State v. Williams

• Decision Date: 30 November 2006
• Docket Number: No. 76625-8.,76625-8.
• Citation: 148 P.3d 993,158 Wn.2d 904
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Matthew Arthur W. WILLIAMS, Respondent.

Page 993

148 P.3d 993

158 Wn.2d 904

STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Matthew Arthur W. WILLIAMS, Respondent.

No. 76625-8.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued October 27, 2005.

Decided November 30, 2006.

Thomas E. Weaver Jr., Attorney at Law, Bremerton, WA, for Petitioner.

Randall Avery Sutton, Kitsap Co. Prosecutor's Office, Port Orchard, WA, for Respondent.

MADSEN, J.

¶ 1 Matthew Williams challenges his conviction for possession of an unlawful firearm pursuant to RCW 9.41.190. Williams claims that instruction 11, the "to convict" instruction, was a misstatement of the law because it failed to inform the jury that in order to convict him it must find he knew the characteristics of the firearm that made it unlawful under RCW 9.41.190. We hold the State must prove that a defendant knows, or should know, the characteristics of the firearm that make it unlawful.

¶ 2 Nevertheless, we conclude that the defect in instruction 11 was harmless. There is no dispute that Williams' knowledge of the law prohibiting him from possessing the shotgun at issue is irrelevant to the question of guilt. He is presumed to know the law. Because the barrel of the shotgun that Williams possessed was shortened to only 13 inches, 5 inches shorter than the law permits, the evidence of his guilt is overwhelming. Although Williams arguably presented a sympathetic explanation for possessing the gun, such considerations were for the prosecuting attorney in deciding initially whether to charge Mr. Williams with possession of an unlawful firearm. We affirm.

FACTS

¶ 3 In April 2003, Mr. Williams was helping his grandmother move out of her house and into another residence. While he was cleaning out his grandmother's garage he came across his deceased grandfather's shotgun. Mr. Williams took the shotgun and placed it in the bathroom that was inside the back bedroom — the bedroom that had been his grandmother's — because there was a lock on that door and the garage did not have a lock. He then locked the door to the bedroom to prevent others from stumbling upon the gun and hurting themselves.

¶ 4 The following week, Mr. Williams was leaving his grandmother's house to run some errands when Deputy Sheriff Mark Malloque approached him and inquired about a certain juvenile suspect for whom Malloque was looking. Mr. Williams said that the juvenile was not at his grandmother's house. At Deputy Malloque's request Mr. Williams allowed him to search the house for the juvenile. He unlocked the bedroom door to allow Deputy Malloque to look for the juvenile. Inside the bathroom Malloque saw the shotgun sitting on top of the toilet tank and noticed that the barrel was shorter than allowed by law. When asked about the weapon Williams initially denied knowing anything about the gun. Upon further inquiry, he said the gun came from the garage. Deputy Malloque arrested Mr. Williams. Williams said he did not understand why he was being arrested until Deputy Malloque informed him that the gun was too short. The barrel on the shotgun measured 13 1/8 inches with an overall length of 24 3/8 inches. Report of Proceedings (RP) (jury trial, July 29, 2003) at 105. The State charged Mr. Williams with one count of possession of an unlawful firearm pursuant to RCW 9.41.190(1).

¶ 5 At trial, the court advised the jury in instruction 11 that to convict the defendant it must find beyond a reasonable doubt, "(1) [t]hat on or about April 23, 2003 [Williams] did knowingly have in his possession or under his control a short-barreled shotgun and (2)[t]hat the acts occurred in the State of Washington." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 56. The State proposed that the jury be instructed that "[i]t is not a defense to a criminal charge that the Defendant believe [sic] his or her conduct was lawful. Ignorance of the law is no excuse for criminal conduct." RP at 132. The State argued that the purpose of the instruction was to preclude defense counsel from arguing that the defendant did not know this particular weapon was illegal. The trial court declined to give the proposed instruction.

¶ 6 In closing argument defense counsel argued that under instruction 11 Williams had to know that the shotgun was a short-barreled shotgun but did not have to know it was illegal. In contrast, the State argued that Williams did not have to know the weapon was a short-barreled shotgun in order for the jury to convict him.

¶ 7 The jury found Mr. Williams guilty, and the court sentenced him to 45 days in jail (with possibility of jail alternatives). Williams appealed his conviction, arguing that the State needed to prove that he knew the facts that made the firearm illegal. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the State need only prove that a defendant knowingly possessed the unlawful firearm. State v. Williams, 125 Wash.App. 335, 340-41, ¶ 15, 103 P.3d 1289 (2005).

