State v. Coker
| Decision Date | 18 November 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 2 CA-CR 2013-0551,2 CA-CR 2013-0551 |
| Parties | THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. AARON TODD COKER, Appellant. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24.
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
The Honorable Scott Rash, Judge
AFFIRMED
Thomas C. Horne, Arizona Attorney General
Joseph T. Maziarz, Section Chief Counsel, Phoenix
By Amy Pignatella Cain, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson
Counsel for Appellee
By Robb P. Holmes, Assistant Legal Defender, Tucson
Chief Judge Eckerstrom authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Miller and Judge Espinosa concurred.
¶1 Following a jury trial, appellant Aaron Coker was convicted of criminal damage and two counts of aggravated driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI). The trial court imposed concurrent prison terms, the longest of which are eight years. On appeal, Coker challenges the court's rulings admitting his blood test results and precluding his expert witness. He also maintains the court erred in responding to questions from the jury during deliberations. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶2 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the convictions. See State v. Nereim, 234 Ariz. 105, ¶ 2, 317 P.3d 646, 648 (App. 2014). In the early afternoon of November 26, 2012, several witnesses rushed to investigate a loud noise they heard outside the victim's house. The noise was caused by a pickup truck crashing into a tree in the victim's front yard, damaging her fence, mailbox, and gas meter in the process. The truck was "completely totaled," inoperable, and lodged against a chain-link fence on its passenger side.
¶3 A neighbor, B.G., approached and saw Coker "sitting behind the wheel" of the truck with lacerations on his face and head. The doors of the truck were both closed, and Coker was its only occupant. No one was seen leaving the scene of the accident. B.G. asked Coker if he was all right. Coker stumbled out of the truck, surveyed the damage, then got back in and attempted to drive away. Once B.G. informed Coker that emergency services were coming, Coker became agitated and belligerent. He retrieved an empty liquor bottle from the vehicle and fled into a nearby lot, leaving atrail of blood. A pastor of a nearby church followed Coker and showed police officers his location.
¶4 When the officers made contact with Coker, he ignored their commands to stop and show his hands, responding with profanity and racial slurs. Police used a Taser to take him into custody. They then transported him to a hospital to receive medical treatment. A blood draw conducted at the hospital indicated Coker's blood alcohol concentration (BAC) was .292. Because his driver's license had been suspended at the time of the accident, Coker was charged with two counts of aggravated DUI pursuant to A.R.S. § 28-1383(A)(1): one based on his impairment, see A.R.S. § 28-1381(A)(1), and the other on his BAC, see § 28-1381(A)(2). The state also charged one count of criminal damage of property with a value of more than $1,000 but less than $2,000. See A.R.S. § 13-1602(A), (B)(4).1 Coker was convicted and sentenced as noted above, and this appeal followed.
¶5 Coker first contends the trial court erred in admitting his blood test results over his objection, arguing a "faulty" chain of custody caused a lack of proper foundation. We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court's admission of evidence, including its determination of whether adequate foundation was laid for the evidence. See State v. McCray, 218 Ariz. 252, ¶ 8, 183 P.3d 503, 507 (2008); State v. Romanosky, 162 Ariz. 217, 224, 782 P.2d 693, 700 (1989). "An item is authenticated when there is 'evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.'" McCray, 218 Ariz. 252, ¶ 9, 183 P.3d at 507, quoting Ariz. R. Evid. 901(a).
¶6 Coker contends there was inadequate foundation for the test results because the police officer who testified that he had witnessed the blood draw and taken the blood samples intoevidence did not arrive at the hospital, according to an "Event Unit Information" report, until approximately twenty minutes after the blood draw had been completed. The officer explained this discrepancy by noting that the event report was simply incorrect. That report was based on manual input into a computer in the officer's vehicle, and the officer did not update his location information when he arrived at the hospital. The correct information was provided in the officer's blood draw report, which he completed immediately after witnessing the blood draw and collecting Coker's samples.
