State v. Civil Service Com'n

• Decision Date: 12 November 2003
• Docket Number: No. ED 82428.,No. ED 82384.,ED 82384.,ED 82428.
• Citation: 120 S.W.3d 279
• Parties: STATE of Missouri ex rel. Addington STEWART, Individually and on Behalf of Other Similarly Situated African American Firefighters, Relator/Respondent, v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS, John H. Clark, Stanley Newsome, Sr., and Kay Leonard, Respondents/Appellants, and St. Louis Firefighters Association Local 73, Bruce Williams, Robert Shy, and Daniel Sutter, Intervenors/Appellants.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

120 S.W.3d 279

STATE of Missouri ex rel. Addington STEWART, Individually and on Behalf of Other Similarly Situated African American Firefighters, Relator/Respondent, v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS, John H. Clark, Stanley Newsome, Sr., and Kay Leonard, Respondents/Appellants, and St. Louis Firefighters Association Local 73, Bruce Williams, Robert Shy, and Daniel Sutter, Intervenors/Appellants.

No. ED 82384.

No. ED 82428.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Two.

November 12, 2003.

Richard P. Perkins, Diekemper, Hammond, Shinners, Turcotte and Larrew, P.C., St. Louis, MO, for appellants.

Althea P. Johns, Law Office of Althea P. Johns, St. Louis, MO, for respondent.

Mark Lawson, Associate City Counselor, St. Louis, MO, for respondents.

KATHIANNE KNAUP CRANE, Judge.

The Civil Service Commission of the City of St. Louis, along with its members, (the Commission) appeals from the trial court's judgment prohibiting it from using promotional lists for battalion chief and fire captain that had previously expired. The Commission contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss for lack of standing, issuing a writ of prohibition on a petition that requested a writ of mandamus, and holding that the city charter did not give the Commission the authority to reinstate a promotional list after it expired. Intervenors, St. Louis Firefighters Association Local 73 and three of its members, also appeal, and assert that the court erroneously interpreted and applied the law governing the Commission's authority and discretion. We affirm.

In March, 2002 the City of St. Louis (City) administered examinations to applicants in the Fire Department for the positions of battalion chief and fire captain. These examinations were given in order to create a promotional list for the positions of battalion chief and fire captain. Relator, Addington Stewart, a fire captain who was an acting battalion chief and who was on the existing promotional list for battalion chief, took the March, 2002 examination.

Because of the possibility that the security of the examination process had been compromised, the March, 2002 examinations were not scored and not used to create a new promotional list. On September 6, 2002, William Duffe, the Director of Personnel for the City, intentionally allowed the existing promotional lists for battalion chief and fire captain to expire pursuant to Rule VI, Section 16 of the City's Civil Service Rules (the Rules), which provide for "employment lists" to remain in force for two years. On September 13, 2002, Mr. Duffe sent a memorandum to the Commission, advising it that the lists had expired, that the mayor had requested him to extend the lists, and that he did not believe he had the authority to extend the lists once they had expired. He referred the matter to the Commission pursuant to Article XVIII of the Charter of the City of Saint Louis, Missouri (the Charter).

The Commission thereafter solicited written comments and a legal opinion. Relator was among those who submitted comments opposing the extension of the existing lists. On October 17, 2002, the Commission issued findings and a written decision requiring that the eligible lists for fire captain and battalion chief be reinstated on October 16, 2002, not to expire again until October 15, 2003.

On October 24, 2002, relator filed a "Petition for Writ of Mandamus," pursuant to section 536.150 RSMo (2000), requesting the circuit court to issue an order in mandamus directing the Commission to rescind its decision of October 17, 2002 that reinstated the lists. He alleged that the decision harmed him because he would lose the chance to improve his position on the battalion chief list through retesting and to compete for positions within the department on a regular basis. The trial court thereupon entered a Preliminary Order in Mandamus ordering the Commission to answer the petition. The Commission filed an answer and a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, which the trial court denied. Thereafter, intervenors filed a motion to intervene and an answer. Intervenors included firefighters who were on the battalion list only, the fire captain list only, or on no list. The trial court granted the motion to intervene and proceeded with a bench trial.

In its judgment the trial court determined that the facts alleged entitled relator to prohibition even though the petition was titled mandamus. It concluded that the Commission acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it voted to reinstate the eligibility lists and it prohibited the Commission from using the expired eligibility lists for the positions of captain and battalion chief "for any promotional purposes."

