State v. Chapman, 42800
| Citation | 84 Wn.2d 373,526 P.2d 64 |
| Decision Date | 12 September 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 42800,42800 |
| Parties | The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Virginia CHAPMAN, Appellant. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Washington |
Philip Mahoney, Seattle, for appellant.
Christopher T. Bayley, Pros. Atty., Lee Yates, Geoffrey G. Revelle, Bruce M. Ries, Deputy Pros. Attys., Seattle, for respondent.
This is a prosecution for second degree murder. Several questions are presented. Although there are some 16 assignments of error, the questions argued fall into three areas: (1) Were certain statements properly admitted? (2) Should a mistrial have been granted because of hearsay statements? and (3), was a sketch of the scene properly admitted?
At approximately 2:45 a.m. on December 23, 1972, the husband of appellant was fatally shot while in the couple's apartment at 1603 Terry Avenue, Seattle, Washington. Appellant fired six shots from a .38 revolver, one of which missed her husband and struck the wall on the other side of the apartment.
An occupant of the adjoining apartment, Mr. Wilford Skubi, called the police. Officer Knechtel of the Seattle Police Department soon arrived at the scene and was directed to appellant's apartment. He identified himself as a police officer and appellant opened the door to the apartment and said, 'He shot himself.' Observing a portion of the victim's body by looking over appellant's shoulder, Officer Knechtel entered the apartment to check on the condition of the victim. Upon discovering that there were several wounds in the body of the deceased, the officer placed appellant under arrest. Officer Knechtel then read appellant her constitutional rights from a standard Miranda warning card carried by police officers and asked her if she understood her rights. Appellant responded that she did understand them. Officer Mark Sigfrenius of the Seattle Police Department had also responded to the police call and observed Officer Knechtel advise appellant of her constitutional rights.
Officer Robert A. Christophersen of the Seattle Police Department subsequently transported appellant, along with another officer to the Seattle Police Department's main station, a trip of approximately 10 blocks. Upon arrival at the police station, Officer Christophersen admonished appellant of her constitutional rights from the standard Seattle Police Department form 9.28.1. At this time, appellant again stated that her husband had shot himself.
Officer Christophersen offered a Breathalyzer test to appellant and she signed a standard police department Breathalyzer form agreeing to the test. The test was administered at 4:12 a.m. and resulted in a Breathalyzer reading of .270 blodd alcohol percent by weight. Expert testimony indicated that at 2:30 a.m. appellant would normally have a reading of .292; at 6:30 a.m. she would have had a reading of approximately .233; and at 7 a.m. she would have had a reading of approximately .225. The expert testimony indicated that at .300 a person normally would cease to function and would go into a state resembling unconsciousness.
During the above time, appellant was also questioned by Officer John Thomas of the Seattle Police Department for about 30 minutes and supplied the officer with 'vital statistics' information. Officer Thomas testified that after giving appellant instructions not to wash her hands because of possible tests that might be administered, he summoned a jail matron to accompany appellant on her requested trip to a restroom. He further testified that appellant had tried to wash her hands several times while in the restroom. According to Officer Thomas, appellant upon returning from the restroom, said: 'You didn't want me to wash my hands because of the graphite test, or something like that, did you?'
Some time prior to 6:25 a.m., appellant was questioned by Seattle Police Detectives Owen C. McKenna and Richard W. Reed. When a statement form was introduced into the interrogation by the detectives, appellant protested giving a statement. According to his own testimony, Detective McKenna responded: 'I told her basically to keep quiet, that this form had to be done, it was a matter of paperwork and the format in the office.' After going through her constitutional rights on the statement form with the detectives, appellant hesitated in signing the form and asked if she could have an attorney 'now'. Detective McKenna testified that he told appellant that she could have an attorney if she could contact one and explained to her that she could have a court appointed attorney if she didn't have the money for an attorney. He further told her that the earliest she could have an appointed attorney was on the following Monday morning, and that she would have to remain in jail in the interim. A representative of the public defender's office, Richard Brothers, testified that his office has a contract with the City of Seattle to provide an attorney service 24 hours a day, 7 days a week; and two attorneys from the public defender's office were on call at the time and available.
Appellant then signed two conflicting written statements on police statement forms. These forms contained an acknowledgment and waiver of constitutional rights. First, she signed a written statement which basically contained an explanation that the victim had shot himself. However, when she was told how many shots had entered the body of deceased, she said: 'Why in the hell didn't you tell me that in the first place and I would have told you the truth.' Appellant then signed a second written statement wherein she admitted shooting her husband and her intention to kill him. This final statement was taken over a period of approximately 25 munutes, from 7:05 a.m. to 7:30 a.m. The two detectives testified that appellant did not hesitate, lose her train of thought or express any lack of memory during the taking of that statement.
All the officers testifed that appellant appeared to be quite normal; one officer stated she was calm and soft spoken. Other officers stated she walked properly and displayed good balance. All said she appeared not to be intoxicated.
Were the statements given by appellant properly admitted?
This question has two aspects. First, we will consider appellant's contention that she could not make an intelligent waiver because of intoxication. There was substantial testimony to support the trial court's finding that appellant was capable of making an intelligent waiver. Furthermore, appellant herself never testified that she was intoxicated when making the statements. If there is substantial evidence to support the finding of the trial court it will not be disturbed. Sylvester v. Imhoff, 81 Wash.2d 637, 503 P.2d 734 (1972); State v. Braun, 82 Wash.2d 157, 509 P.2d 742 (1973).
Next, we will consider if the appellant asked for an attorney and if at that time all questioning should have stopped. The language of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473--474, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1627, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) is very...
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State v. Byers, 43491
...Corp. v. Pierce County, 84 Wash.2d 667, 529 P.2d 9 (1974); State v. Smith, 84 Wash.2d 498, 527 P.2d 674 (1974); State v. Chapman, 84 Wash.2d 373, 526 P.2d 64 (1974); House v. Erwin, 83 Wash.2d 898, 524 P.2d 911 (1974). Sergeant Franklin, the arresting officer who testified on the subject of......
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State v. Byers
...Corp. v. Pierce County, 84 Wash.2d 667, 529 P.2d 9 (1974); State v. Smith, 84 Wash.2d 498, 527 P.2d 674 (1974); State v. Chapman, 84 Wash.2d 373, 526 P.2d 64 (1974); House v. Erwin, 83 Wash.2d 898, 524 P.2d 911 The majority's statement that the facts here should be reviewed de novo because ......
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State v. Lord, 54385-2
...favored and the trial court is given wide latitude in determining whether or not to admit demonstrative evidence. State v. Chapman, 84 Wash.2d 373, 378, 526 P.2d 64 (1974); 5 K. Tegland, Wash.Prac., Evidence § 94, at 300 (3d ed. 1989). Illustrative evidence is appropriate to aid the trier o......
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State v. Shandola, No. 27923-1-II (Wash. App. 2/3/2004)
...71, 794 P.2d 850 (1990). We will not disturb a trial court's findings of fact if substantial evidence supports them. State v. Chapman, 84 Wn.2d 373, 376, 526 P.2d 64 (1974). We review the trial court's decision by engaging in the same analysis as the trial court. State v. Longshore, 141 Wn.......