State v. Chapman

• Decision Date: 20 March 1992
• Docket Number: No. 90-281,90-281
• Citation: 605 A.2d 1055,135 N.H. 390
• Parties: The STATE of New Hampshire v. Fred CHAPMAN.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Page 1055

605 A.2d 1055

135 N.H. 390

The STATE of New Hampshire v. Fred CHAPMAN.

No. 90-281.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

March 20, 1992.

John P. Arnold, Atty. Gen. (Mark S. Zuckerman, Asst. Atty. Gen., on the brief, and David S. Peck, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., orally), for State.

James E. Duggan, Chief Appellate Defender, Concord, on brief and orally, for defendant.

THAYER, Justice.

The defendant appeals the Superior Court's (McGuire, J.) denial of his motion to suppress certain evidence, arguing that the evidence was obtained in violation of the holding in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and both the State and Federal Constitutions. The evidence was introduced at trial, and the jury convicted the defendant of two counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault, RSA 632-A:2, and one count of second degree assault, RSA 632-A:4. The court sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of seven-and-one-half to fifteen years for each sexual assault offense, and a concurrent term of three-and-one-half to seven years for the second degree assault offense. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

In 1988, the defendant and the victim met and began dating. In the summer of 1988, their relationship progressed to the point where they decided to live together. Their cohabitation continued until June of 1989, when the defendant was incarcerated at the Grafton County House of Correction for an unrelated offense. While the defendant was incarcerated, the victim decided to terminate the relationship, moved out of the apartment she had been sharing with the defendant, and began living with another man, Walter Simpson.

On October 7, 1989, the defendant was released from the house of correction. Thereafter, he attempted to rekindle the relationship with the victim and tried to induce her to leave Simpson, but to no avail. At one point, the defendant threatened the victim and her child, and on another occasion a fistfight occurred between the defendant and Simpson.

On the morning of October 18, 1989, the defendant flagged down the victim's car as she was driving to work in Sunapee. Once he had succeeded in stopping the car, the defendant entered the vehicle and "put his hand on" a knife that was on the console of the car. He told the victim that he wanted to talk with her and directed her to pull off to the side of the road bordered by a wooded area. There they discussed the defendant's problems with alcohol, his anger at his ex-wife, and the disposition of their property. Eventually, the defendant decided that he wanted to carve their initials in a tree. He took the knife from the car, grabbed the victim by the arm, and pulled her into the woods. As the victim struggled to free herself, the defendant beat her and threw her to the ground. He continued to beat her and eventually sexually assaulted her. Afterwards, the defendant told the victim not to report the incident until noon and then forced her to drive him to a store in Sunapee. After dropping him off, she then drove home, and the police were called. Sergeant Murphy, of the Sunapee Police Department, responded to the victim's complaint. Sergeant Murphy observed that she had been injured, investigated the crime scene, and prepared a warrant for the defendant's arrest.

At approximately 5:00 p.m. that same day, the defendant turned himself in at the Newport police station where he was placed under arrest. According to the defendant, he consumed a considerable amount of beer prior to his arrival at the police station, and several police officers who spoke with the defendant on the night of his arrest noticed the smell of alcohol on his breath. Two hours later, at approximately 7:00 that evening, Sergeant Murphy arrived at the Newport police station for the purpose of interviewing the defendant. Sergeant Murphy also noticed the smell of alcohol on the defendant's breath, but determined that he was sober enough to discuss the events of that day. Officer Brown of the Newport Police Department and State Trooper Hurley were also present during the course of the interview, but Sergeant Murphy was solely responsible for questioning the defendant. The interview was videotaped with the knowledge and permission of the defendant. Sergeant Murphy began by reading the defendant his Miranda rights line by line and, after reading each right, asked the defendant to indicate orally whether he understood that right. On each occasion, the defendant indicated to Sergeant Murphy that he understood the right that was read to him. The defendant then signed a consent form showing that he understood his rights and agreed to talk with the officers.

