State ex rel. Webster Groves Sanitary Sewer Dist. v. Smith

• Citation: 87 S.W.2d 147,337 Mo. 855
• Parties: State of Missouri at the Relation of Webster Groves Sanitary Sewer District, Relator, v. Forrest Smith, State Auditor
• Decision Date: 07 October 1935
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

87 S.W.2d 147

337 Mo. 855

State of Missouri at the Relation of Webster Groves Sanitary Sewer District, Relator, v. Forrest Smith, State Auditor

Supreme Court of Missouri

October 7, 1935

Peremptory writ of mandamus issued.

Alva C. Trueblood, B. H. Charles and Carl Trauernicht for relator.

(1) The Sewer District Act, Laws 1933-34, Ex. Sess., p. 119, is not unconstitutional either: (a) Under Section 28, Article IV of the Constitution, because all of the provisions of the act are germane to the subject expressed in the title. State v. Price, 229 Mo. 670, 129 S.W. 650; Thomas v Buchanan County, 330 Mo. 627, 51 S.W.2d 95; State v Ward, 328 Mo. 658, 40 S.W.2d 1076. Nor is the act void as containing more than one subject; all the powers conferred by the act have reference to sewers; and the title of the act expresses the subject matter of the act. State ex inf Attorney General v. Curtis, 319 Mo. 316, 4 S.W.2d 467. (b) Nor is the act unconstitutional as containing a provision for a tax levy to cover estimated expenses of maintaining the district corporation, when that provision is not mentioned in the title. It is not required of a title that it be a comprehensive index of the act. (c) Nor because sections 21 to 28 of the act provide for the subdivision of the district for the constructing of lateral sewers, for the issuance of sewer revenue bonds to cover the cost of laterals in such subdistricts and the raising of revenue funds by rental charges for the service of laterals; nor do said sections constitute a subject separate from the general subject of sewers. These sections amplify the act and provide an appropriate method of constructing local laterals after trunk-line sewers may have been constructed for the whole district. These sections cover the subject of sewers, as do the other sections of the act. (d) Nor is the act unconstitutional as being an attempt to provide for creating a new class of municipal corporation contrary to Section 7 of Article IX of the Constitution. State ex inf. Attorney General v. Curtis, 319 Mo. 316, 4 S.W.2d 467; Harris v. Bond Co., 244 Mo. 692, 149 S.W. 603. (e) Nor is it unconstitutional as diminishing the corporate powers of a city, town or village, any part of which may be embraced within the sewer district. State ex inf. Attorney General v. Curtis, 319 Mo. 316, 4 S.W.2d 467. (f) Nor is the act unconstitutional as being a special or local law in violation of Paragraphs (2), (11), (12) and (15) of Section 53, Article IV of the Constitution. (g) A law is not local nor special, within constitutional prohibitions, if applicable alike to all of a given class where the classification is not arbitrary nor unreasonable. Thomas v. Buchanan County, 330 Mo. 627, 51 S.W.2d 95; State v. McCann, 329 Mo. 748, 47 S.W.2d 95; Waterman v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Works, 328 Mo. 668, 41 S.W.2d 575; Springfield v. Smith, 19 S.W.2d 1, 322 Mo. 1129. (h) Population is a proper basis for classification. State ex inf. Attorney General v. Curtis, 319 Mo. 316, 4 S.W.2d 467. (i) Nor is the act unconstitutional as depriving interested parties of property without due process of law by limiting the nature of objections to two propositions only; because the act contains no restrictions as to other objections. (j) This view is confirmed by the form the statutory notice set out in the next preceding section, where notice to property owners must be in a form to advise them that they may examine the petition and report and file exceptions "to all or any part thereof." (k) The proceedings for the formation and incorporation of the district do not of themselves deprive any property owner of his property. They merely create a legal entity. Garden of Eden Drain. Dist. v. Bartlett Trust Co., 50 S.W.2d 627, 330 Mo. 554; State v. Dawson, 284 Mo. 490, 225 S.W. 100; Buschling v. Ackley, 270 Mo. 165, 192 S.W. 729. (1) A public corporation may be created under an act which affords no hearing whatsoever. The creation of a public corporation is primarily a legislative act. A hearing is indeed required, under certain circumstances, with respect to the organization of benefit districts. But this act does not create benefit districts. Harris v. Bond Co., 244 Mo. 664, 149 S.W. 603; State ex rel. v. Thompson, 315 Mo. 66, 285 S.W. 57. (m) The payment of election expenses by the county is not in aid of this district, but is a payment made in fulfilling one of the governmental purposes of the county itself. State ex rel. v. Board of Education, 141 Mo. 49, 41 S.W. 924. (n) This situation is no different from that of a county or a school district or a road district which embraces a municipality. The county, the district and the municipality each has its separate debt limit. 6 McQuillin, Mun. Corp. (2 Ed.), sec. 2373; Stamford v. Stamford, 109 Conn. 596, 141 A. 894; 44 C. J., p. 1190, sec. 4161. (2) The fact that provision is made in Sections 21 to 28 of the act for the issuance, on a simple majority vote, of sewer revenue bonds payable from rentals derivable from lateral sewers, does not render the act unconstitutional. (a) Bonds of that class do not come within the provisions of Section 12, Article X of the Constitution. State ex inf. Attorney General v. Curtis, 319 Mo. 316, 4 S.W.2d 467; State ex rel. Hannibal v. Smith, 74 S.W.2d 367, 335 Mo. 825. (3) Even if there were any portions of the act that for any reason might be deemed unconstitutional, such provisions could be elided and a thoroughly workable act would remain. State ex rel. Audrain County v. Hackmann, 275 Mo. 534, 205 S.W. 12; State ex rel. McDonald v. Lollis, 326 Mo. 644, 33 S.W.2d 98; Kristanick v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 74 S.W.2d 890, 335 Mo. 60; State v. Hall, 75 S.W.2d 582. (a) The act itself, Section 40, Laws 1933-34, Ex. Sess., p. 135, is express authority therefor. Note, 73 L.Ed. 287-306. (4) "Proper disposition of sewerage is essential to public health and the passage of laws making such possible is obviously a proper exercise of the police power." State ex inf. Attorney General v. Curtis, 319 Mo. 326, 4 S.W.2d 467; Morrison v. Morey, 146 Mo. 562; Dillon on Mun. Corp., secs. 93-96; Cooley on Taxation (4 Ed.) 202. (5) The circuit court had jurisdiction to create the district. It is no valid objection to jurisdiction that the engineer's plan provided for two separate and distinct trunk line sewers to serve two watersheds, because the facts show that these two watersheds were really related parts of an area which, according to the engineer's plan, were both to be served by common outlet. Joplin v. Wilder, 217 Mo. 271, 116 S.W. 1081; Southworth v. Glasgow, 232 Mo. 128, 132 S.W. 1168; 57 C. J. 540; Pioneer v. Portland, 119 Ore. 7, 247 P. 319. (6) Neither the act nor the authorities required that the amount of the proposed bond issue should be definitely stated in the proposition submitted to the voters of the district. Secs. 5, 7, Laws 1933-34, Ex. Sess., pp. 123, 124.

