State v. Chambers

• Decision Date: 07 February 2013
• Docket Number: No. 86474–8.,86474–8.
• Citation: 293 P.3d 1185
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. James John CHAMBERS, Jr., Petitioner.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

293 P.3d 1185

STATE of Washington, Respondent,

v.James John CHAMBERS, Jr., Petitioner.

No. 86474–8.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued May 1, 2012.

Decided Feb. 7, 2013.

Stephen Gregory Johnson, Attorney at Law, Tacoma, WA, for Petitioner.

Stephen D. Trinen, Pierce County Prosecutor's Office, Tacoma, WA, for Respondent.

MADSEN, C.J.

¶ 1 James John Chambers Jr. was charged with several crimes arising from incidents which occurred during February, May, and November 1999.¹ Before committing the November crimes, Chambers pleaded guilty to charges resulting from the February and May incidents. Prior to sentencing on these charges, Chambers entered into an agreement that provided that he would plead guilty to the November crimes and stipulate to a 240 month sentence to run consecutively to the sentences for the February and May crimes. Chambers was sentenced for the February and May crimes and pleaded guilty to the November crimes on the same date. He was sentenced for the November crimes at a subsequent hearing.

¶ 2 Several years later, Chambers filed personal restraint petitions (PRPs), seeking to withdraw his plea to the February charges and arguing that his sentence on the November charges was incorrectly calculated. The trial court granted Chambers' motion to withdraw his February plea but denied his request for resentencing on the November charges. The Court of Appeals consolidated the PRPs and reversed, holding that the pleas were indivisible and declining to consider the validity of the sentence arising from the November crimes. We hold that Chambers entered into a global plea agreement that was indivisible and that he failed to demonstrate that his 240 month sentence resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 3 In February 1999, the State charged Chambers with four crimes under Pierce County Superior Court No. 99–1–00817–2, including one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, one count of unlawful manufacturing of a controlled substance (both with firearm enhancements), and two counts of first degree unlawful possession of a firearm (February charges). Chambers negotiated a plea agreement with the State and pleaded guilty on July 7, 1999. The State's sentencing recommendation was listed as “open.” Also on that date, Chambers pleaded guilty to the crime of unlawful possession of methamphetamine under cause No. 99–1–02235–3, which he committed in May 1999 (May charges). The State's recommendation was also listed as “open.”

¶ 4 Following his pleas but prior to sentencing, Chambers committed several additional crimes, including fatally injuring a pedestrian while driving a stolen vehicle. On November 22, he was charged with one count of failure to remain at an injury accident, two counts of first degree possession of stolen property, one count of unlawful possession of a firearm, and one count of unlawful manufacture of methamphetamine under No. 99–1–05307–1 (November charges).

¶ 5 The prosecutor's office offered Chambers a plea agreement following the November charges, which was memorialized in a letter on February 9, 2000. The letter stated that the offer included two parts. First, Chambers must agree that the sentencing for the November charges would run consecutively to the February and May charges. As to the range, the letter noted the standard range of 149–198 months for the February charges and stated that Chambers was free to ask for the low end of the range.

¶ 6 The second part of the offer required Chambers to plead guilty to the November charges. The letter stated that the statutory maximum for a crime of manufacture or possession with intent to deliver was 10 years. However, the letter then erroneously said that RCW 69.50.408 authorized a doubling of the standard range for a subsequent conviction for these charges. In re Pers. Restraint of Cruz, 157 Wash.2d 83, 90, 134 P.3d 1166 (2006) (RCW 69.50.408 authorizes doubling of the statutory maximum, not the standard range). The letter continued, “Your client would have to agree to 240 months on the manufacturing on the 99–1–05307–1 matter. The other counts on this matter involve lesser amounts of time.... This would run consecutive to the 02235–3 and 00817–2 matters.” Clerk's Papers (CP) (Aug. 10, 2010) at 45.

¶ 7 Finally, the letter noted that if the offer was rejected, the State would amend the November charges to include a felony murder charge and a gun enhancement on the manufacturing charge.

¶ 8 On March 17, 2000, Chambers pleaded guilty to the November charges, pursuant to the plea agreement. Also that day, the trial court entered judgment and sentence on the February charges and the May charge. The judgment and sentence form stated that the charges would run concurrently to one another but consecutively to the November charges that were yet to be sentenced, following the State's recommendation.