¶7 The discrepancy here concerns the weight to be given to the evidence, not its admissibility, see State v. Morales, 170 Ariz. 360, 365, 824 P.2d 756, 761 (App. 1991), and Coker offers no support for his suggestion that the event report is dispositive evidence of when the officer arrived at the hospital. Despite the discrepancy in the police reports, a sufficient foundation was laid to authenticate the blood samples and test results. See State v. Lavers, 168 Ariz. 376, 386, 814 P.2d 333, 343 (1991) (). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence.
¶8 Coker next contends the trial court erroneously precluded his expert witness and a report that the expert had prepared. Although Coker had disclosed the witness's name as an "Investigator/ Accident Reconstructionist" before trial, the state only received the expert's report on the day the trial began. The court precluded the expert as a sanction under Rule 15.7, Ariz. R. Crim. P., and it also ruled the evidence inadmissible under Rule 403, Ariz. R. Evid. We address only the latter ruling, as we may affirm on any ground supported by the record. See State v. Inzunza, 234 Ariz. 78, ¶ 18, 316 P.3d 1266, 1271 (App. 2014). We review a court's evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion. State v. Garza, 216 Ariz. 56, ¶ 37, 163 P.3d 1006, 1016 (2007).
¶9 Coker maintains the expert would have supported the defense that Coker had been a passenger at the time of the accident "by explaining that . . . it was entirely possible that another person had been driving." The trial court noted that the expert's report ultimately stated he was "not able to offer an opinion as to the definitive presence of a passenger in the vehicle." Coker acknowledged this point below but nonetheless sought to admit the witness's testimony to show that the possibility of a passenger could not be ruled out by the physical evidence from the truck. According to the expert's report, that possibility was based on police photographs showing "damage to the passenger side windshield and glove compartment" of the truck, as well as what appeared to be blood on a bottle on the passenger floor. Those photographs were admitted as defense exhibits at trial, and Coker used them to make the same argument to the jury.
¶10 Relevant evidence may be excluded under Rule 403 if its probative value is "substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence." State v. Hardy, 230 Ariz. 281, ¶ 49, 283 P.3d 12, 22 (2012). A trial court has considerable discretion when weighing these factors. State v. Gibson, 202 Ariz. 321, ¶ 17, 44 P.3d 1001, 1004 (2002). And when a jury's common knowledge and experience make it equally capable of reaching a conclusion as a purported expert, the testimony should be excluded. State v. Williams, 132 Ariz. 153, 160, 644 P.2d 889, 896 (1982); State v. Mosley, 119 Ariz. 393, 399-400, 581 P.2d 238, 244-45 (1978); State v. Kevil, 111 Ariz. 240, 247, 527 P.2d 285, 292 (1974).
¶11 Here, the jury could easily understand how the photographs suggested the possibility of a passenger in the vehicle, without any need of expert testimony. Indeed, the neighbor who first responded to the accident testified that it "[l]ooked like [Coker's] face had bounced off the windshield." Without a more detailed offer of proof explaining what the expert's testimony would have been, see Ariz. R. Evid. 103(a)(2), there is nothing in the record to suggest he would have provided "information . . . beyond [the jury's] competence." Wal-Mart v. Indus. Comm'n, 183 Ariz. 145, 147, 901 P.2d 1175, 1177 (App. 1995). Permitting the expert to state anobvious conclusion, however, would have wasted time and risked unfair prejudice to the state by suggesting that the possibility of a passenger somehow seemed more likely to a person with specialized knowledge. See id. ().
¶12 But even assuming the expert testimony had some probative value, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding it substantially outweighed by the dangers listed in Rule 403. Contrary to Coker's assertion, the exclusion of the expert did not infringe on Coker's constitutional right to present a defense, because that right "'is limited to the presentation of matters admissible under ordinary evidentiary rules.'" Hardy, 230 Ariz. 281, ¶ 49, 283 P.3d at 22, quoting State v. Dickens, 187 Ariz. 1, 14, 926 P.2d 468, 481 (1996), abrogated in part on other grounds by State v. Ferrero, 229 Ariz. 239, ¶ 20, 274 P.3d 509, 513 (2012).
¶13 Last, Coker challenges the trial court's actions during deliberations when it "respond[ed] to two jury questions by sending back a...
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