State v. Chao, ID No. 88001884 (Del. Super. 9/25/2006)
| Decision Date | 25 September 2006 |
| Docket Number | ID No. 88001884. |
| Parties | STATE OF DELAWARE v. VICKY CHAO, Defendant. |
| Court | Delaware Superior Court |
Bernard J. O'Donnell, Office of Public Defender, New Castle County, State of Delaware, for Defendant.
Loren C. Meyers, Department of Justice, New Castle County, State of Delaware, for the State of Delaware.
Vicky Chao ("Defendant") filed a Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Procedure Rule 61, wherein she seeks to set aside her judgment of criminal convictions for felony murder based on the "newly recognized right" under Williams v. State.1 In recognizing this right, the Williams Court specifically overruled the opinion of the Court that convicted Defendant Chao for felony murder.
The Superior Court in State v. Chao convicted Defendant based on its reading of the felony murder statute, and the Supreme Court of Delaware reaffirmed this decision by ruling that, "for felony murder liability to attach, a killing need only accompany the commission of an underlying felony."2 Several years later, the Williams Court overruled the Chao Court stating that, "felony murder cannot attach unless the murder is a consequence of the felony and is intended to help the felony progress."3 Hence, for the Court to convict a Defendant of felony murder, the Court must also find that the murder helped move the felony forward.
Following the Williams decision, the Superior Court in State v. Kirk granted the defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief, and the Supreme Court subsequently confirmed this decision.4 The Kirk Court held that the felony murder statute recognized by Williams invalidated the defendant's convictions of felony murder.5 Similar to the case at hand, an arson started by the defendant resulted in the deaths of three people.6 In Kirk, the defendant argued that the Williams decision "required the vacation of his three felony murder convictions..".7 The State conceded to this position.8
In her Motion for Postconviction Relief, Defendant Chao, therefore, asserts that the Court should retroactively apply the Williams decision to invalidate her conviction of three counts of felony murder. The Superior Court denied this motion and summarily concluded that reconsideration was not necessary in the "interest of justice". Defendant then appealed this decision to the Supreme Court.
On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court abused its discretion by abstaining from offering rationale for its decision. The Supreme Court, thereby, remanded this decision and asked the Superior Court to address two issues: 1) Is the Superior Court required to reconsider Chao's felony murder convictions in light of Williams?, and 2) Is the State estopped from arguing against the retroactive application of Williams in light of its contrary position in State v. Kirk?
In response to these questions, the Court has made the following conclusions of law. First, the Superior Court is required to reconsider Chao's felony murder conviction in light of Williams. Second, the State is not estopped from arguing against the retroactive application of Williams in light of its contrary position in State v. Kirk.
William Chen ("Chen") immigrated to the United States with his mother in 1978 from China.9 Although he and his mother first settled in Delaware, Chen moved to New York City to attend college.10 It was there that he met and became involved in a romantic relationship with the Defendant.11 Although they never actually lived together, Chen eventually gave the Defendant the keys to his apartment and the two grew close, often spending a great amount of time together.12 At one point in their relationship the Defendant provided Chen with four thousand dollars enabling him to open his business.13 Their relationship, however, changed dramatically in 1985 when Chen traveled to China to marry Jing Hong Guo Chen.14 Upon returning from China with his wife, the couple settled in Claymont, Delaware.15
During the early morning hours of March 9, 1988, a fatal fire occurred at Chen's Claymont residence.16 Chen's wife, mother, and daughter were killed in a fire that burned their home.17 Chen was the sole survivor of those living in the house.18 During the police investigation, Chen named the Defendant as a person who might have information regarding the crime.19 Investigators interviewed Chen on three separate occasions on the day of the conflagration.20 During an interview Chen revealed that he had been involved in a turbulent relationship with the Defendant.21 He recounted an incident in which the Defendant had him arrested for assaulting her approximately one month prior to the fire.22 Moreover, Chen indicated that as early as nine days before the fire, the Defendant had been to his Claymont home causing a disturbance.23 In particular, he claimed that she became embroiled in an argument with both his wife and mother and that she threatened to cause "big trouble" if he didn't "throw his family away" and marry her instead.24
