." The previously-provided instructions included a pattern instruction directing the jury "in considering the evidence in this case, you may apply to the facts and circumstances matters of common knowledge." We have held a jury, in reaching a verdict, may use any reasonable definition of a common word that is not specifically defined in the instructions. O'Toole , 2009 ND 174, ¶ 12, 773 N.W.2d 201.
[¶11] In O'Toole , we considered a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction for reckless endangerment by "creat[ing] a substantial risk of serious bodily injury or death to another." 2009 ND 174, ¶ 9, 773 N.W.2d 201. On appeal, the defendant argued he did not "create" the situation resulting in the risk of injury. Id. at ¶ 10. The Court concluded the word was not ambiguous and its plain meaning included a definition found in an ordinary dictionary: "to produce or bring about by a course of action or behavior." Id. at ¶ 11 (citing Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 532 (2002)). The code did not define the word "create," and no jury instruction was provided to define the term. Id. at ¶¶ 11-12. Relying in part on the common knowledge instruction, we concluded: "The jury could use any reasonable definition of the word ‘create’ in deciding whether O'Toole was guilty." Id. at ¶ 12. Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we concluded that by applying a reasonable definition of this commonly-used verb, the jury could have found the evidence supported a guilty verdict. Id. at ¶ 14.
[¶12] Here we are not presented with a simple action verb in common use for which the jury's common knowledge may yield a widely accepted, reasonable definition. Unlike "create," which we left to the jury's common knowledge of reasonable definitions, or "obtain," to which we applied a similar rule after a bench trial, the term "mental injury" is not a term in common use or for which dictionaries provide definitions consistent with common understanding. O'Toole , 2009 ND 174, ¶ 12, 773 N.W.2d 201 ; State v. Rufus , 2015 ND 212, ¶ 19, 868 N.W.2d 534 (). Black's Law Dictionary contains no definition of "mental injury." Neither does Webster's Third New International Dictionary (3d ed. 2002). If broken up into its component parts, "mental" and "injury," the combined term conceivably encompasses any harm relating to the mind, whether brief or lasting, and whether mild or severe. We conclude that "mental injury" is not among the commonly-used words or phrases for which the jury may apply whatever definition it deems reasonable.
[¶13] We have not yet exhausted our tools of statutory interpretation. We read statutes as a whole, reading each section in context with related provisions. Motisi v. Hebron Pub. Sch. Dist. , 2021 ND 229, ¶ 13. Section 14-09-22(1), N.D.C.C., refers to both "mental injury" and three variations of "bodily injury." Unlike the undefined term "mental injury," "bodily injury" is defined by reference to the criminal code definition in N.D.C.C. § 12.1-01-04(4). The definition of "bodily injury" expressly includes both "any impairment of physical condition" and temporary physical distress, "including physical pain." But our examination of this parallel definition of bodily injury is inconclusive in determining the plain meaning of "mental injury." Because the bodily injury definition expressly "includ[es] physical pain," in an assault case the element may be satisfied by brief pain resulting from a shove or a kick. State v. Hamre , 2019 ND 86, ¶¶ 25-26, 924 N.W.2d 776 ; State v. Hannah , 2016 ND 11, ¶¶ 9-10, 873 N.W.2d 668. A simple conversion of the definition from physical to mental would be one...
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