State v. Chasteen
| Citation | 97 S.E.2d 517,231 S.C. 141 |
| Decision Date | 08 April 1957 |
| Docket Number | No. 17279,17279 |
| Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Charlie CHASTEEN, Appellant. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina |
G. Ross Anderson, Jr., Anderson, for appellant.
Rufus Fant, Anderson, for respondent.
Appellant was tried in November 1955 upon an indictment which contained two counts, (1) assault with intent to ravish, and (2) assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature. The prosecutrix was an eleven-year-old girl. The first count charged a very serious crime, which may be punished by death. Code, Sec. 16-72. One convicted is disfranchised by Sec. 6 of Art. II of the constitution.
The appellant testified and on cross-examination, over objection, admitted that he had pleaded guilty in 1949 in a federal court in the State of Georgia to a charge of assault with intent to ravish. The testimony was admitted only for the purpose of attacking the credibility of the defendant-witness, and the jury were so instructed. He was convicted on the second count of the indictment and sentenced to seven years imprisonment. He appeals upon the ground that the cross-examination was irrelevant and prejudicial. He makes no question of incompetency of the evidence of the former crime because it was too remote in time and we shall intimate no opinion thereabout.
Upon consideration of the leading case of State v. Robertson, 26 S.C. 117, 1 S.E. 443, it is found to be controlling of the instant appeal. It was a prosecution for rape which resulted in a verdict of guilt with recommendation to mercy, and appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment. The sheriff testified to a former warrant which charged the defendant with assault and battery on a woman. Objection was sustained to the evidence as indirectly assailing defendant's character; but in argument to the jury the solicitor made reference to it. There was an exception to the admission of the evidence in impeachment of the character of the defendant for veracity; and a second exception alleged error in allowing argument thereabout to the jury. Thus the exceptions implied that the evidence was admitted; and the court so considered the appeal. The exceptions were overruled and it was concluded that when a defendant accepts the privilege of testifying he puts his character in issue so far as truthfulness is concerned; in the words of the opinion, The result of the decision was that the evidence of the former charge against the defendant for assault and battery on a woman was admissible, and the fair subject of argument to the jury by the solicitor. Thus the authority of the cited case fits this 'like a glove.' It was the first case that construed and applied in this particular the statute of 1866 which is now Sec. 26-405 of the Code of 1952, 'In the trial of all criminal cases the defendant shall be allowed to testify,' etc.
In State v. Wyse, 33 S.C. 582, 12 S.E. 556, State v. Robertson was cited with approval and evidence that the defendant, who testified, had been previously convicted of petit larceny was held admissible in impeachment of his testimony; and it was said that it is competent to impeach the credibility of a witness by production of the record of his conviction of an infamous offense, which necessarily affects his character. State v. Williamson, 65 S.C. 242, 43 S.E. 671, approved the cross-examination of a defendant as to a prior indictment for perjury. Evidence was admitted in State v. Van Williams, 212 S.C. 110, 46 S.E.2d 665, of the prior convictions of the defendant (who testified) of housebreaking and larceny and grand larceny. In State v. Corn, 215 S.C. 166, 54 S.E.2d 559, cross-examination of the defendant as to prior convictions by court martial of robbery and larceny was approved.
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State v. Britt
...witnesses, and his truth and veracity may be impeached in a proper way. State v. Bigham, 133 S.C. 491, 131 S.E. 603, and State v. Chasteen, 231 S.C. 141, 97 S.E.2d 517. It is also a primary principle in criminal procedure that the State cannot in any way attack the character of the defendan......
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State v. Ball, 22705
...goods]; Daniel v. Hazel, 242 S.C. 443, 131 S.E.2d 260 (1963) [conspiracy to obtain property under false pretenses]; State v. Chasteen, 231 S.C. 141, 97 S.E.2d 517 (1957) [assault with intent to ravish]; State v. Gregg, 230 S.C. 222, 95 S.E.2d 255 (1956) [accessory to bank robbery]; State v.......
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State v. Gadsden
...a witness may be impeached by questioning the witness concerning prior convictions for crimes of moral turpitude. See State v. Chasteen, 231 S.C. 141, 97 S.E.2d 517 (1957). This Court has never decided whether aiding and abetting prostitution is a crime of moral We need not decide that issu......
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State v. Young
...disagree. A defendant who testifies may be cross-examined on evidence which fairly tends to affect his credibility. State v. Chasteen, 231 S.C. 141, 97 S.E.2d 517 (1957). Here, the Solicitor's questions were proper to rebut Young's testimony that, following the shooting he did not know the ......