During the first two hours of the interview, the defendant denied either raping or assaulting the victim. However, after Sergeant Murphy terminated the interview and turned off the video camera, the defendant admitted that he had been lying and then confessed that he had assaulted the victim. Sergeant Murphy turned the video camera back on and continued the interview. This time on tape, the defendant again admitted to striking the victim in the woods. He also admitted to touching her in a sexual manner. He continued, however, to deny that he raped her or that he had a knife with him. Sergeant Murphy concluded the interview at approximately 9:30 p.m. At approximately midnight, a blood sample was taken from the defendant. Chemical analysis revealed that his blood alcohol content was .13 percent at that time.

Prior to trial, in a motion to suppress, the defendant challenged the admissibility of his statement to the police, arguing that it was the product of a violation of his Miranda rights. Additionally, the defendant argued that his intoxication at the time of the interview, the length of the interview, the failure of the police to reveal the charges against him when they first advised him of his rights, and the failure of the police to scrupulously honor his attempts to terminate the questioning, compelled a finding that his confession was involuntary and therefore obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. After a lengthy evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress his statement.

At trial, the defendant stipulated that he was guilty of second degree assault. In its case-in-chief, the State introduced the videotape of the conversation between the defendant and Sergeant Murphy. The defendant objected to this evidence based on the grounds he had raised earlier at the suppression hearing. The judge overruled the defendant's objection, and the jury viewed the videotape in its entirety. Although the defendant stipulated before trial that he was guilty of second degree assault, he testified about, and offered an exculpatory version of, the events that occurred on the morning of October 18, 1989. The jury returned a verdict against the defendant.

On appeal, the defendant raises essentially two arguments. First, he maintains that during the interview with Sergeant Murphy, he twice asserted his right to remain silent, but that the police violated this right by failing to terminate the questioning or clarify whether the defendant's statements indicated a desire to stop the questioning. Accordingly, defendant argues, his subsequent statements were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights and must therefore be suppressed. Second, the defendant contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his confession was voluntary. Thus, according to the defendant's argument, the trial court committed reversible error in permitting his statements to be introduced into evidence.

The first issue we will address is whether the trial court erred in finding that the defendant did not assert his rights under Miranda to terminate questioning and remain silent during his interview with Sergeant Murphy. The defendant raises this argument under both the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution and part I, article 15 of our State Constitution. Therefore, we will address the defendant's claim under the State Constitution first and look to the decisions of the federal courts only for guidance. State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231-32, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (1983). In New Hampshire, the State must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights under Miranda before the defendant's confession may be admitted as evidence. State v. Zurita, 133 N.H. 719, 724, 584 A.2d 758, 761 (1990); State v. Gullick, 118 N.H. 912, 915, 396 A.2d 554, 555 (1978); State v. Phinney, 117 N.H. 145, 146, 370 A.2d 1153, 1153 (1977). On appeal, in reviewing the trial court's finding that the State met its burden, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. See Zurita, 133 N.H. at 724, 584 A.2d at 762; State v. Bushey, 122 N.H. 995, 999, 453 A.2d 1265, 1267 (1982).

The defendant does not argue that his initial waiver of his rights under Miranda was involuntary. The defendant, instead, relies upon that portion of the Miranda decision which mandates that "[i]f the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease," Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74, 86 S.Ct. at 1627. In order to determine whether, after initially waiving his constitutional rights under Miranda, the defendant subsequently invoked his right to remain silent, we examine the defendant's statements by considering the totality of the circumstances. See United States v. D'Antoni, 856 F.2d 975, 981 (7th Cir.1988) (in determining whether defendant invoked right to remain silent defendant's statements must be viewed within the context of the entire conversation); see also Zurita, 133 N.H. at 724, 584 A.2d at 762 (in deciding whether defendant knowingly and intelligently waived Miranda rights, court properly looked at the totality of the circumstances); Bushey, 122 N.H. at 999, 453 A.2d...