State v. Karst

• Decision Date: 11 May 2022
• Docket Number: Docket No. 48593
• Citation: 509 P.3d 1148
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Desiree Elaine KARST, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

509 P.3d 1148

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.Desiree Elaine KARST, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 48593

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, May 2021 Term.

Filed: May 11, 2022

Erik D. Fredericksen, Idaho State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, attorney for Appellant. Jenny Swinford argued.

Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, attorney for Respondent. Mark Olson argued.

BRODY, Justice.

Desiree Elaine Karst appeals the district court's partial denial of her motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop. Karst asserts the police sergeant impermissibly extended the traffic stop when he briefly interrupted his traffic-related investigation to contact dispatch and request a drug-dog unit at the scene. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, citing its recent decision in State v. Still , 166 Idaho 351, 458 P.3d 220 (Ct. App. 2019). This Court granted Karst's petition for review. We overrule Still , reverse the district court's decision, and remand this case for further proceedings.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 29, 2017, Sergeant Jeremy Hyle with the Kootenai County Sheriff's Office stopped a truck outside Post Falls, Idaho, for multiple minor traffic violations. Sergeant Hyle observed two occupants in the vehicle, whom he later identified as Jeremy Guydos and Desiree Elaine Karst. Karst was seated in the passenger seat and was not wearing a seatbelt. Sergeant Hyle requested Guydos’ license, registration, and insurance. Sergeant Hyle also requested Karst's information. She responded verbally but did not produce any form of identification.

As Sergeant Hyle started to return to his patrol vehicle, he stopped and radioed dispatch to request that a drug-dog unit respond to the scene. According to Sergeant Hyle at the hearing on the motion to suppress, he requested a drug-dog unit because the truck was coming from a suspected drug location and the Guydos’ name had come up in connection with drug investigations:

the house the truck was coming from in the beginning was the suspected drug location that [officers] had intel on, and Mr. Guydos—I actually recognized his name when I met him or when I contacted him that night, that his name had come up in drug investigations and drug intel previously, and then based on the movement that he made, leaning over towards Ms. Karst, that's common with people trying to either obtain or conceal a weapon or evidence of contraband of some sort, and based on all that I wanted [a drug-dog unit] to come run the truck with [a] canine.

The time it took to request the drug-dog unit was about nineteen seconds. After that request, Sergeant Hyle then asked dispatch to run a warrants check on the occupants and returned to his vehicle.

Once Sergeant Hyle returned to his vehicle to write a no seatbelt citation for Karst, he entered her information into his computer system. As he was gathering information, dispatch relayed that Guydos had a suspended Idaho license. Based on this new information, Sergeant Hyle contacted Guydos a second time to ask about the suspended Idaho license. During this inquiry, Sergeant Hyle discovered Guydos did not have insurance on the vehicle.

Sergeant Hyle returned to his patrol vehicle again, this time to write citations against Guydos for driving without privileges and no insurance. At this time, the drug-dog unit arrived at the scene and conducted a dog sniff around the vehicle. Sergeant Hyle completed the citations for Guydos and returned to the no seatbelt citation for Karst when he realized he needed more information from her. Sergeant Hyle exited his patrol vehicle to give the citations to Guydos at the same time the drug dog alerted on the truck.

After the alert, Sergeant Hyle learned Karst admitted to having marijuana in the vehicle, so he shifted his focus to investigating Karst further. When Sergeant Hyle asked Karst to exit the vehicle, she stalled and began shifting items around on her lap. Sergeant Hyle requested Karst hand over anything on her lap, which led to the discovery of a small tin containing methamphetamine. Upon further search of Karst's pockets, Sergeant Hyle found marijuana and paraphernalia. Karst was later arrested and transported to the county jail where more marijuana and paraphernalia were discovered on her person.

Karst was charged with possession of methamphetamine, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and introducing major contraband into a correctional facility. Karst moved to suppress the drug and paraphernalia evidence. Karst initially challenged the legality of the stop, but subsequently conceded it was legal. Karst also argued Sergeant Hyle unlawfully extended the traffic stop and impermissibly searched her. The district court denied Karst's suppression motion in part. First, the district court found Sergeant Hyle did not unlawfully prolong the traffic stop:

[Sergeant] Hyle did not "drag his feet," as [Karst] argued, to gain time for the dog to arrive. The investigation of the traffic violations was somewhat complicated given the unusual circumstances of Guydos having a suspended Idaho license along with a valid Florida license, and the fact that Guydos gave some conflicting and confusing answers to some of Hyle's questions.

