State v. Casto

• Decision Date: 13 May 1977
• Citation: 375 A.2d 444
• Parties: STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff below, Appellant, v. John M. CASTO and David H. Daudt, Defendants below, Appellees.
• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 444

375 A.2d 444

STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff below, Appellant, v. John M. CASTO and David H. Daudt, Defendants below, Appellees.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted Aug. 18, 1976.

Decided May 13, 1977.

Upon appeal from Superior Court. Affirmed.

Lawrence B. Steele, III, Deputy Atty. Gen., Georgetown, for plaintiff-appellant.

Angelo Falasca, Wilmington, for defendant-appellee John M. Casto.

Randy J. Holland of Dunlap, Holland & Eberly, Georgetown, for defendant-appellee David H. Daudt.

Before HERRMANN, C. J., and DUFFY and McNEILLY, JJ.

DUFFY, Justice:

This is the State's consolidated appeal, authorized by 10 Del.C. § 9902, from a Superior Court order remanding two cases to the Justice of the Peace Courts with instructions to permit each defendant to withdraw a guilty plea to a charge of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of 21 Del.C. § 4177. ¹ Defendants had been sentenced to a statutory minimum fine of $200 in one case, and to a statutory minimum fine of $500 and a mandatory term of 60 days imprisonment in the other. ²

I

We first consider the appeal of defendant John M. Casto. On July 21, 1973 he was arrested for driving under the influence and arraigned four days later. According to the transcript of the Justice of the Peace Court's meager record of the case, Casto "was advised of his rights of election, right to Counsel and effect of a plea of guilty . . . (and) the right to elect to be tried by the Court of Common Pleas." He entered a guilty plea, without counsel, on July 25. Some thirteen days later he was sentenced to pay a fine of $200 and was advised of his right to appeal. Within a few days he paid the fine and court costs. Then, on September 19, an attorney appeared for Casto and moved for leave to withdraw the plea. The State opposed the motion on the ground that it was not timely filed. The next entry in the record transcript states:

"And now to wit: this 27th day of November, A.D. 1973 the Court, having considered the State's Motion, it was ordered . . . Motion Denied . . . by Judge William A. Booth".

On January 18, 1974, a motion was filed by another attorney to vacate the Court's order of November 27, on the ground that defendant's first attorney had been retained the day following payment of the fine but, for reasons unknown and unstated, had failed to appear on defendant's behalf until more than a month later. On March 6, the Court denied the motion and defendant appealed to the Superior Court which reversed the ruling below.

II

Turning now to defendant David H. Daudt, it appears that he had a prior conviction for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time of his arrest on the present charge. By statute, a second conviction occurring within five years of the first requires a minimum fine of $500.00 and imprisonment for "not less than 60 days nor more than 18 months." 21 Del.C. § 4177(a).

Prior to arraignment, Daudt was advised of his rights to counsel, to trial in the Court of Common Pleas and as to the effect of a guilty plea. He signed a waiver in the form stated in the footnote. ³

Thereafter, Daudt pleaded guilty to the charge and the case was continued for sentencing. On October 1, counsel filed a timely application to withdraw the plea asserting five grounds listed in the footnote. ⁴

After an evidentiary hearing, the motion was denied on October 17, sentence of a fine of $500 and imprisonment for 60 days was imposed, and defendant appealed to the Superior Court, which reversed the ruling denying his application to withdraw the guilty plea.

III

The appeals were considered on a consolidated basis in the Superior Court, which reversed on the basis that "substantial constitutional rights were involved which were not properly handled below." Other than this vague reference, the Court did not identify the grounds on which the reversals were ordered. It simply directed that withdrawal of the guilty pleas be permitted, and the State then docketed this appeal.

IV

The appeals have been submitted to us as companion cases to Shoemaker v. State, supra. As in Shoemaker, the appeals were stayed pending a decision by the United States Supreme Court in North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 96 S.Ct. 2709, 49 L.Ed.2d 534 (1976).

The parties have argued the Delaware case law governing withdrawal of guilty pleas and the applicable Rules of the Superior Court and the Rules of the Justices of the Peace Court. The State contends that the motions were not timely filed in the latter Court and that the Superior Court did not apply the proper criteria in reviewing the decisions below. Casto argues that the Superior Court had the power of review under 10 Del.C. § 542(a), while Daudt contends, inter alia, that he was deprived of due process of law because sentence was imposed by a non-lawyer judge. Gordon v. Justice Court for Yuba Judicial District of Sutter County, 12 Cal.3d 323, 115 Cal.Rptr. 632, 525 P.2d 72 (1974).

