State v. Chapple

• Decision Date: 29 September 1993
• Docket Number: No. 19856,19856
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Val C. CHAPPLE, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 95

861 P.2d 95

124 Idaho 525

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Val C. CHAPPLE, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 19856.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Sept. 29, 1993.

Larry EchoHawk, Atty. Gen., Michael A. Henderson, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-appellant. Michael A. Henderson argued.

Cox & Ohman, Idaho Falls, for defendant-respondent. Dean C. Brandstetter, argued.

WINMILL, Judge pro tem.

This is an appeal by the state from an order granting defendant Val C. Chapple's motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to the execution of a search warrant at Chapple's business. The state argues that the evidence should not have been suppressed because there was a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed when the warrant was issued. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.

This case stems from Val Chapple and Jill Olsen's alleged involvement in the trafficking of methamphetamine in Idaho Falls during the fall of 1991. On September 24, 1991, a confidential informant reported to Terry Morgan, of the Idaho Department of Law Enforcement, Bureau of Narcotics, that Cheryl Duncan, a known supplier of methamphetamine, had told the informant that Olsen was going to San Diego, to pick up a large shipment of methamphetamine. On September 24, 1991, in the presence of Officer Morgan, the informant telephoned Duncan to see if the drugs had arrived. Duncan indicated that it had not, but that she expected that it would arrive shortly and that there were a number of people waiting for it.

A warrant was obtained and, on September 26, 1991, Olsen's residence was searched. ¹ The search disclosed quantities of methamphetamine, packaging materials, cutting agent and records relating to drug trafficking.

On September 26, 1991, Kim Marshall of the Bonneville County Sheriff's Office received a report from another informant that Olsen had brought a large shipment of methamphetamine to Idaho Falls the prior evening. The informant also indicated that Val Chapple was giving out free samples of methamphetamine, informing prospective purchasers that they could return to purchase more if they desired. Marshall conveyed this information to Officer Morgan.

On September 27, Officer Morgan applied for a warrant to search Chapple's auto body shop for controlled substances, evidence of drug trafficking, business records, and indicia of occupancy and financial records. In his affidavit, Morgan described the information which he had received about Olsen's activities, and further indicated that he knew Chapple to be an associate of Olsen's. Morgan stated that Chapple resided in the auto body shop, and believed that he would have personal records there. Morgan also related the information obtained from Deputy Marshall that Chapple had been giving away free samples of methamphetamine on the previous day.

Later on September 27, a hearing on the search warrant application was held before District Judge Marvin Smith. Following the hearing, Judge Smith determined that probable cause had been shown, and issued a warrant for the search of Chapple's business. In executing the warrant, the police discovered approximately 110 grams of methamphetamine, various items of drug paraphernalia, approximately $26,000 in cash, a pistol and business records.

Chapple was bound over to the district court on charges of conspiracy to deliver methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, failure to affix a tax stamp, and racketeering. Counsel for defendant filed a motion to suppress on the assertion that the search of the shop violated Chapple's Fourth Amendment rights. Following a hearing on the motion, District Judge Ted V. Wood issued a Memorandum Decision and Order suppressing the evidence.

In his Memorandum Decision and Order, Judge Wood held that the statements of the confidential informant regarding Chapple's giving away free samples of methamphetamine did not provide the court with an adequate basis for the informant's knowledge and could not, by itself, support Judge Smith's issuance of a search warrant. Judge Wood also determined that the officer's statement that he knew Chapple to be an associate of Olsen's was a bald assertion of suspicion which could not be used to tie Chapple to Olsen's conduct. Judge Wood then concluded that removing these matters from Morgan's affidavit left Judge Smith without a substantial basis upon which to conclude that probable cause existed for the issuance of a search warrant for Chapple's place of business. Finally, Judge Wood rejected the state's argument that the warrant should nevertheless be upheld under the Leon "good faith" doctrine, finding that Officer Morgan intentionally or recklessly omitted material information from the warrant application.

From this order suppressing the evidence discovered in Chapple's Auto-Body, the state appeals.

Preliminarily, we note our standard of review in considering a trial court's suppression of evidence. This Court has stated that when a trial court has ruled on a motion to suppress evidence on constitutional grounds, our standard of review is one of deference to factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, but free review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found. See, State v. Brennan, 123 Idaho 553, 555, 850 P.2d 202, 204 (Ct.App.1993); State v. Peightal, 122 Idaho 5, 7, 830 P.2d 516, 518 (1992); State v. Weber, 116 Idaho 449, 776 P.2d 458 (1989).

In reviewing the issuance of a search warrant by a magistrate, the appellate court's function is limited to insuring that the magistrate had a "substantial basis" for concluding that probable cause existed, with great deference paid to the magistrate's determination. State v. Lang, 105 Idaho 683, 684, 672 P.2d 561, 562 (1983). In State v. Gomez, 101 Idaho 802, 623 P.2d 110 (1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 963, 102 S.Ct. 503, 70 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), the Idaho Supreme Court stated:

We note at the outset the somewhat deferential standard of appellate review used to test the sufficiency of affidavits in support of search warrants. Affidavits for search warrants should not be viewed and tested in a hypertechnical manner. A magistrate's determination of probable cause should be accorded great deference by the appellate court.

101 Idaho at 805, 623 P.2d at 113 (citations omitted). Under this standard, we consider Judge Wood's decision to suppress the evidence obtained in the execution of the search warrant at Chapple's auto body shop.

Each of Judge Wood's conclusions appear interconnected, leading him to the conclusion that Judge Smith did not have a "substantial basis for concluding probable cause existed." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332-33, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). However, central to that conclusion was his determination that a confidential informant's tip that Chapple was giving away samples of methamphetamine was the only evidence presented to Judge Smith which suggested that contraband would be found at Chapple's Auto Body. This provides an appropriate starting point for our evaluation of Judge Smith's decision.

The standard for considering hearsay statements from a confidential informant in search warrant applications has been previously stated by our Supreme Court. A judge who considers the warrant application is entrusted with the task of making a "practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." See State v. Lang, 105 Idaho 683, 684, 672 P.2d 561, 562 (1983) citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 227, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2326, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).

The Lang and Gates standard can best be understood in the context of the rules which it supplanted. Previously, the United States Supreme Court had suggested that the issuing judge use a two-pronged test to determine whether hearsay information could be used in establishing probable cause. The test required the government to demonstrate both the veracity of the informant and the basis of his or her knowledge. See, Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). Veracity could be demonstrated either through the general credibility of the informant or through the reliability of the particular information provided. The basis of the informant's information could be demonstrated either directly, by a statement describing the circumstances upon which the informant obtained his or her information, or indirectly, by including enough detail that the information became self-verifying. See, Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. at 114-15, 84 S.Ct. at 1514; Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. at 415, 89 S.Ct. at 588.

In Illinois v. Gates, supra, the Court abandoned the Aguilar- Spinelli standard as being unduly rigid and in its place adopted the "totality of circumstances" standard. This requires the magistrate to examine the full set of circumstances surrounding the warrant application, and not rigidly scrutinize any particular factors and from that point determine whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant. However, the Court did not completely abandon the two-pronged test of Aguilar- Spinelli but suggested that the two prongs are closely intertwined, so that "a deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability." 462 U.S. at 233, 103 S.Ct. at 2329. Thus, while the "totality of the circumstances" has eliminated the rigid requirements of "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" derived from the Aguilar- Spinelli decisions, these standards remain a useful first step in evaluating probable cause where...