State v. Clark
| Decision Date | 17 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 48117 |
| Parties | STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JASON EDWARD CLARK, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho, Washington County. Hon. Susan E. Wiebe, District Judge.
Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jenny C Swinford, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon Raul R. Labrador, Attorney General; John C. McKinney, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
Jason Edward Clark appeals from the judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance in violation of Idaho Code § 37-2732(c)(1). Clark argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We reverse the denial of the suppression motion, vacate Clark's conviction, and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In August 2019, Officer Stratton initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle after observing it make a U-turn in the middle of the highway without headlights or brake lights. Officer Stratton contacted the vehicle's driver, Clark; activated the body camera; and asked for Clark's identification.
As Clark was getting his identification, Officer Stratton observed a second identification card in Clark's wallet and asked for it too. As Clark was getting the second identification card, Officer Stratton questioned Clark about what was in a case in his vehicle. Clark told Officer Stratton the case contained sunglasses. Officer Stratton responded it did not look like a sunglasses case and asked to look inside, but Clark declined to open the case. Officer Stratton then questioned Clark about the discrepancy in the length of hair between the two identification photographs and Clark explained he sometimes grows his hair out.
After obtaining Clark's documents, Officer Stratton spoke about the sunglasses case to Sergeant Singleton, who was also on the scene as a cover officer and an on-scene supervisor. Officer Stratton told Sergeant Singleton that Officer Stratton asked Clark what was in the case; he would not open it; and "there's drugs in there." Both Officer Stratton and Sergeant Singleton returned to Officer Stratton's patrol vehicle, at which time Officer Stratton contacted dispatch to perform a driver's check on Clark.
While in the patrol vehicle, Officer Stratton continued to discuss with Sergeant Singleton Officer Stratton's belief the sunglasses case contained drugs, his desire to search the case, and whether they should call a drug dog to the scene. Thereafter, Officer Stratton's body camera stops recording. The camera begins recording again approximately three and a half minutes later and as Officer Stratton approaches Clark to inform him that his driver's license is expired.
Officer Stratton then returned to his patrol vehicle and discussed with Sergeant Singleton the discrepancies between Clark's two identifications, including the weight discrepancies[1] and that the photographs appeared to depict two different people. Based on the discrepancies, Officer Stratton contacted dispatch and attempted to obtain a recent booking photograph of Clark. Officer Stratton continued investigating the discrepancies between Clark's identifications until the drug dog arrived.[2] Thereafter, the dog alerted on Clark's vehicle, and methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia were discovered in the vehicle.
The State charged Clark with possession of a controlled substance and drug paraphernalia. Clark filed a motion to suppress, arguing the State could not establish reasonable suspicion to justify an extension of the traffic stop and seeking to suppress "all evidence, oral or tangible, obtained from [Clark]." During the suppression hearing, both Officer Stratton and Sergeant Singleton testified, and the videos from their body cameras were admitted into evidence. Importantly for purposes of this appeal, Officer Stratton testified about contacting the drug-dog handler during the traffic stop, stating "I called [the drug-dog handler] on my cell phone as he was off, and he was at home." Likewise, Sergeant Singleton testified Officer Stratton called a drug dog to the scene.
After the hearing, the district court issued a written decision denying Clark's suppression motion. The court found that, Officer Stratton "used his cell phone to call for the [drug dog]"; "this call does not appear on the video"; and "there is a break in Officer Stratton's body camera video after about 5 minutes of recording." Further, the court found that, although "it is unclear exactly when Officer Stratton called for a [drug dog], it likely occurred approximately 5 minutes into the stop, after the second discussion between the officers of suspected narcotics." As relevant to this appeal, the court concluded that "the inquiry into the availability of a [drug dog] did not constitute the abandonment of the traffic stop, and was therefore lawful." In support, the court quoted the rule in State v. Still, 166 Idaho 351, 356, 458 P.3d 220, 225 (Ct. App. 2019), overruled by State v. Karst, 170 Idaho 219, 220, 509 P.3d 1148, 1149 (2022), that "a radio call to inquire if a drug dog is available does not constitute [an] abandonment" of the traffic stop's mission under Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015).
After the district court denied his suppression motion, Clark pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance and reserved his right to appeal the denial. Clark timely appeals.
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
Clark challenges the district court's order denying his suppression motion, arguing "Officer Stratton unlawfully extended the traffic stop to request a drug-dog unit without reasonable suspicion to justify the extension." The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants and implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); Atkinson, 128 Idaho at 561, 916 P.2d at 1286. Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct. App. 1998).
The tolerable duration of an officer's inquiries during a traffic stop is measured in reference to the stop's mission. State v. Riley, 170 Idaho 572, 578, 514 P.3d 982, 988 (2022). That mission includes, without limitation, addressing the traffic violation; determining whether to issue a traffic citation; and making ordinary inquiries incident to the stop, such as checking the driver's license and proof of insurance. Id. The officer's authority for the seizure ends when the officer has completed or reasonably should have completed the tasks related to the stop's mission. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005).
An officer may conduct certain unrelated checks during a traffic stop without independent reasonable suspicion, so long as the check does not prolong the stop. Riley, 170 Idaho at 578, 514 P.3d at 988; see also Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 356-58. Although a drug-dog sniff is not part of the stop's mission, such a sniff is constitutionally permissible if executed in a reasonable manner that does not infringe on a constitutionally protected privacy interest, Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409-10, and does not prolong the stop. Riley, 170 Idaho at 578, 514 P.3d at 988.
The critical question in determining whether a drug-dog sniff unconstitutionally extended a traffic stop is whether the sniff "prolonged or added time to the overall duration of the traffic stop." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); Karst, 170 Idaho at 227, 509 P.3d at 1156. "[A] dog sniff does not prolong the stop where one officer pursues the original objective of the stop while another officer conducts the dog sniff." Riley, 170 Idaho at 579, 514 P.3d at 989. If, however, an officer without independent reasonable suspicion deviates or detours from the stop's mission for a sniff, he may unconstitutionally delay the stop. Id. For example, "a dog sniff unlawfully prolongs the stop where the officer detours from the stop to radio for a drug dog, even if it only extends the seizure by mere seconds." Id.; Karst, 170 Idaho at 227, 509 P.3d at 1156 ().
In this case, the district court ruled that Officer Stratton did not unlawfully extend the traffic stop's duration because "the inquiry into the availability of a [drug dog] did not constitute the abandonment of the traffic stop, and was therefore lawful." In support, the court relied on the ruling in Still that "a radio call to inquire if a drug dog is available does not constitute [an] abandonment...
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