On March 9, investigators traveled to New York City to question the Defendant.25 Law enforcement personnel arrived at Defendant's apartment and informed her that they were investigating an "incident."26 They asked her to accompany them to the 115th Precinct of the New York City Police Department.27 The Defendant agreed.28 Eventually, the Defendant announced that she was willing to make a tape-recorded statement.29 In that statement, the Defendant implicated an individual named Tze Poong Liu ("Liu") as the arsonist.30 According to the Defendant, she and Chen were mutual acquaintances of Liu.31 She explained to investigators that Liu wanted to kill Chen and that he forced her to accompany him to Delaware the previous night in a taxicab.32 She further stated that while traveling to Delaware Liu stopped and filled a plastic container with gasoline.33 She then claimed that when they arrived at Chen's home she was terrified and waited in the taxi after Liu exited it because he had threatened her.34 The Defendant stated that when Liu eventually returned to the taxi he exclaimed that he had set fire to the house.35
By the following day, the police had implicated the Defendant in the crime along with Liu.36 Therefore, they decided to question the Defendant again.37 The Defendant again made statements containing allegedly inculpatory material.38 She was arrested several hours later and taken to Queens Criminal Court for arraignment.39 The police then returned to Delaware with the Defendant.40 On March 12, 1988, the Defendant was arraigned in Delaware.41
According to expert testimony offered at trial in 1989, the investigation revealed that gasoline had been poured in three separate areas of the house, and a "very intense, fast-burning fire" had been set at each location.42 Given the strategic placement of the gasoline, investigators concluded that the fires had been specifically set so as to deny the occupants of the house a route of escape.43 The State rebutted the Defendant's account of her victimized bystander role in the arson-murder with evidence portraying her as a vengeful woman scorned.44 The prosecution argued that the Defendant had become distraught over Chen's refusal to leave his family and was jealous of the life he made for himself in Delaware.45 Consequently, the State argued that she acted upon these emotions by soliciting Liu, another suitor, to help her seek retribution against Chen.46
On August 14, 1989, the jury convicted the Defendant of six counts of Murder in the First Degree, 11 Del. C. §§ 636(a)(1), 636(a)(2); one count of Attempted Murder in the First Degree, 11 Del. C. § 531; one count of Arson in the First Degree, 11 Del. C. § 803(2); one count of Burglary in the First Degree, 11 Del. C. § 826; two counts of Conspiracy in the First Degree, 11 Del. C. § 513; and one count of Conspiracy in the Second Degree, 11 Del. C. § 512.47 A penalty hearing was held at which the jury found the existence of two statutory aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, but did not unanimously find that the statutory circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances.48
On September 8, 1989, the Defendant filed a motion for new trial.49 The Superior Court denied Defendant's motion on March 29, 1990.50 The Defendant was sentenced on May 24, 1990 to seven consecutive terms of life imprisonment to be served without probation or parole or any other reduction, 11 Del. C. § 4209, and fifteen years' imprisonment.51
On January 7, 1992, the Defendant filed an appeal in the Supreme Court raising several claims, including an allegation that the Court abused its discretion in sentencing her to six life terms on the basis of convictions of both intentional murder, 11 Del. C. § 636(a)(1), and felony murder, 11 Del. C. § 636(a)(2) for each of three victims.52 The Defendant also alleged that there was insufficient evidence to establish her guilt of intentional murder and felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt.53 Specifically, she argued that since all of the State's evidence indicated that she intended to kill the Chens by setting their house on fire, no rational juror could infer that the killings were caused "in furtherance of the commission" of arson, a felony.54 The Delaware Supreme Court held that, in order 55 56 The Court cited Weick v. State57 for support, without overruling that portion of Weick requiring that death be a consequence of the felony and not a coincidence of it. Defendant's convictions were affirmed by the Supreme Court on January 29,...
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