Hyle diligently and thoroughly investigated these violations and meticulously prepared citations for them, all of which took a considerable amount of time. He did not prolong the stop to effectuate the dog sniff. Rather, he continued working on the investigation/citations both before and after the dog arrived. He did not appear to be wasting time and walked quickly between his patrol car and the truck on the few occasions he did so.

As a result, the district court ruled that the methamphetamine found in the tin should not be suppressed. However, the district court held the additional search of Karst's pocket was unlawful and suppressed the marijuana and paraphernalia evidence found there.

Thereafter, Karst entered conditional guilty pleas pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 11(a)(2). The State agreed to dismiss the introduction of major contraband charge, while Karst conditionally pleaded guilty to the possession of methamphetamine charge, the possession of marijuana charge, and the possession of drug paraphernalia charge. The possession of marijuana and paraphernalia charges were based on items found on Karst at the jail, not the items found in her pocket which were suppressed. The district court accepted Karst's guilty pleas and sentenced Karst to four years in the penitentiary, with two years fixed, for possession of methamphetamine. She was sentenced to time served on the other charges. The district court suspended her sentence and placed her on probation for two years. Karst timely appealed the district court's partial denial of her motion to suppress. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. This Court granted Karst's petition for review.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"When reviewing a case on petition for review from the Court of Appeals this Court gives due consideration to the decision reached by the Court of Appeals, but directly reviews the decision of the trial court." State v. Gonzales , 165 Idaho 667, 671, 450 P.3d 315, 319 (2019) (quoting State v. Schmierer , 159 Idaho 768, 770, 367 P.3d 163, 165 (2016) ).

When reviewing a motion to suppress, the standard is bifurcated. Id . "[T]his Court will defer to the trial court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous. However, free review is exercised over a trial court's determination as to whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found." State v. Samuel , 165 Idaho 746, 755, 452 P.3d 768, 777 (2019) (quoting State v. Doe , 137 Idaho 519, 522, 50 P.3d 1014, 1017 (2002) ).

III. ANALYSIS

Karst argues the district court erred when it denied her motion to suppress because Sergeant Hyle impermissibly extended the traffic stop when he stopped for nineteen seconds on the way back to his vehicle to contact dispatch and request a drug-dog unit. Although the deviation was slight, Karst maintains the deviation from the traffic stop's mission constituted a violation of her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. We agree with Karst.

Karst's challenge calls on us to once again decide how to interpret the United States Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez v. United States , 575 U.S. 348, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015). We attempted to settle the issue in State v. Linze , 161 Idaho 605, 389 P.3d 150 (2016), but since that case was decided, the boundaries of its precedent have been tested in State v. Pylican , 167 Idaho 745, 755, 477 P.3d 180, 190 (2020), reh'g denied (Oct. 1, 2020) (distinguishing Linze because the district court made no findings that any specific amount of time was added to the traffic stop in connection with the dog sniff) and State v. Hale , 168 Idaho 863, 868, 489 P.3d 450, 455 (2021) (holding that the officer's questioning regarding permission to operate a vehicle was an ordinary inquiry incident to the traffic stop). The Idaho Court of Appeals has, likewise, had to contend with continued challenges, most notably deciding State v. Still , 166 Idaho 351, 458 P.3d 220 (Ct. App. 2019), the precedent it relied upon in this case to affirm the district court's decision.

There clearly is a difference in how this Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals interpret Rodriguez and Linze . That difference stems from the word "abandonment"—a term introduced during our analysis in Linze . Today we reiterate that the proper focus of this case, and cases like it, is whether the dog sniff "prolonged" or "added time to" the traffic stop. Whether the officer "abandoned" the traffic stop is not determinative. We also reiterate that there is no de minimis intrusion justification for prolonging a traffic stop. As we said in Linze , the rule of law announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Rodriguez is...