V

The critical issues in these cases involve, respectively, a guilty plea and a subsequent motion to withdraw it and so we focus on those procedures.

Little is to be gained by reviewing the present way or ways in which a guilty plea is taken in a Magistrate's Court. It is sufficient for our purposes to say that the respective records in these appeals reflect procedures in processing which vary with the case, and which are entirely inadequate under current norms of justice, particularly when a jail sentence is imposed. Logically, and in the fair administration of justice, it makes no difference whether such a sentence is imposed by the Superior Court or by a Magistrate; jail is jail no matter at whose hands it is ordered. And when it is grounded upon a waiver of constitutional rights, and that is what a guilty plea is all about, the procedural standards and safeguards required of the higher Court should be no less applicable to the lower.

For these reasons, and in the exercise of our supervisory power over judicial proceedings in Justice of the Peace Courts, Constitution, Art. IV § 13(1), we hold that the following procedures must be followed before a Magistrate may accept a guilty plea in any criminal case:

The Justice of the Peace shall determine that such plea is knowingly and intelligently made by direct interrogation of defendant to show that:

(1) The Magistrate has explained the charge to defendant who has made an intelligent statement in open court that he is aware of all the essential elements of the offense.

(2) Defendant understands that he has rights to a speedy trial, to cross-examine the State's witnesses, to present witnesses on his own behalf, and the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, all of which are waived by a plea of guilty.

(3) Defendant understands the consequences of entering a plea of guilty, including particularly, the possibility of incarceration.

(4) The guilty plea has not been induced by any promise or representation as to what sentence will be imposed, nor by threat or coercion.

(5) Defendant voluntarily enters the plea and is in fact guilty of the charge or, if he is unable or unwilling to admit guilt, that there is a factual basis for the plea.

(6) Defendant understands that by pleading guilty he will waive any right which he may have to appeal a conviction to the Superior Court.

See Sheppard v. State, Del.Supr., 367 A.2d 992 (1976); Brown v. State, Del.Supr., 250 A.2d 503 (1969).

Such statement of rights and advice shall be given orally by the Magistrate and shall be submitted to defendant in writing for signature. The writing shall be part of the record. It shall contain defendant's acknowledgment that he signed it knowingly and intelligently and that he desires to plead guilty; it shall also contain the Magistrate's signed certification that he has fully explained defendant's rights, as hereinabove set forth, and that he is satisfied that defendant understood the explanation and knowingly and intelligently signed the statement and entered the guilty plea. If defendant refuses to sign the statement, or if after a review of the totality of the circumstances the Magistrate is not fully satisfied that the plea has been both knowingly and intelligently made, the Magistrate shall refuse to accept it and order the case to trial.

Much of what we have said in Shoemaker about the waiver in the Magistrate Court of a right to trial in the Court of Common Pleas is pertinent to the acceptance of a guilty plea, and bears repeating here:

"We judicially notice that certain Justice of the Peace Courts are open twenty-four hours each day and that a waiver of the kind here discussed may be offered at any time of the day or night. There is neither a stenographic record of the proceedings nor are they recorded verbatim in any other way. The regularity of the proceedings is critical to a defendant whom more often than not is without counsel; and it is of great importance, also, to a society concerned with how justice is administered in our 'peoples' courts.' Generally speaking, in the interest of the administration of justice, it is always desirable to document the proceedings in the most reliable way; but it is essential to do so when an important right of the defendant essential to the jurisdiction of the Court is being waived. For comparison, we point to the meticulous care which the Superior Court must exercise in taking a guilty plea, under guidelines set forth in Brown v. State, Del.Supr., 250 A.2d 503, 505 (1969), all of which must be recorded stenographically. No less care must be exercised in a Justice of the Peace Court when taking a waiver of a right essential to the Court's jurisdiction."

That same reasoning applies when a Magistrate is asked to accept a guilty plea from a defendant. A guilty plea constitutes a waiver of important constitutional rights, such as the right to a jury trial, the right to confront witnesses, and the right to avoid...