State v. Rufus
| Citation | 868 N.W.2d 534 |
| Decision Date | 25 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 20140378.,20140378. |
| Parties | STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Galen Paul RUFUS, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of North Dakota |
Christene Ann Reierson, Minot, ND, for plaintiff and appellee.
William Kirschner, Fargo, ND, for defendant and appellant.
[¶ 1] Galen Paul Rufus appeals from a criminal judgment entered after a bench trial finding him guilty of human trafficking. We affirm, concluding sufficient evidence supports the district court's verdict finding Rufus guilty of human trafficking.
[¶ 2] Rufus responded to an advertisement posted on Craigslist under “personals > casual encounters” by a Ward County Deputy Sheriff using the undercover persona of “Chad Russo.” The advertisement indicated Russo's girlfriend would be out of town for the weekend and her daughter wanted to make some money while her mother was gone. According to the advertisement, interested individuals could contact Russo for more details. Rufus responded to the advertisement requesting more information. Russo replied, informing Rufus that the girl was fourteen years old. Rufus asked Russo whether it would be illegal, as the girl was only fourteen, and requested more details. Russo acknowledged fourteen was illegal, but indicated he would not tell anyone. In two separate online Yahoo Messenger conversations, Russo and Rufus discussed the pricing for various sexual acts and a meeting place and time. Russo also sent Rufus a picture of “the girl.” During Yahoo Messenger conversations, Rufus agreed to exchange two bags of marijuana, each worth $60, for one hour of time with the fourteen-year-old girl as follows:
Rufus and Russo agreed to meet in a parking lot at 9:00 p.m. Russo told Rufus to bring condoms if he wanted to have sexual intercourse with the girl. Rufus arrived and was arrested. The deputy found marijuana and money on Rufus. The deputy also found a cooler containing beer, additional marijuana, one morphine pill, and one oxycodone pill in Rufus's vehicle.
[¶ 3] Rufus was charged with human trafficking. Rufus waived his right to a jury trial and, on May 28, 2014, the district court held a bench trial. The court issued its findings and verdict, convicting Rufus of human trafficking, a class AA felony. The district court entered judgment on October 21, 2014, sentencing Rufus to ten years of incarceration, with five years suspended. Rufus appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, and alternatively, whether the offense should be classified as a class AA felony.
[¶ 4] Rufus argues the evidence is insufficient to sustain the district court's finding that he committed the crime of human trafficking. Specifically, Rufus contends (1) this Court should review both the facts and law under a de novo standard of review; (2) the district court's findings are flawed; (3) the elements of the crime of human trafficking do not include making a date with a pimp to possibly have sex with an underage prostitute; and (4) his actions do not constitute an attempt to commit a crime.
[¶ 5] Rufus argues this Court should review both the facts and law under a de novo standard of review because only one individual, a law enforcement officer, testified at trial and all of the evidence in the record that was available to the district court is also available to this Court on appeal.
[¶ 6] The applicable standard of review for a criminal conviction resulting from a trial is as follows:
In an appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, we look only to the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the verdict to ascertain if there is substantial evidence to warrant the conviction. A conviction rests upon insufficient evidence only when, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and giving the prosecution the benefit of all inferences reasonably to be drawn in its favor, no rational fact finder could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In considering a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we do not weigh conflicting evidence, or judge the credibility of witnesses.
State v. Corman, 2009 ND 85, ¶ 8, 765 N.W.2d 530. This Court's “standard of review for a criminal trial before the district court without a jury is the same as a trial with a jury.” Id.
[¶ 7] Rufus presents no persuasive authority in support of his argument that this Court should apply a de novo standard of review to the facts of this case. “The task of weighing the evidence and judging the credibility of witnesses belongs exclusively to the trier of fact, and we do not reweigh credibility or resolve conflicts in the evidence.” Greywind v. State, 2004 ND 213, ¶ 22, 689 N.W.2d 390 (emphasis added). In a bench trial, the judge is the trier of fact, and the judge makes determinations of credibility. State v. Barendt, 2007 ND 164, ¶ 18, 740 N.W.2d 87. Although this Court reviews the evidence in the record on appeal, this Court does not make independent determinations of credibility of witnesses or other evidentiary weight. See id. at ¶ 21. Instead, we “look only to the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the verdict to ascertain if there is substantial evidence to warrant the conviction.” Corman, 2009 ND 85, ¶ 8, 765 N.W.2d 530. Our standard of review does not vary depending on how much evidence in the form of testimony was presented to the district court, and we are not persuaded to adopt such an inconsistent, variable standard. We decline Rufus's invitation to stray from our longstanding standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction.
[¶ 8] Rufus argues that some of the district court's findings are not supported by the evidence. According to Rufus, the district court erroneously found Rufus suggested the trade of marijuana for sexual services from the girl. Rufus contends the evidence presented shows that Russo initially made the suggestion. Rufus also asserts the district court failed to note that Rufus did not have any condoms with him or in his vehicle at the time of his arrest. Rufus contends this fact was important because Russo told Rufus to bring condoms if he wanted to have sexual intercourse with the girl. According to Rufus, his failure to bring a condom to the meeting place shows he did not intend to engage in sexual intercourse with the girl.
[¶ 9] In regard to reviewing a district court's findings of fact made during a bench trial, this Court has stated:
State v. Hartleib, 335 N.W.2d 795, 797 (N.D.1983). State v. Berger, 235 N.W.2d 254, 263 (N.D.1975). State v. Steiger, 2002 ND 79, ¶ 8, 644 N.W.2d 187.
[¶ 10] Rufus's argument is misguided. We need not consider whether the district court made flawed factual findings because we are not limited by the district court's findings. Instead, we look to the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the verdict to ascertain whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant a conviction. Corman, 2009 ND 85, ¶ 8, 765 N.W.2d 530.
[¶ 11] Rufus argues insufficient evidence supports the verdict because the elements of the crime of human trafficking do not include making a date with a pimp to possibly have sex with an underage prostitute. Rufus also argues there is insufficient evidence to show he would have caused the fourteen-year-old girl to engage in sexual conduct with him. Finally, Rufus argues there is insufficient evidence to show he completed a substantial step toward committing the crime of human trafficking or that he had the requisite intent to do so.
[¶ 12] Rufus's arguments regarding whether his conduct falls within the meaning of human trafficking involve interpreting statutory language. “The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which is fully reviewable on appeal.” State v. Brossart, 2015 ND 1, ¶ 23, 858 N.W.2d 275. At the time of Rufus's arrest, N.D.C.C. 12.1–40–01(1) (2009)1 provided:
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