State v. Clayton (Ex parte State)

Decision Date04 April 2014
Docket Number1130013.,1130012
Citation155 So.3d 290
PartiesEx parte State of Alabama. (In re STATE of Alabama v. Jennifer Leigh CLAYTON). Ex parte State of Alabama. (In re State of Alabama v. Justin Andrew Bailey).
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Luther Strange, atty. gen., John C. Neiman, Jr., deputy atty. gen., and Michael G. Dean, asst. atty. gen., for petitioner.

Raymond Johnson, Montgomery, for respondent Jennifer Leigh Clayton.

R. Donelson Kloess, Montgomery, for respondent Justin Andrew Bailey.

Opinion

STUART, Justice.

Jennifer Leigh Clayton1 and Justin Andrew Bailey2 filed separate motions requesting that the trial court suppress evidence seized in a warrantless search of their apartment by law-enforcement officers on January 7, 2011. After a hearing, the trial court granted their motions to suppress the evidence. The State appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's order as to the January 7 search.3 State v. Lee, 155 So.3d 278 (Ala.Crim.App.2013).4 The State petitioned this Court for certiorari review of the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

The following evidence was presented at the suppression hearing. On January 7, 2011, between 12 a.m. and 1 a.m., Officer James Taylor and Sgt. James Hall, Montgomery law-enforcement officers, as well as other Montgomery law-enforcement officers and Montgomery firefighters, received a dispatch5 indicating that a methamphetamine laboratory was in operation at an apartment on Stonehenge Drive in Montgomery. Officer Taylor and Sgt. Hall testified that when they arrived at the apartment complex6 they could smell an odor that they knew from their training and experience was consistent with the chemicals used during the production of methamphetamine. Officer Taylor described the odor as a distinct, strong, “ammonia-like,” nauseating odor that is easily recognizable once one knows it to be consistent with the process of manufacturing methamphetamine. Sgt. Hall described the odor as very strong, pungent, and offensive, explaining that it almost burned the sinuses when inhaled.

The officers, in an effort to determine the origin of the odor, knocked on the door of the apartment. The officers testified that when Bailey opened the door the odor they knew to be consistent with the manufacture of methamphetamine grew stronger. The officers informed Bailey that they had received calls about a strong odor coming from his residence and that it had been reported that a methamphetamine laboratory was being operated in the apartment. Bailey responded that the calls had to be prank calls because no illegal activity was going on in the apartment. Sgt. Hall informed Bailey and Clayton, who was also present with two small children, that law-enforcement officers had to enter the apartment and conduct a protective sweep to clear the residence of all occupants so that the fire department could enter and check the apartment for safety reasons.

Sgt. Hall and Officer Taylor testified that they then searched each room of the apartment “to make sure there was nobody else in the apartment.” Officer Taylor testified that they spent approximately five minutes in the apartment and that the apartment “appeared to be safe.” Sgt. Hall testified that because of the odor he and his officers did not stay in the apartment long, just “long enough to make sure that the apartment was clear, long enough to allow the infant to be properly clothed for the cold weather.” After Officer Taylor and Sgt. Hall completed the protective sweep and left the apartment with Bailey, Clayton, and her two children, they turned the apartment over to the firefighters, who went inside to “mak[e] sure there [were] no chemicals in there that could explode endangering the other residents in the building.” Additionally, law-enforcement officers had the residents of the other apartments leave their residences until the fire department determined that they were not in danger from the process of manufacturing methamphetamine and it was safe to reenter the apartments.

During the firefighters' search of the apartment, they located a methamphetamine “laboratory” inside a cooler in a closet. The laboratory was not operating at the time. After the firefighters showed the laboratory to Sgt. Hall, Sgt. Hall notified the on-call narcotics officer, Detective Joel Roberson. Sgt. Hall testified that even after the methamphetamine laboratory was found he and the officers continued to secure the area because people can get hurt from the odors” and “meth labs are known to explode.”

Detective Roberson testified that when he arrived at the apartment complex he could smell an odor that, based on his training and experience, he knew to be consistent with the odor created during the manufacture of methamphetamine. Detective Roberson stated that when he entered the apartment with the Montgomery Fire Department's hazardous-materials crew a member of the crew showed him a foam cooler, which contained “everything you needed to [manufacture] methamphetamine.” Detective Roberson also found other materials in the apartment known to be associated with manufacturing methamphetamine, including lithium batteries, a funnel hidden under a bed, and small plastic bags. After Detective Roberson had photographed the methamphetamine laboratory, a crew from the Drug Enforcement Administration collected and disposed of the materials.