Roy McKittrick, Attorney General, Covell R. Hewitt, Assistant Attorney General, and John L. Graves for respondent.

(1) When the bond involved in this proceeding was presented to respondent for registration it became his duty to determine whether or not all of the conditions of law had been complied with in the issuance thereof. Secs. 2915, 2920, R. S. 1929. (2) In determining whether all conditions of the law had been complied with in the issuance of the bond, it was the duty of the respondent to determine, among other things, whether or not the bond was being issued by a legally organized entity. State ex rel. Burkley v. Thompson, 323 Mo. 248, 19 S.W.2d 714; State ex rel. School Dist. v. Thompson, 325 Mo. 1170, 30 S.W.2d 603. (3) Sections 21 to 25 inclusive, are unconstitutional and void in that said sections thereof provide for subdivision of any district, provide for the adoption of plans and specifications for lateral sewers, for the issuance of sewer revenue bonds by a majority vote for the purpose of anticipating the revenue of any subdistrict and other subjects pertinent thereto, because the subject matter constitutes a subject different and separate from the general subject covered by the act and was not referred to in the title thereto, contrary to the provisions of Section 28, Article IV of the Constitution, and Section 12, Article X of the Constitution of Missouri. Sec. 28, Art. IV, Const. of Mo.; State ex rel. v. Hackmann, 292 Mo. 31; State ex rel. v. Roach, 258 Mo. 560; State ex inf. Attorney General v. Armstrong, 286 S.W. 705. (a) Section 36 purports to authorize the organization of sewer districts for any contiguous area within and partly without or wholly without or wholly within one or more cities, towns or villages of the State of Missouri, located within any county now having a population of not less than 150,000 nor more than 400,000 inhabitants. Said provision is not embraced in the title and is germane thereto, and does not have a reasonable or natural connection with the subject named in the title, and is violative of Section 28, Article IV of the Constitution of Missouri. Sec. 28, Art. IV, Const. of Mo.; State ex rel. v. Hackmann, 292, Mo. 31; State ex rel. v. Roach, 258 Mo. 560. (b) Where the title is less comprehensive than the body of the act, so much of the law as is not embraced in or germane to the title is invalid. State v. Weber, 205 Mo. 44. (c) So much of the body of the act as goes outside of, beyond or adds to the purposes expressed in the title of the act, is unconstitutional. The subject must be single and clearly expressed in the title. Sec. 28, Art. IV, Const. of Mo.; State ex inf. v. Borden, 164 Mo. 236; Berry v. Majestic Milling Co., 284 Mo. 190; State v. Walker, 309 Mo. 108; State ex rel. v. Gordon, 268 Mo. 733; State v. Sloan, 258 Mo. 314; State v. Fulks, 207 Mo. 40; State ex rel. v. Schofield, ...