State v. Chism

Decision Date03 February 2005
Docket NumberNo. 20030412-CA.,20030412-CA.
Citation107 P.3d 706,2005 UT App 41
PartiesSTATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Derek Chad CHISM, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtUtah Court of Appeals

Margaret P. Lindsay, Provo, for Appellant.

Mark L. Shurtleff, Atty. Gen., and Kenneth A. Bronston, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for Appellee.

Before BILLINGS, P.J., DAVIS, and THORNE, JJ.

OPINION

THORNE, Judge:

¶ 1 Derek Chad Chism appeals his conviction for attempted possession of cocaine, a class A misdemeanor. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(A)(i) (2002). He argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence, contending that the arresting officer violated his Fourth Amendment rights by detaining him to run a computer check on his identification without reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity. We reverse.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 On June 2, 2001, Deputy Utah County Sheriff James Randall was patrolling Redwood Road north of Highway 73 in Utah County. At approximately midnight, Randall stopped a vehicle after he observed it following another vehicle too closely. Chism was a passenger in the back seat of the stopped vehicle.

¶ 3 Upon approaching the stopped vehicle, Randall noticed the smell of tobacco smoke coming from inside the vehicle and observed two packs of cigarettes on the dashboard. Randall suspected that the five occupants of the car, including Chism, "appeared to be juveniles and not old enough to possess tobacco." Randall asked the vehicle's occupants to stick out their tongues, and observed a brown residue on some of their tongues. This indicated to Randall that these individuals had been using tobacco.1 Randall asked the occupants about their tobacco use and they all admitted to smoking tobacco.

¶ 4 Randall then asked everyone in the vehicle for identification "so [he] could be sure that the occupants of the vehicle would be old enough to be in possession of tobacco." Each of the five produced identification.2 Chism produced a driver license indicating that he was nineteen years old, of age to possess tobacco in Utah. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-105(1) (2003) ("Any 18 year old person who ... has in his possession any cigar, cigarette, or tobacco in any form is guilty of a class C misdemeanor[.]"). Randall testified that the picture on the license appeared to be Chism's, and that the license did not appear to have been altered. Nevertheless, Randall took all five identification cards back to his vehicle to "verify that the information on the identification they gave [him] was valid." Randall later testified that he did this because the identifications could have been false and that it is his standard procedure to verify identifications through a computer check.

¶ 5 Randall ran a computer check on the identification cards, from which he learned that Chism had a warrant out for his arrest.3 Randall arrested Chism on the warrant and proceeded to search the area of the vehicle where he had been seated. Randall found a backpack that Chism admitted was his. A search of the backpack revealed two baggies, one containing a white crystalline substance ultimately determined to be cocaine, and another that Chism admitted he used to store marijuana. Chism admitted ownership of both baggies. ¶ 6 The State charged Chism with possession of cocaine and drug paraphernalia. Chism moved to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to his arrest, arguing that Randall violated his Fourth Amendment rights by detaining him to run a computer check without reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Randall had identified "specific and articulable facts" supporting his suspicion that Chism was illegally possessing tobacco.4 The court found that "[Randall's] subjective observation of [Chism's] age conflicted with the identification presented," and that the brief detention while the identification was verified was reasonable in light of that disparity.

¶ 7 After the denial of his motion to suppress, Chism entered a Sery plea, pleading guilty to one count of attempted possession of cocaine but preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. See State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938-39 (Utah Ct.App.1988). He now brings this appeal.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 8 Chism argues that he was illegally seized when Randall retained his driver license to run a computer check on it without having reasonable suspicion that he was committing a crime. "If a case involves a mixed question of fact and law, we afford some measure of discretion to the district court's application of the law." State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 26, 63 P.3d 650.5 "The measure of discretion afforded varies, however, according to the issue being reviewed." Id.

¶ 9 "When a case involves the reasonableness of a search and seizure, `we afford little discretion to the district court because there must be state-wide standards that guide law enforcement and prosecutorial officials.'" State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36,¶ 12, 78 P.3d 590 (quoting Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at ¶ 25, 63 P.3d 650). "State-wide standards also help ensure different trial judges will reach the same legal conclusion in cases that have little factual difference." Id. (quoting Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at ¶ 25, 63 P.3d 650). The supreme court recently clarified that it considers the standard applied in Hansen and Warren to be synonymous with a "non-deferential" review for "correctness." State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ¶ 15, 103 P.3d 699.

ANALYSIS

¶ 10 The only issue before the court is whether Randall's detention of Chism to conduct a computer check on his identification violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.6 Randall's only basis for detaining Chism was the suspicion that Chism was underage to possess tobacco. Chism produced identification that, if valid, should dispel that suspicion in a reasonable person. Randall articulated no objective facts supporting a reasonable belief that Chism's identification was false or unreflective of his true age. Accordingly, Randall had no reasonable basis to further detain Chism after he presented identification.

¶ 11 Three levels of constitutionally permissible encounters between police officers and citizens exist:

"(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has an `articulable suspicion' that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the `detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop'; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe an offense has been committed or is being committed."

Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, ¶ 10, 998 P.2d 274 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). The undisputed facts of this case place it in the second category, an investigatory detention requiring reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. Cf. State v. Cripps, 533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn.1995) (determining, in the context of alcohol consumption, that a police officer's request for age identification is more than a simple inquiry into identity and constitutes a seizure).

¶ 12 An officer may initiate a so-called level two stop "when `specific and articulable facts and rational inferences ... give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person has or is committing a crime.'" State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125,¶ 35, 63 P.3d 650 (quoting United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir.1990) (alteration in original)). The reasonableness of a level two stop is "evaluated objectively according to the totality of the circumstances." State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, ¶ 14, 78 P.3d 590; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). An officer "must be able to point to specific facts which, considered with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion." Warren, 2003 UT 36 at ¶ 14, 78 P.3d 590. Officers "must `diligently pursue a means of investigation that is likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly,'" and it is unlawful to continue the detention after reasonable suspicion is dispelled. State v. Bissegger, 2003 UT App 256, ¶¶ 19-20, 76 P.3d 178 (emphasis and alterations omitted) (quoting State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994)).

¶ 13 Chism argues that State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991), controls the disposition of this matter. In Johnson, the defendant was the sole passenger in a vehicle that was stopped for an equipment violation. See id. at 762. The driver could not produce the vehicle's registration and the name on her driver license did not match that of the registered owner. See id. These facts led the investigating officer to suspect that the car was stolen. See id. Based only on this suspicion, the officer requested Johnson's identification and ran a warrants check on both passenger and driver. See id. The warrants check revealed an arrest warrant for Johnson, and a search of her backpack incident to her subsequent arrest produced illegal drugs. See id. The Utah Supreme Court reversed Johnson's drug conviction, reasoning that her detention for a warrants check went "beyond what was reasonably related in scope to the traffic stop [and] was not justified by an articulable suspicion that defendant had committed a crime." Id. at 764.

¶ 14 The State's argument suggests that under State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994), a detention for a computer check is reasonable any time that an officer has reasonable suspicion to temporarily detain a person and request identification. However, Lopez determined only that a warrants check on a driver does not exceed the permissible bounds of a traffic stop if it does not significantly extend the period of detention beyond that "reasonably necessary to request a driver's license and valid registration and...

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