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Relator brought this proceeding pursuant to section 536.150 which provides for circuit court review of a non-contested administrative decision. Mo. Nat. Educ. v. Mo. State Bd. of Educ., 34 S.W.3d 266, 274 (Mo.App.2000). In non-contested cases the circuit court conducts a de novo review in which it hears evidence on the merits of the case, makes a record, determines the facts, and decides whether, in view of those facts, the agency's decision is unconstitutional, unlawful, unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise involves an abuse of discretion as set out in section 536.150.1. Id.; Mosley v. Members of Civil Service Bd., 23 S.W.3d 855, 858 (Mo.App.2000). The circuit court does not defer to the agency's factual findings or credibility assessments and is not required to conform doubtful evidence to the agency's decision. Mo. Nat. Edu., 34 S.W.3d at 274. However, section 536.150.1 does not allow the court to substitute its discretion for discretion legally vested in the administrative agency. Id.

On appeal from a circuit court judgment rendered pursuant to section 536.150, we review the judgment of the circuit court, not the decision of the administrative agency. Id. Our review of the circuit court's judgment in a noncontested case is essentially the same as our review of a judgment in a court-tried case. Id. We review the circuit court's judgment to determine whether its finding that the agency decision was or was not unconstitutional, unlawful, unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or the product of an abuse of discretion rests on substantial evidence and correctly declares and applies the law. Id. at 275.

I. Standing

For its first point the Commission claims that the trial court misapplied the law in denying its motion to dismiss that part of the petition that challenged the Commission's decision to reinstate the promotional list for fire captain because relator already held the position of fire captain, and did not allege any injury or threatened injury to his private rights as a fire captain sufficient for standing.

Standing is a question of law that we review de novo. HBA v. City of Wildwood, 32 S.W.3d 612, 614 (Mo.App.2000). "Standing is the requisite interest that a person must have in a controversy before the court." Mo. Nat. Educ., 34 S.W.3d at 275. It is not related to a person's capacity to sue, but is an adversary's interest in the subject of the suit as an antecedent to the right of relief. Id.

Section 536.150 allows judicial review of an agency decision in a noncontested case when the agency decision determines the "legal rights, duties or privileges of any person," in other words, a decision involving individual rights and interests. Id.; May Department Stores Co. v. State Tax Commission, 308 S.W.2d 748, 756 (Mo.1958). Thus, for a person seeking judicial review under section 536.150 to have standing, the agency decision must affect that person's private rights. Mo. Nat. Edu., 34 S.W.3d at 275.

Whether a person has standing to seek judicial review of the decision is a question of law that depends upon a number of factors, including the nature and extent of the person's interest in the subject matter, the character of the administrative action, and the terms of the statute that created the right or the method of review. Id. at 276. See State ex rel. Rouveyrol v. Donnelly, 365 Mo. 686, 285 S.W.2d 669, 676 (Mo. banc 1956); Farmer's Bank of Antonia v. Kostman, 577 S.W.2d 915, 920 (Mo.App.1979); State ex rel. Schneider v. Stewart, 575 S.W.2d 904, 909 (Mo.App.1978). See also 73A C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure Section 189 (1983).

In his petition relator challenged the Commission's decision reinstating the expired lists for fire captain and battalion chief. As previously set out, he alleged how the decision harmed him with respect to the battalion chief list, and the Commission concedes that he has the requisite interest to challenge the decision with respect to that list. However, the Commission takes the position that he cannot challenge the entire decision, but only part of it. We disagree.

Section 536.150 provides for review of a "decision." The Commission's decision did not distinguish between the lists, but revived them both in one order based on one set of findings. The question of whether the decision was unconstitutional, unlawful, unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or the product of abuse of discretion does not turn on whether the list so revived was the captain list or the battalion chief list. Relator is an individual whose private rights were directly affected by the Commission's decision reviving the expired lists. Relator has standing to contest that decision.

The trial court did not misapply the law in concluding that relator had standing. Point one is denied.

II. Remedy of Prohibition

For its second point the Commission contends that the trial court misapplied the law when it sua sponte granted the remedy of prohibition on a petition requesting a writ of mandamus. It argues that relator failed to establish that he was entitled to a writ of mandamus, and therefore the trial court should have dismissed the petition rather than grant prohibition.

The petition, which was...