State v. Chavez
| Decision Date | 08 December 1968 |
| Citation | 761 P.2d 607,111 Wn.2d 548 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 57 USLW 2222 STATE of Washington, Appellant, v. Manuel Ruelas CHAVEZ, DOB: |
Dennis DeFelice, Franklin County Prosecutor, Robert A. Ellis, Deputy, Pasco, for appellant.
Daniel M. Arnold, Richland, for Chavez.
Arthur J. Bieker, Pasco, for Blackman, et al.
Terry J. Bloor, Richland, for Rotter.
At issue in these four consolidated cases is the validity of a local court rule providing that an action brought against a juvenile may be dismissed if there is more than a 30-day delay between the completion of the police investigation and the filing of an information by the prosecuting attorney.
LJuCR 7.14(b), as written by aBenton/Franklin County Superior Court judge, was circulated among the Benton/Franklin County Superior Court judges for comment, approval or disapproval in January 1986. No objection being made to the rule, it was deemed adopted. The rule provided:
To Dismiss for Delay in Referral of Offense, the Court may dismiss an information if it is established that there has been an unreasonable delay in referral of the offense to the Court. For purposes of this rule, a delay of more than thirty (30) days from the date of completion of the police investigation of the offense to the time of filing of the charge shall be deemed prima facie evidence of an unreasonable delay. Upon a prima facie showing of unreasonable delay, the Court shall then determine whether or not dismissal or other appropriate sanctions will be imposed. Among those factors otherwise considered, the Court shall consider the following: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the impact of the delay on ability to defend against the charge; and (4) the seriousness of the alleged offense. Unreasonable delay shall constitute an affirmative defense which must be raised by motion not less than one (1) week before trial. Such motion may be considered by affidavit.
Following its approval by the judges, the rule was submitted to the Office of the Administrator for the Courts for filing. This procedure was consistent with that regularly followed by the Benton/Franklin County Superior Court judges when adopting or amending local rules. The rule was filed and became effective on April 28, 1986.
The January 1986 adoption of LJuCR 7.14(b) was nowhere documented. Neither a filed action nor a court order was entered in the county clerk's records for Franklin or Benton Counties following the rule's January 1986 adoption. Nor was LJuCR 7.14(b) submitted to the local bar for comment prior to adoption. Adoption of the rule was, however, announced at the April 24, 1986 Legal Process Quarterly Review Meeting held at the Benton/Franklin County Unable to find a court order or filed action in the county clerk's office documenting majority approval, the Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney challenged whether LJuCR 7.14(b) had been adopted by proper majority procedure. The Benton/Franklin County Superior Court judges addressed the lack of documentation at a June 9, 1986 meeting. All judges present ratified LJuCR 7.14(b) as previously adopted. 1
Juvenile Justice Center. The rule was read to those present, including local attorneys and court officials
Following adoption of LJuCR 7.14(b), the cases against four juvenile defendants were dismissed pursuant to a superior court finding that the delay between completion of the police investigation and filing of the information by the prosecuting attorney was unreasonable under the four LJuCR 7.14(b) factors. 2
The relevant facts and dates resulting in dismissal of each of these four cases are as follows.
MANUEL RUELAS CHAVEZ
--------------------
2-12-86 Date of alleged criminal activity
1-19-86 Completion of police investigation
and submittal to prosecutor
6-11-86 Filing of information charging second
degree burglary
A period of approximately 4 months elapsed between the completion of the police investigation and the filing of the information. The former prosecuting attorney, the Honorable C.J. Rabideau, who filed the appellate brief in the Chavez and Rotter cases, concedes that he purposefully delayed filing charges after the motions to dismiss were A period of approximately 4 months elapsed between the police investigation and the filing of the information. After reviewing the LJuCR 7.14(b) factors, the court dismissed the second degree burglary charge against the defendant. Again, as indicated above, the former prosecuting attorney stated that he had purposefully delayed filing charges in order to challenge LJuCR 7.14(b) on appeal. The court determined that CR 83 and GR 7 had been complied with and that LJuCR 7.14(b) was not prima facie unreasonable. The court stated that in reviewing the LJuCR 7.14(b) factors, the length of delay and reason for the delay were the most important considerations. The court observed that the offense was serious but made no specific findings regarding prejudice to the defendant's ability to defend due to the delay. The court concluded, however, that the seriousness of the offense and the lack of actual prejudice were outweighed by the length of and the reason for delay.
A period of over 6 months elapsed between the completion of the police report and the filing of the information. No excuse was given for the delay. The court dismissed the third degree assault charges against the defendant after determining that although the assault charge was serious, the delay caused by the prosecutor would damage the defendant's ability to defend herself, even if only slightly.
The State then sought review of the four dismissals in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in turn, certified the cases to this court. 4 We accepted certification on October 15, 1987.
Three issues are presented.
ISSUE ONE. Did the Superior Court for Benton and Franklin Counties lawfully adopt the local rule in question, LJuCR 7.14(b)?
ISSUE TWO. Does the local rule, LJuCR 7.14(b), violate the separation of powers doctrine?
ISSUE THREE. Was the local rule, LJuCR 7.14(b), properly applied when the court dismissed the four defendants in this case?
ISSUE ONE.
CONCLUSION. The Benton/Franklin County Superior Court local juvenile court rule (LJuCR 7.14(b)) was not improperly adopted pursuant to this court's guidelines in CR 83 and GR 7 and is consistent with the policy of prompt adjudication that underlies the juvenile justice system.
In promulgating and amending local court rules governing practice and procedure, superior courts must follow the guidelines set forth by this court in CR 83 and GR 7. CR 83 contains three requirements. First, the adoption or amendment of a local rule must be made by action of the majority of the court. Second, the local rule must not be inconsistent with the general rules of procedure as established in the Official Rules of Court that govern all superior courts in this state. Third, the local rule or amendment becomes effective only after being filed with the state Administrator for the Courts in accordance with GR 7.
Like CR 83, GR 7 requires local rules to be consistent with those promulgated by the Supreme Court, and adds that they also should conform to those rules in numbering and format. GR 7 also states that adoptions and amendments are effective only after they have been filed with the state Administrator for the Courts.
The Benton/Franklin County Superior Court judges satisfied the first requirement of CR 83 by adopting LJuCR 7.14(b) by majority action in January 1986. CR 83(a) does The judges also satisfied the requirement of CR 83 and GR 7 that a local rule must be consistent with the general rules of procedure in the Official Rules of Court.
not state that a formal action must be filed or that a court order must be entered in the records of the county clerk to prove majority action. However advisable such a course might be, these words not being included in the plain language of the...To continue reading
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...holding in Burnet. See Harbor Enters., Inc. v. Gunnar Gudjonsson, 116 Wash.2d 283, 293, 803 P.2d 798 (1991) (citing State v. Chavez, 111 Wash.2d 548, 554, 761 P.2d 607 (1988)); CR 83(a). Trial courts have been required to perform the Burnet analysis before excluding witnesses for late discl......
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