State v. Van Williams

• Decision Date: 03 March 1948
• Docket Number: 16053.
• Parties: STATE v. VAN WILLIAMS et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

46 S.E.2d 665

212 S.C. 110

STATE v. VAN WILLIAMS et al.

No. 16053.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

March 3, 1948

George W. Keels, of Florence, for appellant.

Sidney S. Tison, Sol., of Bennettsville, for respondent.

BAKER Chief Justice.

At the June, 1947, term of the Court of General Sessions for Darlington County, Harry Van Williams was found guilty as an accessory before the fact to breaking and entering a house with intent to commit a felony, or other crime of a lesser grade, on an indictment charging him, along with Clyde Dixon and John E. Richardson, in one count with the breaking and entering and in another charging them with being accessories before the fact. From his conviction Harry Van Williams has appealed to this Court.

Appellant was examined as a witness in his own behalf, and after he closed his case the State was permitted, over his objection to introduce as testimony in reply records of his previous convictions of housebreaking and larceny and grand larceny. In admitting the testimony the Court said: 'I understand those are indictments offered solely as to the question of veracity.' Solicitor acquiesced in this understanding on the part of the Court and expressly declared: 'We offer them solely for the purpose of attacking the credibility of the defendant as a witness, not as proof of his having committed the crime for which he is now being tried.'

Appellant contends that this testimony was inadmissible for any purpose because not in reply, and not coming within the intent and purpose of section 1012-1, Code of Laws, S.C., 1942, removing the disqualification as witnesses of persons convicted of crime, but permitting the fact of such conviction to be shown, and also because it constituted an attack upon his character and reputation when he had not placed his character and reputation in issue. He also complains of improper argument by the Solicitor to the jury in relation to these previous convictions.

We are not at all purporting to decide that this testimony was not in reply, but if it be conceded that it was not, we do not think that this would be any ground for the reversal of the judgment of the Circuit Court. If appellant felt aggrieved by what he claims to be new matter brought into the case after he had closed his testimony, his remedy was to request the Court to permit him to offer additional evidence by way of rejoinder. If he had any testimony to offer in response to this alleged new matter and had requested the Court to permit him to offer it, no doubt such permission would have been granted, but he made no such request, and he is now in no position to complain. The rule governing a situation of this kind is thus stated in Ford v. A. A. A. Highway Express, Inc., et al., 204 S.C. 433, 29 S.E.2d 760, 763:

'The general rules for the introduction of testimony must necessarily be so often applied or relaxed according to circumstances apparent only to the Court engaged in conducting the trial, that a strict uniformity at all times is not to be expected, and indeed, in some instances would prove injurious to the interests of justice. The Courts are agreed, accordingly, that the order of proof must be left to the sound discretion of the trial Court, and such Court will not be reversed unless it clearly appears that the Court has abused its discretion. Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 6, § 1873 p. 517.

'The jury heard all of the evidence, and they have heard none but what was proper for them to hear. The only objection is that they did not hear it at the appropriate time, and that the defendants were thereby prejudiced. We do not think that the contention is sound that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to offer the wagon wheels in evidence while offering his evidence in chief. This evidence was purely in rebuttal, and had no place in the case until the defendants offered evidence tending to show that the truck hit the left front wheel of the wagon.

'If appellants had desired to present evidence by way of rejoinder, they should have moved for permission to do so. Walker v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 92 S.C. 188, 75 S.E. 1024.'

See also State v. Jones, 29 S.C. 201, 7 S.E. 296.

It also seems unnecessary to decide whether this testimony comes within the intent and purpose of section 1012-1 of the Code removing the disqualification of witnesses previously convicted of crime, because we think the testimony was competent, either with or without the aid of section 1012-1, and that it was not an improper attack upon appellant's character and reputation, as he contends when he had not placed his character and reputation in issue. When appellant elected to testify in his own behalf he...