State v. Cobbs, 11487

• Decision Date: 31 March 1987
• Docket Number: No. 11487,11487
• Citation: 522 A.2d 1229,203 Conn. 4
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Felix COBBS.

Page 1229

522 A.2d 1229

203 Conn. 4

STATE of Connecticut v. Felix COBBS.

No. 11487.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 13, 1987.

Decided March 31, 1987.

Carl D. Eisenman, Simsbury, with whom, on the brief, was Bruce L. Levin, Orange, for appellant (defendant).

Susann E. Gill, Deputy Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, was Richard A. Schatz, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (State).

Before PETERS, C.J., and ARTHUR H. HEALEY, DANNEHY, SANTANIELLO and CALLAHAN, JJ.

DANNEHY, Associate Justice.

The defendant, Felix Cobbs, appeals from a conviction and sentence for felony murder. This is the second appeal of this case. On the former appeal this court remanded the case to the trial court with direction to file a memorandum of decision articulating the basis upon which the court found the defendant guilty of felony murder. See State v. Cobbs, 198 Conn. 638, 504 A.2d 513 (1986). Briefly, the case was tried to a three judge court. The court made findings of fact, stated its conclusions thereon, and found the defendant guilty of felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c. See State v. Cobbs, supra, 640-41, 504 A.2d 513. Upon remand, following our order for a further articulation, the trial court filed a supplemental memorandum of decision, and the defendant perfected this appeal. His only contention is that his conviction and the judgment based upon it are not supported by the evidence.

The defendant was tried and convicted pursuant to an indictment charging him with felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c. The predicate felony was robbery. General Statutes § 53a-54c provides, in material part, that "[a] person is guilty of murder when, acting either alone or with one or more persons, he commits or attempts to commit robbery ... and, in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of flight therefrom, he, or another participant, if any, causes the death of a person other than one of the participants...." The provisions of the statute must be strictly met. A defendant may be convicted of felony murder even though he had no intent to and did not personally kill the victim. See State v. Castro, 196 Conn. 421, 429, 493 A.2d 223 (1985); accord State v. Hill, 196 Conn. 667, 675-76, 495 A.2d 699 (1985). Essentially, it was incumbent upon the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that the defendant and others committed or attempted to commit a robbery; (2) that the death of the victim was caused by the defendant or one of the other participants; and (3) that the defendant or one of the other participants caused the death in the course of and in furtherance of the robbery. It is not enough, however, that the defendant committed a robbery and caused the death of the victim unless the death was a part of the robbery and directly involved in it.

The defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction under § 53a-54c. In reviewing the claim of insufficient evidence we will not weigh the evidence nor resolve questions of credibility of witnesses, but will look to that evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom which support the findings of the trial court. State v. Haddad, 189 Conn. 383, 389, 456 A.2d 316 (1983). The conviction will be affirmed if from that viewpoint there is evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably have inferred that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Vincent, 194 Conn. 198, 206, 479 A.2d 237 (1984).

The nature of the contention on appeal requires a detailed account of this case. Unfortunately, familiarity with the facts stated in our former opinion cannot be assumed. Hence, the statement of facts contained in the opinion in that case must be reproduced. See State v. Cobbs, supra, 198 Conn. at pp. 640-41, 501 A.2d 513.

In the trial, "[t]he court found that three men, including the defendant, on or about midnight on the evening of June 14 or during the early hours of the morning of June 15, 1980, forcibly dragged Nestor Rodriguez, the victim, to the rear yard of a pool hall located at 98 Barbour Street in Hartford. The victim had previously been observed with a foot long knife protruding from his rear waistband. Officer Leo Shoupron of the Hartford police department, in response to information provided by neighborhood onlookers, conducted a twenty-five minute search of the area at about 12:20 a.m. The site was poorly illuminated, covered with undergrowth, junk cars and litter, and he found nothing. Returning to the scene a short time later, he sought additional police assistance to continue the search. At 2:21 a.m., officer Gary Dumas and another policeman found the body of the victim in the front yard of a house about one hundred yards from 98 Barbour Street." Id., 640, 504 A.2d 513.

