State v. Charles

• Decision Date: 19 November 1907
• Citation: 207 Mo. 40,105 S.W. 609
• Parties: STATE v. CHARLES et al.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

105 S.W. 609

207 Mo. 40

STATE v. CHARLES et al.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

November 19, 1907.

1. BAIL—IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS—DISCHARGE OF SURETIES.

If, in compliance with the condition of a recognizance, the defendant appears at the proper term to answer the charge preferred against him, and is ready to obey any order of the court, and the court fails to exercise its power in not making an order either to commit the defendant or otherwise secure his appearance at some subsequent time, the sureties are relieved of any further liability.

2. SAME—RELIEF FROM LIABILITY.

Where the accused is on bail, it is the court's duty, on a plea or verdict of guilty, to order him into the custody of the sheriff, and on the entering of the plea or return of the verdict the powers and duties of the sureties in respect to him cease.

3. SAME.

The conditions of a recognizance required the party to appear and answer the information, and not depart the court without leave. The party appeared at the time specified, pleaded guilty, was let free, and was not called to be sentenced until seven days thereafter. Held, that the principal's appearance and plea of guilty satisfied the conditions and released the sureties thereon.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Carroll County; John P. Butler, Judge.

Scire facias by the state against James Charles and others on a forfeited recognizance. From a judgment for the state, James Charles appeals. Reversed.

This cause is brought to this court by appeal on the part of the defendant James Charles, from a judgment in the circuit court of Carroll county upon an alleged forfeiture of recognizance. We deem it unnecessary to set forth in detail the entire record applicable to this cause, and shall be content with a substantial statement of the history of the cause from which this proceeding emanates, together with a sufficient reference to a recital of the record. Roy Charles, of Carroll county, Mo., was charged upon information filed by the prosecuting attorney with the offense of embezzlement. At the January term, 1905, of the circuit court of Carroll county, the defendant, as principal, and James Charles and Frank Yehle, two citizens of Carroll county, entered into a recognizance for the appearance of Roy Charles to answer the charge contained in the information. The recognizance, as disclosed by the record, was in the following form: "Comes the defendant, Roy Charles, as principal, and Frank Yehle and James A. Charles, as securities, and jointly and severally acknowledge themselves to owe the state of Missouri the sum of one thousand dollars, conditioned that the said Roy Charles shall personally be and appear on the first day of the next term, of this court, to be held at Carrollton, on the third Monday in April next, 1905, to answer and defend the information filed, charging him with embezzlement, and not depart the court without leave, then this recognizance to be void." The defendant appeared in the Carroll county circuit court in obedience to the conditions of his bond, on the first day of the April term, 1905. He appeared from day to day, commencing on the first day of the term, until Thursday, the 20th day of April, which was the 4th day of the term, when on that day the record discloses that he waived formal arraignment and entered a plea of guilty to the offense as charged in the information. The record entries touching what was done in respect to this defendant were as follows: "And afterwards and at the said April term, 1905, of the said Carroll county circuit court, on the 20th day of April, 1905, the same being the 4th day of the April term, 1905, of said court, the said information and cause coming on to be heard, the state appearing by the prosecuting attorney of said county of Carroll, and said defendant, Roy Charles, appearing in his own proper person and in open court waives formal arraignment under the information charging him with embezzlement as a public officer, and for plea thereto says that he is guilty as charged in said information. And afterwards, to wit, at said April term of said court and on the 27th day of April, 1905, the same being the 10th day of said term of said court, comes the state of Missouri, by W. J. Allen, prosecuting attorney, and moves the court that sentence and judgment be now entered against defendant, Roy Charles, in accordance with his plea of guilty. Whereupon, the said defendant, Roy Charles, is duly called to appear and receive sentence in accordance with his plea of guilty, and the said defendant, although duly called, makes default and comes not, as by his recognizance he was bound to do, but departed the court without leave, and did not remain and abide final judgment and sentence of the court as by his recognizance he was bound to do."

Following these entries of record it is sufficient to state that the usual course of procedure was adopted. Scire facias was issued and returned duly served. Defendant filed a demurrer to the scire facias, which was by the court overruled. There was also an application for a change of venue filed, which was by the court denied. Defendant James Charles then filed his answer, which in its last analysis substantially presents the claim and contention that, when the defendant Roy Charles appeared in the circuit court, the cause was called for trial upon the information charging the defendant with embezzlement, that he then and there waived formal arraignment and entered his plea of guilty, that this was a compliance with the conditions of the bond, and that the defendant Charles, as one of his securities, was no longer liable upon his bond for his failure to be in court, and that his appearance and entering a plea of guilty was a complete answer to the information as conditioned in the bond. A controversy arose as to what was done in respect to the defendant being permitted to go until a future date, when he agreed to appear to receive sentence. There was oral evidence concerning this controverted question, however, that is outside of the disclosures of the record proper respecting what was done, concerning the substantial question in dispute, and therefore we do not deem it essential to reproduce the oral evidence introduced, and it did not constitute any part of the record proper in this proceeding, and therefore will not be considered in the final disposition of this case. The trial court heard the proceedings upon the issues presented by the scire facias and answer, and found the issues for the state, and rendered judgment for the penalty designated in the recognizance. Timely motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment were filed by the appellant, James Charles, which were by the court overruled, and the defendant James Charles in due time and proper form prosecutes his appeal to this court, and the record is now before us for review.

Scott J. Miller, for appellant. The Attorney General, for the State.

FOX, P. J. (after stating the facts as above).

It is manifest that the main proposition disclosed by the record before us is whether or not the appearance of the defendant, as shown by the record in the circuit court of Carroll county, and his waiver of formal arraignment and his plea of guilty to the offense charged in the information, constitutes such answer to the information as contemplated by the conditions of the bond, and whether or not it is such a compliance with the requirements of the bond as would relieve his sureties from the results of a forfeiture of such recognizance taken at a subsequent time for failure to appear in court to receive sentence and judgment upon his plea of guilty.

Our statute, in providing for the taking of a recognizance for the appearance for trial in the circuit court in cases of felony, does not expressly provide the form of such recognizance, nor does it undertake to designate or specify particularly what the conditions of such recognizance shall be. It simply makes provision that in cases where bail is allowed a recognizance may be taken, and provides what officers shall take it, and how it shall be certified. This doubtless brought about the announcement of the rule in State v. Poston, 63 Mo., loc. cit. 523, where the learned judge deciding that case said: "There is no substantial difference between a recognizance at common law and the one provided for by our statute." While the forms of bail bonds taken in this state, and even in other jurisdictions, are quite similar, and it may be said are substantially the same, yet an examination of this question has convinced us that very often the terms employed in the conditions of a bond are very dissimilar. There are recognizances entered into conditioned not only for the appearance to answer a criminal charge or a quasi-criminal charge, but there is also embraced the additional stipulation that "the defendant will submit to and obey all orders and judgments of the court."

At the very threshold of the consideration of the legal proposition confronting us in this cause we find that the appellate courts of this state, both the Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court, have indicated in no un-uncertain terms their unwillingness to extend the obligation of sureties beyond what is clearly contemplated by the terms employed in the conditions of the bond. In the case of State v. Mackey, 55 Mo. 51, the recognizance recited that "the defendant would appear to answer an indictment for certain offenses which was pending against him, on the first day of the next term of the circuit court to be begun and held in the county where such indictment was pending, and would not depart...