In re Cruz, 77317-3.
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Washington |
| Citation | 134 P.3d 1166,157 Wn.2d 83 |
| Decision Date | 25 May 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 77317-3.,77317-3. |
| Parties | In re the Matter of the Personal Restraint Petition of Gilberto CRUZ, Petitioner. |
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Thomas E. Weaver, Jr., Attorney at Law, Bremerton, for Petitioner/Appellant.
Kevin Michael Korsmo, Attorney at Law, Spokane, for Appellee/Respondent.
J.M. JOHNSON, J.
¶ 1 Mr. Gilberto Cruz seeks relief from his judgment and sentence because, he argues, it is facially invalid. After a jury convicted Mr. Cruz of various drug offenses, the superior court sentenced Mr. Cruz to double the low end of the standard range sentence pursuant to its interpretation of RCW 69.50.408. That statute provides that any person convicted of a subsequent controlled substance offense may be imprisoned for "a term up to twice the term otherwise authorized." RCW 69.50.408(1). Mr. Cruz argues that he was improperly sentenced because RCW 69.50.408(1) doubles the maximum sentence not the standard range sentence. We agree.
¶ 2 On May 14, 1998, a jury convicted Gilberto Cruz of eight drug offenses involving cocaine. The judgment and sentence entered recognizes that the standard range sentence for most of these convictions was 108-144 months, while two of the convictions carried a 0-12 month standard sentence range. The judgment and sentence noted that all of the crimes had a maximum term of 10 years.
¶ 3 The sentencing court sentenced Mr. Cruz to 216 months' confinement for each of the crimes with a standard range sentence of 108-144 months and 12 months' confinement for the crimes with a standard range sentence of 0-12 months. The sentences were imposed concurrently; thus, the total confinement
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ordered was 216 months. The court reached this number by doubling the low end of the standard range (108 months) pursuant to RCW 69.50.408.1
¶ 4 Mr. Cruz filed a direct appeal to Division Three of the Court of Appeals arguing, among other things, that the sentencing court improperly doubled his standard range sentence because RCW 69.50.408 doubles the maximum sentence. Division Three affirmed in an unpublished decision and held that the doubling of the standard range was authorized by RCW 69.50.408. State v. Cruz, 99 Wash.App. 1022, 2000 WL 122644 (Wash.Ct. App.), review denied, 142 Wash:2d 1005, 11 P.3d 824 (2000).
¶ 5 Several years later, Mr. Cruz filed a personal restraint petition with Division Three, again arguing that his sentence was improper because the sentencing court doubled his standard range. However, this time Mr. Cruz cited the recently published Division Two case State v. Clark, 123 Wash.App. 515, 94 P.3d 335 (2004), as authority for this argument. The Clark court held that RCW 69.50.408 doubled the statutory maximum penalty not the standard range.
¶ 6 Division Three declined to follow Clark and adhered to its earlier opinion that "Mr. Cruz's 108-month standard range was plainly `otherwise authorized' and thus subject to doubling under RCW 69.50.408."2 Order Dismissing Personal Restraint Pet. at 4. The court held that "RCW 69.50.408(1) authorizes both doubling of the range and the maximum sentence." Id. Division Three then dismissed Mr. Cruz's personal restraint petition.
¶ 7 Mr. Cruz filed a motion for discretionary review, and we granted review in order to resolve a conflict between divisions.
¶ 8 Does RCW 69.50.408(1)'s language "twice the term otherwise authorized" refer to the standard range sentence or the maximum sentence or both?
¶ 9 RCW 69.50.408(1) provides:
Any person convicted of a second or subsequent offense under this chapter may be imprisoned for a term up to twice the term otherwise authorized, fined an amount up to twice that otherwise authorized, or both.
¶ 10 This court has not directly addressed whether RCW 69.50.408 doubles the standard range sentence or the maximum sentence. The closest we have come to addressing the issue was in In re Personal Restraint of Hopkins, 137 Wash.2d 897, 976 P.2d 616 (1999). In that case, this court declined to address the Court of Appeals' holding "`that RCW 69.50.408 is neither discretionary nor a sentence enhancement but rather a provision that automatically doubles the statutory maximum sentence for convictions under RCW 69.50 when the defendant has a prior conviction under that statute.'" Id. at 900 n. 2, 976 P.2d 616 (quoting In re Personal Restraint of Hopkins, 89 Wash.App. 198, 203, 948 P.2d 394 (1997), rev'd on other grounds by 137 Wash.2d 897, 976 P.2d 616). However, this court's wording suggests that we believed RCW 69.50.408 applied to the maximum term. This court said "[t]he question is whether the sentencing doubling provisions contained in RCW 69.50.408 apply to petitioner's current conviction, thereby doubling the maximum term that would otherwise apply." Id. at 900, 976 P.2d 616 (emphasis added). Admittedly, this was dicta and not required to resolve Hopkins.
¶ 11 While each of the divisions of the Courts of Appeals has ruled on this issue, they are split as to whether RCW 69.50.408 authorizes doubling the standard range sentence or the statutory maximum.
¶ 12 As mentioned above, in In re Personal Restraint of Hopkins, 89 Wash.App. 198, 948 P.2d 394, Division One held that pursuant to RCW 69.50.408, a sentencing court could impose a sentence up to twice what the maximum term would otherwise be. Id. at 200, 948 P.2d 394 (this court reversed the Court
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State v. Peterson
...of a statute de novo. Cyr , 195 Wash.2d at 498, 461 P.3d 360 (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Cruz , 157 Wash.2d 83, 87, 134 P.3d 1166 (2006) ); State v. Villela , 194 Wash.2d 451, 456, 450 P.3d 170 (2019) (quoting State v. Lanciloti , 165 Wash.2d 661, 667, 201 P.3d 323 (2009) ). We begin ......
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