Williams v. State
| Decision Date | 13 December 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 470/475,2001.,470/475,2001. |
| Citation | 818 A.2d 906 |
| Parties | Joseph WILLIAMS, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Delaware |
Joseph M. Bernstein, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellant.
William M. Kelleher, Esquire (argued) and Elizabeth R. McFarlan, Esquire, Deputy Attorneys General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee.
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, HOLLAND, BERGER and STEELE, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc. VEASEY, Chief Justice.
In this appeal we consider the application of the statutory language of Delaware's felony murder statute requiring that one of the elements of the crime must be that the homicide is caused by the defendant in furtherance of the felony. The statutory provision in question is Section 636 of the Criminal Code, which provides: 1 The felony charged here was First Degree Burglary,2 charging the defendant with entering a dwelling at night "with intent to commit the crime of murder."
We hold that where a burglary is alleged to be the felony on which the felony murder charge is predicated, the death that occurs must not only be "in the course of" the burglary but also must be "in furtherance of" the burglary. That is, the burglary must have an independent objective that the murder facilitates. Accordingly, if the intent of the burglary was to commit murder, the death that occurred was not "in furtherance of" the burglary — it was the intent of the burglary, as charged in the indictment here. As a result, we reverse on this ground alone the death sentence from which this appeal is taken because the death sentence was predicated solely on the felony murder statute.
Although the parties addressed the constitutionality of the death sentence in light of the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Ring v. Arizona,3 we need not reach that issue in view of our reversal of the death sentence based on statutory interpretation of the Delaware felony murder statute. As a result of defendant's conviction on other homicide charges, we remand to the Superior Court for resentencing.
On June 16, 1996, appellant, Joseph Williams shot and killed his girlfriend, Virginia Mason, at the home of her co-worker, Rosetta Charles. Mason was residing at the home of Charles and her family as a result of a dispute that occurred between her and Williams two days before her death. During the argument Williams threatened to beat Mason, and Mason called the police. By the time the police arrived at the home Williams and Mason shared, Williams had already left. The police did, however, find two weapons on the premises.
The day after the argument Mason gathered her three children and took them to stay with relatives in New Jersey. She then went to stay at Charles' home.
The following day, June 16, the day of the incident in question, Mason, along with Charles and her family, were gathered in Charles' living room watching television and listening to music. Suddenly, a man wearing a mask entered the room, grabbed Mason's arm and ordered her to leave with him. Mason responded, "No, Eb." According to Charles, when Mason refused to go with him, "Eb" produced a gun and shot Mason in the leg. As she was falling he shot her again, this time in the neck, fatally wounding her. "Eb" then fled out the front door.
Immediately thereafter Charles called the police and told them "Eb" had shot Mason. Charles had met Williams on at least one prior occasion and she knew that Mason referred to Williams as "Eb." During the course of the investigation, Mason was shown a photo line-up and identified Williams as the shooter.
Williams fled the scene and was arrested two years later in New Jersey. When asked if he knew there were warrants out for him in Delaware, he stated he knew about a homicide warrant and that he was "slipping and dipping and trying to avoid them."
Williams was charged with intentional murder, felony murder, first degree burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The jury returned a guilty verdict on all four counts. This resulted in a jury finding of felony murder, among other findings. As a result of the murder convictions Williams was subject to the death penalty. During the penalty phase the State alleged two statutory aggravating factors: (1) the murder occurred during the commission of a burglary, and (2) Mason was killed in retaliation for calling the police during the argument.
Applying the felony murder rule for purposes of the death penalty, the trial court instructed the jury that it must find that the felony murder aggravator had been established.4 Accordingly, the jury unanimously found the first aggravating factor (felony murder). The jury found the second aggravating factor (retaliation for calling police) by a vote of 10-2. The judge found the existence of the first factor but concluded that the evidence did not support the second factor. The judge then weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors and sentenced Williams to death.
Williams claims on appeal several reasons for vacating his sentence as a matter of law. He first argues that his felony murder conviction should merge into the other convictions. Second, he contends that the evidence does not prove the elements of the crime of felony murder as provided in the statute. He also asserts that the death sentence is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona.5 We reject Williams' first claim and sustain his second. As a result we must overrule a portion of our prior decision in Chao v. State.6 We do not reach the Ring v. Arizona issue.
Williams first argues that his conviction for felony murder should merge into his convictions for burglary and intentional murder. Essentially this argument amounts to a claim that his convictions violate the prohibition against multiple punishments for the same offense as outlined in the United States Constitution.7 We review such a claim de novo.8
We note from the outset that Williams does not dispute his convictions for intentional murder and burglary. Rather, he contends that the doctrine of merger of offenses must be applied here because it is illogical to allow for a conviction of felony murder in addition to convictions for burglary and intentional murder. He argues that the commentary that led up to the Delaware burglary statutes supports his assertion that the burglary statutes were not intended to permit a conviction of felony murder in addition to convictions for burglary and first degree murder.9 The doctrine of merger of offenses implicates the common law rule that if the same criminal act results in both a misdemeanor and a felony, the misdemeanor merges into the felony.10 The corollary to this rule is that a felony does not merge into another felony. The modern test of whether one criminal offense merges into another ignores the felony/misdemeanor distinction and instead asks whether one offense necessarily involves the other. Accordingly, we must examine whether one criminal act is an integral part of the other.11
This Court had an opportunity to consider a similar claim in Steckel v. State.12 In Steckel the appellant intentionally set a fire to kill his victim. He was subsequently charged with intentional murder, felony murder, and other charges.13 Steckel argued that the trial court erred in failing to merge his convictions for intentional murder and felony murder because the purpose of the fire was to take his victim's life.14 He claimed that all similar offenses should merge upon conviction and require the imposition of only one sentence. This Court ruled against Steckel's claim and did not merge the convictions based on another decided case, Chao v. State.15
In Chao the appellant made the same contention Steckel made and Williams now claims. She argued that her convictions for felony murder and intentional murder violated constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy.16 We denied Chao's claim, finding three significant factors: (1) multiple convictions for a single death are constitutionally permissible; (2) the General Assembly intended such conviction and sentencing schemes; and (3) multiple convictions serve the purpose of assuring punishment in the event that one of the multiple convictions is later invalidated.17
As in Steckel, Williams fails to demonstrate that this holding of Chao is no longer good law. Therefore, the principles of stare decisis prevail, and Williams' argument for merging his felony murder conviction fails.
Williams next contends that his conviction for felony murder should be vacated because the evidence fails to show the murder he committed was "in furtherance of" the underlying felony as the language of the statute requires. We review this claim to determine whether a rational trier of fact could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of every element of the offense of felony murder.18 The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State.19 Section 636(a)(2) of the Delaware Criminal Code states: "A person is guilty of murder in the first degree when ... [i]n the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempted commission of a felony ..., the person recklessly causes the death of another person."20 This Court has previously interpreted the meaning of the "in furtherance of" language in the felony murder statute, but there remains some confusion regarding the state of the law.21
In Weick v. State, we held that the felony murder statute does not encompass all homicides.22 In explaining our holding we concluded:
The mere coincidence of...
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