State v. Cathey

Decision Date20 January 2004
Docket NumberNo. COA03-260.,COA03-260.
Citation590 S.E.2d 408,162 NC App. 350
CourtNorth Carolina Court of Appeals
PartiesSTATE of North Carolina v. Donald Ray CATHEY, Defendant.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Joyce S. Rutledge, for the State.

Anne Bleyman, Chapel Hill, for the defendant-appellant.

WYNN, Judge.

By this appeal, Defendant, Donald Ray Cathey, presents the following issues for our consideration: Whether the trial court (I) erroneously allowed the State to amend a fatally defective larceny indictment; (II) committed plain error in punishing Defendant for exercising his right to a trial by jury in violation of his state and federal constitutional rights; (III) abused its discretion by overruling Defendant's motion for view of the crime scene; and (IV) committed plain error in failing to intervene ex mero motu in admitting testimony without a proper foundation. After careful review, we conclude the larceny indictment was fatally defective and the trial court erred in allowing an amendment of said indictment; otherwise, we find no error in the proceedings below.

The pertinent facts indicate that on 29 April 2001, local police officers responded to an alarm at the Faith Temple Church of God—High Point, Incorporated in High Point, North Carolina. Upon arrival, Officer Chris Wolanin and Lieutenant Larry Stroud observed a suspect, about ten feet away from the church, carrying a large black bag. The officers were unable to see the suspect's face. After the officers shined a flashlight on the suspect, the suspect stopped, went into a line of bushes that ran parallel to the church and ran away. Thereafter, Officer Brian McMillan pursued an individual whom Lieutenant Stroud illuminated with a flashlight. After a short pursuit, Defendant was arrested. Later, the officers recovered a black plastic bag and a boxed ceiling fan from the thicket. None of the latent fingerprints matched Defendant.

Following his convictions at a trial by jury, the trial court sentenced Defendant to imprisonment terms of 7 to 9 months for felonious breaking and entering; 7 to 9 months for felonious larceny to be served consecutively; and 30 days for resisting a public officer. Defendant appeals. On appeal, Defendant first contends the trial court erroneously allowed the State to amend a fatally defective larceny indictment as such amendment constituted a substantial alteration in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-923(e). We agree.

It is well established that "a valid bill of indictment is essential to the jurisdiction of the trial court to try an accused for a felony." State v. Sturdivant, 304 N.C. 293, 308, 283 S.E.2d 719, 729 (1981). The purpose of an indictment is to give a defendant notice of the crime for which he is being charged. State v. Coker, 312 N.C. 432, 323 S.E.2d 343. Our General Statutes state that "a bill of indictment may not be amended." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-923(e) (2001), which has been interpreted by our Supreme Court to mean that "an indictment may not be amended in a way which `would substantially alter the charge set forth in the indictment.'" State v. Brinson, 337 N.C. 764, 767, 448 S.E.2d 822, 824 (1994).

In this case, the felonious larceny indictment stated:

And the jurors for the State upon their oath present that on or about the date of offense shown and in the county named above the defendant named above unlawfully, willfully and feloniously did steal, take and carry away one (1) Sharp VCR, one (1) Table Lamp, one (1) Ceiling Fan, and one (1) Fur Coat, the personal property of Faith Temple Church of God, such property having a value of two hundred and thirty five dollars ($235.00), pursuant to the commission of the felonious breaking and entering described in the charges above.

(Emphasis supplied) (R. p. 4). Defendant contends this indictment was fatally defective because it did not allege ownership of the property in a legal entity capable of owning property. Although commonly known as Faith Temple Church of God, the church is incorporated as "Faith Temple Church— High Point, Incorporated."

"An indictment for larceny which fails to allege the ownership of the property either in a natural person or a legal entity capable of owning property is fatally defective." State v. Roberts, 14 N.C.App. 648, 649, 188 S.E.2d 610, 611-12 (1972). As indicated in Roberts, if a bill of indictment does not allege that an incorporated legal entity is a corporation or the name of the legal entity does not import that it is a corporation, the indictment is fatally defective. Thus, the indictment in the case sub judice, was fatally defective.

