State v. Chhom

Decision Date13 December 2007
Docket NumberNo. 78463-9.,No. 78464-7.,78463-9.,78464-7.
PartiesSTATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Sarun CHHOM, Petitioner. State of Washington, Respondent, v. Dennis Dean Steever, Petitioner.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Christine Anne Jackson, Attorney at Law, Public Defender, Seattle, WA, for Petitioner.

Deanna Jennings Fuller, Attorney at Law, Prosecuting Atty, King County, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.

MADSEN, J.

¶ 1 The common issue in this consolidated case is whether a defendant is detained "outside the county" for purposes of former CrRLJ 3.3(g)(5) (2002) (tolling the time for trial)1 when serving a sentence imposed by a court of limited jurisdiction within the charging county in a detention facility located outside the county. Petitioners Dennis Steever and Sarun Chhom were convicted of misdemeanor offenses in Seattle municipal court and Bellevue municipal court, respectively, but served their sentences in the Yakima County jail under an interlocal agreement between the King County cities and Yakima County. At the time, Steever and Chhom had additional charges pending in different King County district courts.

¶ 2 Although they asked to proceed with the adjudication of the pending charges, the State made no attempt to bring them to trial until they completed their sentences in Yakima. The district courts dismissed the charges for violation of the time-for-trial rule, concluding that the time for trial did not toll during the petitioners' detention in Yakima. The Court of Appeals came to the opposite conclusion, reinstated the charges, and remanded for trial. We agree with the district courts and the superior court in Steever that a defendant is not held "outside the county" within the meaning of former CrRLJ 3.3(g)(5) when the defendant is sent outside the county to serve a sentence imposed by a court of limited jurisdiction within the county. We reverse the Court of Appeals.

FACTS

¶ 3 In response to an existing and projected shortage in jail capacity within King County, the 2002 legislature amended the City and County Jails Act, chapter 70.48 RCW, to allow cities to contract with other cities or counties for jail services. Laws of 2002, ch. 125, § 1. On August 27, 2002, 35 King County cities entered into an interlocal agreement with Yakima County for the housing of the cities' criminal defendants in the Yakima County jail.2 Many of the cities also contract with one another or with King County for the housing of prisoners. The city of Seattle, for example, has contracts with King County and the city of Renton to house prisoners in the King County jail and the Renton municipal jail.

¶ 4 The interlocal agreement between the cities and Yakima authorizes Yakima County to remove an inmate from the jail upon written authorization of the committing court "or by order of any court having jurisdiction." Appellant's Reply Br. (App. 1, at 10). Under the agreement, the cities pay a daily fee for housing an inmate in the county jail. The daily fee includes "a minimum of one (1) roundtrip transport every day, seven days a week" (id. at 7) between the Yakima County jail and any detention facility in King County. The agreement obligates Yakima County "to transport as many City Inmates as are available for such transport." Id. at 8.

Chhom

¶ 5 On February 5, 2003, the city of Seattle charged Chhom in the Shoreline division of the King County District Court with second degree driving while license suspended. The court issued a bench warrant when Chhom failed to appear at a postarraignment pretrial hearing. On April 3, 2003, he was arrested and booked into the King County jail on an outstanding warrant arising from his conviction on another driving while license suspended charge brought by the city of Bellevue. Chhom was transported to the Yakima County jail to serve his sentence pursuant to Bellevue's interlocal agreement with Yakima County. On April 14, 2003, his attorney notified the King County District Court that Chhom was detained in Yakima and that he wished to have the Shoreline matter adjudicated. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 60. No action was taken until Chhom was released on June 19, 2003. That day, he was booked into the King County jail on the Shoreline warrant, and then released on his personal recognizance. CP at 55-57.

¶ 6 On October 3, 2003, the district court granted Chhom's pretrial motion for dismissal for violation of the time-for-trial rule, ruling that former CrRLJ 3.3(g)(5) (excluding period of detention "outside the county") did not apply to the period of Chhom's detention in Yakima. The State filed a RALJ appeal. CP at 27. The superior court reversed the district court. CP at 80. The Court of Appeals granted discretionary review and consolidated the case with Steever's.

