State v. Stevens

• Decision Date: 04 February 2004
• Docket Number: No. 29057.,29057.
• Citation: 84 P.3d 1038,139 Idaho 670
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Patrick STEVENS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

84 P.3d 1038

139 Idaho 670

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Patrick STEVENS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 29057.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

February 4, 2004.

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Paul S. Sonenberg, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Karen A. Hudelson, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

LANSING, Chief Judge.

Patrick Stevens was convicted of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. He appeals the district court's order denying Stevens' motion to suppress evidence and an order determining that Stevens' motorcycle was subject to criminal forfeiture because it was used in the commission of the offense. We affirm the order denying the suppression motion, but we reverse the order of forfeiture of Stevens' motorcycle.

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The facts pertinent to this appeal are derived from the evidence presented on Stevens' suppression motion. For several months prior to Stevens' arrest, the police had been conducting surveillance at a residence where they knew methamphetamine was being sold ("the residence"). They eventually used an informant to conduct a controlled buy of methamphetamine from persons at the residence. The same informant told the police that Stevens was dealing in methamphetamine and had been purchasing two or three ounces of it at the residence every two to three days. Investigating officers also knew that Stevens had been the subject of several prior narcotics investigations. As police continued their surveillance of the residence, a few days after the informant described Stevens' activities, the surveilling detective saw Stevens arrive on a motorcycle. The detective could not see the door of the residence because it was located below ground level and the entrance was obscured by a fence, but he did see Stevens go down the steps toward the door. According to the detective, Stevens appeared to be pulling his wallet out of his back pocket as he started down the stairs. After being out of the detective's view for three to five minutes, Stevens reappeared and left on his motorcycle.

Based upon a belief that Stevens had just purchased drugs, the detective followed and then stopped him. The detective informed Stevens that he had been stopped for investigative purposes and asked if Stevens was carrying any weapons or drugs. Stevens admitted that he had in his possession two knives and a vial of methamphetamine, which he handed to the detective. He was arrested for possession of methamphetamine and transported to jail. During a search of his person incident to the arrest, police found more methamphetamine, $936 in cash, and papers that appeared to be ledgers of drug transactions. Based on this evidence, the police obtained a warrant to search Stevens' residence. Additional methamphetamine, paraphernalia, and cash were found in execution of that warrant.

The State charged Stevens with trafficking in 28 grams or more of methamphetamine, Idaho Code § 37-2732B(a)(4)(A), and requested criminal forfeiture of Stevens' motorcycle and $9,098 in cash found during the searches. Stevens moved to suppress the evidence seized from his person and residence and the statements he made to police. The district court denied Stevens' suppression motion. After a hearing on the forfeiture request, the court ordered forfeiture of both the cash and the motorcycle.

Stevens entered a conditional guilty plea to an amended charge of possessing methamphetamine with the intent to deliver, I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1)(A), reserving the right to appeal the district court's denial of his suppression motion and the forfeiture of his motorcycle. On appeal, Stevens contends that suppression should have been ordered because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him and because there was no showing of probable cause for the warrant authorizing the search of his home. Stevens also contends that the district court erred in ordering the forfeiture of his motorcycle.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Reasonable Suspicion for Stop

Stevens' initial contention is that the stop of his motorcycle was unjustified because the detective lacked reasonable suspicion that Stevens was involved in illegal activity. A police officer may, without violating constitutional rights, make an investigative stop of an individual if that officer reasonably suspects that the individual is or has been engaged in criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906 (1968); State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641, 644 (1998); State v. Zubizareta, 122 Idaho 823, 828, 839 P.2d 1237, 1242 (Ct.App.1992). Reasonable suspicion is a lesser standard than probable cause but is more than mere speculation or instinct on the part of the officer. State v. McCarthy, 133 Idaho 119, 124, 982 P.2d 954, 959 (Ct.App.1999). The reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop, and the "`whole picture' must yield a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that the individual being stopped is or has been engaged in wrongdoing." State v. Sevy, 129 Idaho 613, 615, 930 P.2d 1358, 1360 (Ct.App.1997). On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, an appellate court defers to the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous but exercises free review of the trial court's determination as to whether, on those facts, constitutional standards have been satisfied. DuValt, 131 Idaho at 552-53,961 P.2d at 643-44.

At the time of Stevens' detention, the detective was aware that Stevens had previously been the subject of investigation for illegal drug activity and had just made a brief visit to a residence where a confidential informant had recently made a drug buy. The same informant had told the police that Stevens made drug purchases at that location every two or three days and was selling drugs. Because police were using the informant to make controlled buys, it can be inferred that law enforcement officers considered the informant to be reliable. In addition, the informant's report had been somewhat confirmed by the fact that Stevens had just visited the residence. The detective saw Stevens reaching for his wallet as he approached the door, and Stevens had remained at the residence for a length of time that would have sufficed for conducting a drug transaction. Collectively, this information gave rise to reasonable suspicion that Stevens had made a drug purchase at the residence. The officer's inability to discern whether Stevens actually entered the house is of no consequence, for a drug purchase could have occurred at the threshold. It was therefore permissible for the detective to act on his reasonable suspicion by stopping Stevens for investigative purposes.

B. Probable Cause for Search Warrant

Stevens also contends that even if the traffic stop and the search of his person were legal, evidence found in his house should be suppressed because there was no probable cause for issuance of the search warrant.

A search warrant is appropriately issued if there is probable cause to believe that contraband or other evidence of a crime can be found at a particular location. State v. Josephson, 123 Idaho 790, 792-93, 852 P.2d 1387, 1389-90 (1993); State v. Molina, 125 Idaho 637, 639, 873 P.2d 891, 893 (Ct.App. 1993). The probable cause determination has been described by the United States Supreme Court as "a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before [the court], including the `veracity' and `basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, 548 (1983).

An appellate court reviewing whether a lower court properly issued a search warrant examines the information in the warrant affidavit and the recorded testimony in support of the warrant application to determine whether it provided a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. Molina, 125 Idaho at 639, 873 P.2d at 893; State v. Bulgin, 120 Idaho 878, 881, 820 P.2d 1235, 1238 (Ct.App.1991). Great deference is accorded to the probable cause determination of the court that issued the warrant. Molina, 125 Idaho at 639, 873 P.2d at 893; State v. Chapple, 124 Idaho 525, 527, 861 P.2d 95, 97 (Ct.App.1993).

In the present case, the facts offered in support of the warrant application included not only the information discussed above that justified the vehicle stop, but also the fact that several grams of methamphetamine, over $900 in cash, and documents that appeared to be drug ledgers were found on Stevens. This evidence indicated that Stevens' drug possession at the time of his arrest was not an isolated instance but a part of ongoing drug trade activities. Although this evidence did not point directly to Stevens' home as a repository of other contraband, courts are "entitled to draw reasonable inferences about where evidence is likely to be kept, based on the nature of the evidence and the type of offense." United States v. Whitner, 219 F.3d 289, 296 (3rd Cir.2000) (quoting United States v. Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir.1986)). Drug dealers typically need a place to store and utilize not only the drugs that they distribute but such items as scales, packaging materials, ledgers and cash. The magistrate considering the warrant application could reasonably infer that such evidence probably would be found at Stevens' home. Numerous courts have upheld a finding of probable cause for a search warrant in similar circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Hodge, 246 F.3d 301, 305-07 (3rd Cir.2001)

(holding magistrate could infer that evidence of drugs or paraphernalia would be located in experienced drug...