ANALYSIS

¶ 8 Mr. Williams argues that an essential element of possession of an unlawful firearm is knowledge that the firearm in question has the characteristics of an unlawful firearm. He claims that the "to convict" instruction given in this case erroneously omitted this knowledge requirement. Accordingly, he contends, his conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered under proper instructions. The State argues that it need only prove that a defendant knowingly possessed the firearm.¹

¶ 9 RCW 9.41.190 provides that "[i]t is unlawful for any person to manufacture, own, buy, sell, loan, furnish, transport, or have in possession or under control, any machine gun, short-barreled shotgun, or short-barreled rifle." Because the statute contains no express knowledge element we must decide whether the legislature intended to hold those who possess these weapons strictly liable.

¶ 10 Statutory interpretation is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. Am. Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Steen, 151 Wash.2d 512, 518, 91 P.3d 864 (2004). The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent and purpose. Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C., 146 Wash.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). This is done by considering the statute as a whole, giving effect to all that the legislature has said, and using related statutes to help identify the legislative intent embodied in the provision in question. Id. at 9-10, 43 P.3d 4.

¶ 11 While this court has not decided whether knowledge is an element of RCW 9.41.190, we have determined that knowledge is an element of RCW 9.41.040(2)(a), second degree unlawful possession of a firearm. State v. Anderson, 141 Wash.2d 357, 5 P.3d 1247 (2000). RCW 9.41.040 prohibits convicted felons from possessing firearms. In Anderson, this court relied on the test from Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994), adopted by this court in State v. Bash, 130 Wash.2d 594, 925 P.2d 978 (1996), in finding that the legislature did not intend second degree unlawful possession of a firearm to be a strict liability crime. In Staples, the defendant argued that the government was required to prove that he knew the features of his firearm that brought the weapon within the requirements of the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872, which criminalized possession of an unregistered machine gun. Because the act did not contain a knowledge element, the Court considered several factors to decide whether Congress intended to create strict liability. These factors include: (1) the background rules of the common law and its conventional mens rea requirement, (2) whether the crime can be characterized as a public welfare offense, (3) the extent to which a strict liability reading of the statute would encompass innocent conduct, (4) the harshness of the penalty, (5) the seriousness of the harm to the public, (6) the ease or difficulty of the defendant ascertaining the true facts, (7) relieving the prosecution of time-consuming and difficult proof of fault, and (8) the number of prosecutions expected. Staples, 511 U.S. at 615-19, 114 S.Ct. 1793. The considerations identified in Staples must be applied "in light of the principle that offenses with no mental element are generally disfavored." Anderson, 141 Wash.2d at 363, 5 P.3d 1247.

¶ 12 In Anderson, application of the Staples' factors led to the conclusion that the legislature did not intend to eliminate mens rea from RCW 9.41.040. Id. Accordingly, we held that the State must prove knowing possession to sustain a conviction.

¶ 13 The gun possession offenses created in RCW 9.41.040 and .190 implicate various levels of knowledge. State v. Warfield, 119 Wash.App. 871, 878, 80 P.3d 625 (2003). Under RCW 9.41.190, at issue here, there are three possible points at which knowledge might be relevant: knowledge of the possession itself, knowledge that possessing a short-barreled shotgun, short-barreled rifle, or machine gun is illegal, and knowledge of the weapon's characteristics that makes possession of the weapon unlawful.

¶ 14 With regard to knowledge of possession, in State v. O'Neal, 126 Wash.App. 395, 414-15, 109 P.3d 429 (2005), the court dismissed the defendant's conviction for possession of a machine gun without prejudice because the charging document failed to include knowledge of the possession as an element of the crime. Similarly, in Warfield, 119 Wash.App. 871, 878, 80 P.3d 625, the court held that knowing possession is an element of the crime of possession of an unlawful firearm under RCW 9.41.190. The decisions in O'Neal and Warfield were based, in part, on this court's decision in Anderson. We agree that our reasoning in Anderson compels the result reached by the Court of Appeals in those cases.

¶ 15 Here, the trial court instructed the jury in instruction 11 that to convict Williams of the crime of unlawfully possessing a short-barreled shotgun it must find that "[Williams] did knowingly have in his possession or under his control a short-barreled shotgun." CP at 56. The trial...