The State argues, however, that our Supreme Court's recent decisions in State v. Hunt, 357 N.C. 257, 582 S.E.2d 593 (2003) and State v. Watts, 357 N.C. 366, 584 S.E.2d 740 (2003) indicate that defects in an indictment do not deprive a court of its power to adjudicate a case. However, these cases are limited to short-form murder indictments and do not change the indictment requirements delineated in N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A-924. Indeed, in Hunt, our Supreme Court stated:

Unlike a short-form indictment, the indictment in [State v.] Lucas, [353 N.C. 568, 548 S.E.2d 712 (2001)

] was not exempt from the statutory requirement, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-924, that indictments must state every element of the crime charged.

Hunt, 357 N.C. at 273, 582 S.E.2d at 603. As the owner of the property in question is an essential element of larceny, the larceny indictment in this case did not comply with the provisions of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A-924(a)(5). See State v. Perry, 305 N.C. 225, 233, 287 S.E.2d 810, 815 (1982)

(stating the essential elements of larceny are: (1) taking of the property of another; (2) carrying it away; (3) without the owner's consent; and (4) with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property).

The State also argues that because "Faith Temple Church—High Point, Incorporated" is commonly known as "Faith Temple Church of God," the indictment was sufficient to apprise Defendant of the charges against him and to prevent subsequent prosecution of Defendant for the same offense. In support of its argument, the State relies upon State v. Grant, 104 N.C. 908, 10 S.E. 554 (1889) and State v. Bell, 65 N.C. 313 (1871), which stand for the proposition that in a larceny indictment, "if the owner may have a name by reputation, and if it is proved that he is as well known by that name as any other, a charge in the indictment in that name will be sufficient." Grant, 104 N.C. at 910, 10 S.E. at 555; Bell, 65 N.C. at 314. However, in Grant and Bell, our Supreme Court addressed larceny indictments alleging the property was owned by a natural person, and are, therefore, inapposite to indictments purporting to charge a defendant with larceny of a legal entity. As indicated by our Supreme Court in State v. Thornton, 251 N.C. 658, 662, 111 S.E.2d 901, 904 (1960), a larceny indictment which does not indicate the legal entity is a corporation or the name of the legal entity does not import a...

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20 cases
  • State v. Campbell
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • February 6, 2018
    ...Church of Robbinsville" was fatally defective), disc. rev. denied , 363 N.C. 587, 683 S.E.2d 383 (2009) ; State v. Cathey , 162 N.C.App. 350, 353-54, 590 S.E.2d 408, 410-11 (2004) (holding that indictment naming "Faith Temple Church of God" was fatally defective). Accordingly, the larceny i......
  • State Carolina v. Mcneil
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • March 1, 2011
    ...“An indictment for larceny which fails to allege the ownership of the property ... is fatally defective.” State v. Cathey, 162 N.C.App. 350, 352–53, 590 S.E.2d 408, 410 (2004). In the instant case, defendant's indictment for felonious larceny alleged: And the jurors for the State upon their......
  • State v. Skipper, No. COA09-161 (N.C. App. 11/3/2009)
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • November 3, 2009
    ...the property either in a natural person or a legal entity capable of owning property is fatally defective.'" State v. Cathey, 162 N.C. App. 350, 352-53, 590 S.E.2d 408, 410 (2004) (quoting State v. Roberts, 14 N.C. App. 648, 649, 188 S.E.2d 610, 611-12 (1972)). In Cathey, this Court found t......
  • State v. Jennings
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • June 7, 2011
    ...insufficiently identifies "The TJX Companies, Inc.," the actual entity capable of owning property, and cites State v. Cathey, 162 N.C. App. 350, 353-54, 590 S.E.2d 408, 411 (2004), for the proposition that "a larceny indictment which does not indicate the legal entity is a corporation or th......
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