It was also found that when the victim was discovered, " 'he had been stabbed three times and the pocket or pockets of his trousers were ripped, torn and/or exposed. No knife or valuables were found either on the body or in the surrounding area. Detective [James] Doyle, a robbery expert, felt that the victim had been mugged. Officer Dumas ascertained that the body was cold and displayed no vital signs upon his arrival. Dr. Hazen [Assistant Medical Examiner] felt the body was warm about 4:05 a.m. An autopsy was performed by Dr. [Stephen] Adams and Dr. [Catherine] Galvin, who attributed death to homicidal stab wounds. Defensive wounds were also discovered on the fingers of the victim's right hand. It was felt that the death would have occurred within ten minutes of the stabbing.' " Id. Galvin testified that the exact time of death could not be determined. She estimated the time of death to be around 2 a.m., but indicated in her testimony that death could not have occurred around midnight. Her opinion was based upon Hazen's report which was not in evidence.

"The [trial] court stated its conclusions as follows: 'By virtue of the opinion of Detective Doyle that the victim was mugged and by the manner in which the victim was forcibly taken to the rear yard by the defendant and two others, the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that he was forcibly taken there for the purpose of robbery and that such robbery was attempted. Because of the narrowness of the time frame, the distance involved, surrounding circumstances and the logical inferences to be drawn therefrom, we find that the defendant took part in the robbery or attempted robbery of the victim, and that the victim died as a result of the wounds received in said robbery or attempt. Therefore, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of murder in that when acting either alone or with one or more persons, he did commit or attempt to commit robbery, and in the course of and in furtherance of said crime, or of flight therefrom, he or another participant caused the death of a person other than one of the participants, namely Nestor Rodriguez.' " Id., 641, 504 A.2d 513.

On the first appeal, the defendant contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion for acquittal. He argued that there was a total absence of evidence both as to his alleged involvement in the underlying crime of robbery and as it related to the alleged connection between the robbery and the murder. Id. We held that because of the uncertainty in the findings of the trial court and the apparent conflicts between its various recitals, we were unable to determine whether the state established, beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant's guilt of the crime of felony murder. Id., 643, 504 A.2d 513. Under these circumstances, for the proper disposition of the case, it was necessary for us to order a remand to the trial court for further articulation of the grounds on which it determined that the state had proved its case. Specific directions were contained in the mandate. The trial court was directed to file a memorandum of decision, to answer five questions, and to articulate the factual basis for its answers. Id.

It is well settled that precise and unambiguous directions in a mandate must be obeyed. See State v. Lafferty, 191 Conn. 73, 76, 463 A.2d 238 (1983). In the earlier opinion of this court, it was clearly stated: "The trial court is directed to file a memorandum of decision answering the following questions and articulating the factual basis for its answers: (1) where and when did the robbery occur; (2) how was the defendant involved in the robbery; (3) where and when did the murder occur; (4) how was the murder connected with the robbery; and (5) how was the defendant involved in the murder?" State v. Cobbs, supra. The trial court filed an articulation. ² An examination of the articulation plainly demonstrates that the trial court failed to file a memorandum of decision in accordance with the directions contained in the mandate. The articulation omits the factual basis for answers that are patently conclusional. For reasons unknown to us, the trial court failed to state its reasons for not articulating the factual basis for its answers.

While the failure of the trial court to follow our instructions provides strong support for further remand, certain other aspects of the case militate against such an order. This case is not like those where, because of unresolved questions of fact, this court is unable to reach the questions of law raised on appeal. See State v. Lafferty, supra. The only question that we need to consider is whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for felony murder. We are satisfied that the record in this case now presents all of the evidence. Regardless of what action the trial court might take on further...