Steever

¶ 7 On August 6, 2002, Steever was charged in King County District Court with driving while under the influence and first degree driving while license suspended/revoked. CP at 70, 133. On January 23, 2003, he was arraigned in-custody, while detained on unrelated charges filed by the cities of Burien and Seattle. CP at 102, 135. In February 2003, he was convicted of the unrelated charges and transported to the Yakima County jail to serve his sentences. CP at 102. On February 19, 2003, Steever's attorney appeared at a hearing on his behalf. He informed the court that Steever was incarcerated in Yakima on the Burien and Seattle convictions but wished to proceed. CP at 110. Instead, the State requested a bench warrant so that Steever would be transported to the King County jail following the completion of his sentence in Yakima. His trial was set for July 14, 2003. He moved for dismissal for violation of the time-for-trial rule. On August 7, 2003, the district court granted the motion after concluding that the period of detention in Yakima County jail did not toll the time for trial on the King County charges. CP at 78. The State appealed the decision in superior court, which affirmed the district court. The Court of Appeals granted discretionary review.

¶ 8 The Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court in Chhom's case, reversed the superior court in Steever's case, and remanded for trial. The court held that the time Chhom and Steever were detained in Yakima is excluded from the time-for-trial calculation under the plain language of former CrRLJ 3.3(g)(5). This court granted discretionary review.

ANALYSIS

CrRLJ 3.3(g)(5)

¶ 9 A defendant must be brought to trial within 60 days of arraignment if he is detained in jail and within 90 days if he is not. Former CrRLJ 3.3(c)(1). This court has interpreted the phrase "[d]etained in jail" to mean detained on the current charge. State v. Hardesty, 149 Wash.2d 230, 231, 66 P.3d 621 (2003). The remedy for a violation of the time-for-trial rule is dismissal with prejudice. Former CrRLJ 3.3(i) (2002). Former CrRLJ 3.3(g)(5) excludes from the calculation of the time-for-trial the period of time that a person is detained outside the county:

(g) Excluded Periods. The following periods shall be excluded in computing the time for arraignment and the time for trial:

. . . .

(5) The time during which a defendant is detained in jail or prison outside the county in which the defendant is charged or in a federal jail or prison and the time during which a defendant is subjected to conditions of release not imposed by a court of the State of Washington.

¶ 10 The Court of Appeals determined that under the plain language of the rule the period of the petitioners' incarceration in Yakima is excluded from the time-for-trial on the charges pending in King County district court. The petitioners contend that the court erred in interpreting "detained . . . outside the county" as referring solely to a defendant's geographical location. They urge this court to interpret "detained . . . outside the county" to mean detained by another county or one of its political subdivisions. In their view, the Court of Appeals decision is inconsistent with the language of the rule when read as a whole and leads to arbitrary and absurd results.

¶ 11 The State responds that the Court of Appeals correctly gave effect to the plain language of the rule. The State argues that the court's interpretation of the rule properly acknowledges the impracticality of requiring courts to simultaneously litigate multiple cases. In the State's view, accepting the petitioner's interpretation would result in "chaos" and unnecessary dismissals as the most prolific cross-jurisdictional offenders assert their speedy trial rights.

¶ 12 We interpret a court rule as though it were enacted by the legislature, giving effect to its plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent. State v. Greenwood, 120 Wash.2d 585, 592, 845 P.2d 971 (1993). Plain meaning is discerned from reading the rule as a whole, harmonizing its provisions, and using related rules to help identify the legislative intent embodied in the rule. State v. Williams, 158 Wash.2d 904, 908, 148 P.3d 993 (2006).

¶ 13 When interpreting a court rule, this court has eschewed a literal reading of the language where such a reading fails to effectuate the intent of the rule. In Hardesty, 149 Wash.2d 230, 66 P.3d 621, we interpreted the language "detained in jail" in CrR 3.3(c)(2)(ii). The Court of Appeals had determined that "[t]he plain language of the definition of time elapsed in district court is not restricted to those defendants in jail on the offense charged." State v. Hardesty, 110 Wash.App. 702, 710, 713, 42 P.3d 450 (2002). On review, the State argued that the Court of Appeals erred in interpreting the phrase "detained in jail" in CrR 3.3(c)(2)(ii) to mean, literally, "detained in any Washington jail on any charge." Hardesty, 149 Wash.2d at 234, 66 P.3d 621.

¶ 14 We agreed that the phrase "detained in jail," as the Court of Appeals held, literally meant "detained in any Washington jail on any charge." Howeve...

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