¶ 9 Judgment and sentence was entered on May 5, 2000 for the November charges. At sentencing, the State described the agreement, including the agreed recommendation of 240 months and that the sentences would run concurrently to one other but consecutively to the February and May charges. In response, the court stated, “[I]t's my understanding that that's the highest standard range sentence available for each count.” Pl.'s ex. 2, at 5. The State confirmed. On imposing the sentence, the court observed:

Mr. Chambers' life was just totally out of control when this happened, completely, in every way. And because of that, there's really no sentence that's fair other than the high end of the range on each of the counts, as is being suggested. I'm going to impose the agreed-on sentence and the other financial conditions and otherwise that the State's requesting.

Id. at 17. The trial court directed the November sentence to run consecutively to the February and May sentences, as recommended by the State.

¶ 10 In 2008, Chambers filed a PRP, challenging his sentence on the February charges. The Court of Appeals held that sentences on two of the February charges were incorrect and remanded for resentencing. This court granted discretionary review and remanded the case to the trial court to reconsider the sentences on all four charges. On remand, Chambers moved to withdraw his plea to the February charges. The State argued that the February charges were part of an indivisible plea agreement and that Chambers would need to withdraw both his February and November pleas. The trial court disagreed, concluding that the pleas were divisible, granted Chambers' motion to withdraw the plea on his February charges, and then dismissed the February charges because the State's evidence had been destroyed.

¶ 11 Chambers also sought relief from the November judgment and sentence, arguing that it was based on an erroneous doubling of the sentencing range. The trial court denied relief. Both parties appealed.

¶ 12 The Court of Appeals consolidated the two cases and determined that the plea agreement was indivisible, reversing the trial court. State v. Chambers, 163 Wash.App. 54, 62, 256 P.3d 1283 (2011). The court did not decide the validity of the sentence for the November crimes, reasoning that the issue was moot in light of its holding on indivisibility of the agreement. Id. at 61, 256 P.3d 1283. The Court of Appeals remanded, noting that Chambers may seek to withdraw his pleas to the February and November charges. Id. at 62, 256 P.3d 1283.

ANALYSIS

I. Divisibility of the plea agreement

¶ 13 We first consider whether Chambers' pleas were part of an indivisible plea agreement. “A plea agreement is essentially a contract made between a defendant and the State.” State v. Turley, 149 Wash.2d 395, 400, 69 P.3d 338 (2003); State v. Hardesty, 129 Wash.2d 303, 318, 915 P.2d 1080 (1996). Whether a contract is divisible or indivisible is dependent upon the intent of the parties. Turley, 149 Wash.2d at 400, 69 P.3d 338. We look only to objective manifestations of intent, not unexpressed subjective intent. Id.

¶ 14 In Turley, we were asked to decide whether a defendant can withdraw his guilty plea to one count addressed in a plea agreement, but not to others. Id. at 398, 69 P.3d 338. We held that the agreement was indivisible based on the record, which showed the defendant had pleaded guilty to multiple charges in a single proceeding and that the pleas were described in the same agreement. Id. at 398, 402, 69 P.3d 338. Accordingly, we held the defendant could not withdraw his plea to only one of the charges.

¶ 15 Relying on Turley, Chambers contends his plea agreement is divisible becausethe February and November charges were eight months apart, he was sentenced in separate proceedings, and the sentences were entered in different documents. Chambers appears to argue that the facts we identified in Turley established a new “factors” test. That is incorrect. Turley merely identifies the facts in that case, which revealed an objective intent to address all of the charges in a comprehensive plea agreement, i.e., “a ‘package deal.’ ” Id. at 400, 69 P.3d 338. We continue to look to the objective manifestations of the parties to determine whether a plea is indivisible.

¶ 16 Here, the record shows the parties' intent to create a global, indivisible plea agreement. First, the letter memorializing the agreement referenced all of the cause numbers and sentences for the February, May, and November charges. Second, the letter stated that the sentences for the February and May charges would run concurrently to one other but consecutively to the November charges. This demonstrates the interconnectedness of the charges. In addition, the letter specifically authorized Chambers to seek the low end of the standard range on count one of the February charges, evidencing that the range on the February charges was a consideration in the agreement and a concession by the State.

¶ 17 The intent to establish a global plea agreement is...