When questioned at the hearing on the motion to suppress about the reason for conducting a warrantless entry into and search of the apartment, Sgt. Hall testified that [m]eth[amphetamine] labs are known to explode as well as produce noxious fumes that can harm people and that his intent in going into the apartment was “to make sure that the public remain safe.” Sgt. Hall further stated that when he was “clearing” the apartment he felt like he was in danger and could be harmed by the odor. He stated that he limited the number of officers who entered the apartment because of the adverse health effects breathing the chemicals used in the manufacture of methamphetamine can cause. Sgt. Hall testified that he filed a letter of notice with his supervisor documenting that he had been exposed to a methamphetamine laboratory in case health issues later arose from the exposure. When defense counsel asked Sgt. Hall if he felt like he was in immediate danger, Sgt. Hall responded: “Yes, sir. I did.... Due to the odor that I was smelling, and I knew ... what those odors can cause, harmful to me, so yes, sir, I did feel like that I was in danger and could be harmed.”

Likewise, Officer Taylor testified that, because of the odor, he did not want to enter the apartment. He explained that, although the odor in the apartment did not appear to hurt him, Sgt. Hall, Clayton, Bailey, or the children, an emergency situation existed because “there was still the odor.”

Detective Roberson testified that the manufacture of methamphetamine creates a high risk of explosion because the chemicals used in the process become extremely volatile when combined and can react violently, bursting into flames. He further testified that the manufacture of methamphetamine creates a health hazard for anyone who is near the methamphetamine laboratory. He explained:

“If you can smell it, you're at risk. The proper way to handle this [investigation of a methamphetamine laboratory is] ... anybody that goes anywhere near this lab should have on a respirator, protective clothing, protective suit and that kind of stuff.... You know, it can—anywhere that there is air ducts, air vents that the chemicals can travel, it can affect those areas, too.”

The trial court concluded that no exigent circumstances existed to justify entry into, or the search of, the apartment because “there was no outward sign that danger was imminent” and because one officer testified that he entered the apartment and did not feel he was in any type of danger.” The trial court granted Clayton's and Bailey's motions to suppress. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's order as to the January 7 search.

Standard of Review

This Court reviews pure questions of law in criminal cases de novo.’ ' Ex parte Brown, 11 So.3d 933, 935 (Ala.2008) (quoting Ex parte Morrow, 915 So.2d 539, 541 (Ala.2004), quoting in turn Ex parte Key, 890 So.2d 1056, 1059 (Ala.2003) ).” Hiler v. State, 44 So.3d 543, 546 (Ala.2009).

Discussion

The State contends that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in holding that the trial court properly granted Clayton's and Bailey's motions to suppress the evidence seized from the January 7, 2011, warrantless entry into and search of their apartment.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.”

Article I, § 5, Ala. Const. of 1901, states the same fundamental principle and also applies to this case.

In Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948), the United States Supreme Court recognized that there are situations where the requirement that law-enforcement officers secure a warrant before entry into a person's residence may be obviated. The Supreme Court explained:

“Crime, even in the privacy of one's own quarters, is, of course, of grave concern to society, and the law allows such crime to be reached on proper showing. The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or Government
...

To continue reading

Request your trial
7 cases
  • State v. Tuttle
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • 5 Abril 2017
    ...and supported by evidence, are dangerous to liberty and ought not to be granted.Tenn. Const. Art. I, § 7.11 See State v. Clayton , 155 So.3d 290, 295–96 (Ala. 2014) ; State v. McCall , 139 Ariz. 147, 677 P.2d 920, 929 n.2 (1983) (en banc); Thompson v. State , 280 Ark. 265, 658 S.W.2d 350, 3......
  • Russell v. State, CR–10–1910
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • 29 Mayo 2015
    ...justify [the officer's] action.’ Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978)." State v. Clayton, 155 So.3d 290, 298 (Ala.2014).In State v. Clayton, the Alabama Supreme Court adopted a three-pronged test when evaluating whether a warrantless entry of a hom......
  • Payton v. State, CR-17-0673
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • 24 Mayo 2019
    ...justify [the officer's] action." Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed. 2d 168 (1978).’" State v. Clayton, 155 So. 3d 290, 298 (Ala. 2014)."In State v. Clayton, the Alabama Supreme Court adopted a three-pronged test when evaluating whether a warrantless entry of ......
  • Ex parte Byrd
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • 10 Noviembre 2022
    ...the warrantless entry into and search of a home under certain circumstances. The Court of Criminal Appeals also cited State v. Clayton, 155 So.3d 290 (Ala. 2014), which recognizes that the circumstances surrounding police involvement in rendering emergency assistance may support a warrantle......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT