State v. Colby

• Decision Date: 25 June 2020
• Docket Number: NO. 03-19-00710-CR,03-19-00710-CR
• Citation: 604 S.W.3d 232
• Parties: The STATE of Texas, Appellant v. Patrick W. COLBY, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

604 S.W.3d 232

The STATE of Texas, Appellant

v.Patrick W. COLBY, Appellee

NO. 03-19-00710-CR

Court of Appeals of Texas, Austin.

Filed: June 25, 2020

David A. Escamilla and Giselle Horton, Assistant Travis County Attorney, P. O. Box 1748, Austin, TX 78767, for Appellant.

Christopher M. Perri, 1504 West Avenue, Austin, TX 78701, Jana Ortega, Law Office of Jana Ortega, 818 W. 10th St., Ste A, Austin, TX 78701-2064, for Appellee.

Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Baker and Triana

OPINION

Gisela D. Triana, Justice The State of Texas appeals the trial court's order granting the motion to suppress filed by appellee Patrick W. Colby, who was charged, following a traffic stop, with the misdemeanor offense of driving while intoxicated. In a single issue on appeal, the State argues that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion to suppress. We will affirm the trial court's order.

BACKGROUND

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer Jeremy Garza of the Lakeway Police Department testified that on the night of September 22, 2017, he was on patrol when he approached the intersection of Blue Clearing Way and Highlands Boulevard. Garza explained that Highlands Boulevard is a four-lane roadway, with two northbound and two southbound lanes separated by a median. Blue Clearing Way is a two-lane roadway, with one eastbound and one westbound lane. Officer Garza was driving east on Blue Clearing Way, which had a stop sign at the intersection. Garza acknowledged that he did not come to a complete stop until he was beyond the stop sign, although he disagreed with defense counsel's claim that he was "pretty far out" in the intersection when he stopped. He explained that he stopped beyond the sign to get a better view of cross traffic:

So due to the area, there is a lot of landscape, foliage. Some areas have brick walls. So it's very hard to see—when you stop at the stop sign to see if the actual intersection is actually clear to enter. So you do have to proceed forward without breaking the plane of the intersection to ensure it is safe to turn and make sure you are not going to be involved in a collision, essentially, for failing to yield right-of-way.

While Garza was stopped, he observed a vehicle approaching the intersection from Highlands Boulevard, which did not have a stop sign. Despite the lack of a traffic signal, the vehicle came to a complete stop in the intersection. Garza explained:

I was stopped at the stop sign waiting to turn onto Highlands Boulevard. As I was stopped there for a few seconds, I observed a vehicle coming northbound on Highlands Boulevard. The vehicle pretty much stopped almost at a "T" in front of me. It came to a complete stop in the roadway, stopped, reversed, reversed back, and then began flashing his high beams at me. I just kind of found it odd because they had the right-of-way.

The vehicle then proceeded through the intersection, continuing north on Highlands Boulevard. Garza turned left onto Highlands Boulevard and immediately initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle, whose driver and sole occupant Garza identified as Colby. The basis for the stop was Section 545.302 of the Texas Transportation Code, which prohibits a driver from stopping his vehicle in an intersection.¹ See Tex. Transp. Code § 545.302(a)(3).

A video recording of the stop, taken from Garza's patrol-car dash camera, was admitted into evidence. The video shows Officer Garza's patrol vehicle approach the intersection on Blue Clearing Way and come to a stop beyond the stop sign, in the intersection. The video then shows Colby's vehicle approach the intersection from Highlands Boulevard, come to a stop in the intersection, back up slowly, stop again, flash its lights, and then proceed through the intersection. Finally, the video shows Garza turn left onto Highlands Boulevard behind Colby's vehicle and initiate a traffic stop.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted Colby's motion to suppress and later made the following findings of fact:

1. On-duty Lakeway Police Officer J. Garza was working patrol in a clearly marked vehicle in a residential area of Western Lakeway, when he stopped the Defendant for violation of Tex. Transp. Code Sections 545.302 and 545.501....

2. The location of Defendant's driving at issue occurred at the intersection of Blue Clearing Way and Highlands Blvd. At this intersection, the traffic on Highlands Blvd. does not have a stop sign, but those traveling on Blue Clearing Way do.

3. The testimony and video evidence indicated that Officer J. Garza was at this stop sign on Blue Clearing Way, waiting to turn, when he pulled out into the intersection in an effort to get a better view due to foliage, landscaping and or residential brick wall. Neither side disputes that the Officer's vehicle is in the intersection.

4. The Defendant was on Highlands Blvd., wherein he had the right of way and no stop sign. The Defendant begins to drive through the intersection at a slow speed, when it becomes apparent that there is a patrol car nosed out inside the intersection. The Defendant slows to a stop and then reverses his car giving the marked patrol car clearance to continue on. The Defendant flashes his brights to signal the Officer that he can safely go ahead.

5. Officer Garza responds by signaling back to the Defendant, at which point, the Defendant proceeds through the intersection adhering to Officer Garza's directive.

6. Officer Garza then initiates a traffic stop, based on this action alone and pulls the driver over without any additional bases.

7. It should be noted that there are no other cars in the vicinity.

8. A DWI investigation and arrest of the Defendant ensued.

9. Officer J. Garza provided credible testimony.

The trial court also made the following conclusions of law:

The State argues that the Transportation Code Sections upon which it bases its detention apply and form the sole basis for the stop. The Court disagrees with the application of the Code to these facts, concluding that for all practical purposes and even technically, the Transportation Code violations fail to fit in this case. The Court further, respectfully concludes that the Defendant's actions were reasonable under the circumstances. As the evidence was both clear and uncontested, Officer Garza's marked patrol vehicle was stopped inside the intersection , despite a stop sign, when Mr. Colby backed out of it, in an effort to yield to this marked police vehicle. The Defendant then adheres to Officer Garza's directive by continuing on through the intersection in a reasonable fashion.

Had this been a case where the State argued or offered even some evidence indicating the totality of the circumstances warranted the stop, the Court's ruling would have been different. But there was neither argument nor evidence of that.

Based on an objective standard, the facts available to Officer Garza at the time, would not warrant a man of reasonable caution to detain the defendant on this action alone.

(Emphasis in original). This appeal by the State followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"We review a ruling on a motion to suppress using a bifurcated standard of review." Sims v. State , 569 S.W.3d 634, 640 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (citing Guzman v. State , 955 S.W.2d 85, 87-91 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ). "A trial court's findings of historical fact and determinations of mixed questions of law and fact that turn on credibility and demeanor are afforded almost total deference if they are reasonably supported by the record." Id. "That same deferential standard of review ‘applies to a trial court's determination of historical facts [even] when that determination is based on a videotape recording admitted into evidence at a suppression hearing.’ " State v. Duran , 396 S.W.3d 563, 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (quoting Montanez v. State , 195 S.W.3d 101, 109 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ). "We review a trial court's determination of legal questions and its application of the law to facts that do not turn upon a determination of witness credibility and demeanor de novo." Id.

We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, State v. Story , 445 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), and that ruling will be sustained if it is correct on any applicable theory of law and the record reasonably supports it, State v. Ruiz , 581 S.W.3d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). "As the prevailing party at the trial level, appellee gains the benefit of deference on factual findings made in [his] favor." State v. Ford , 537 S.W.3d 19, 23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (citing State v. Krizan-Wilson , 354 S.W.3d 808, 815-16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) ); see Duran , 396 S.W.3d at 571 ("The winning side is afforded the ‘strongest legitimate view of the evidence’ as well as all reasonable inferences that can be derived from it." (quoting State v. Weaver , 349 S.W.3d 521, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) )). However, whether the facts, as determined by the trial court, add up to reasonable suspicion or probable cause to support a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment is a legal question to be reviewed de novo. See Ford , 537 S.W.3d at 23 ; Byram v. State , 510 S.W.3d 918, 923 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) ; Duran , 396 S.W.3d at 571 ; Weaver , 349 S.W.3d at 525 ; Valtierra v. State , 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

Moreover, "deference is due only if the trial court's rulings are supported by the record." Miller v. State , 393 S.W.3d 255, 263 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Thus, " ‘[w]hen there are factual disputes regarding testimony or the contents of a videotape, the trial court's findings of historical fact are afforded almost total deference.’ " Id. (quoting Tucker v. State , 369 S.W.3d 179, 187 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (Alcala, J., concurring)). " ‘But when evidence is conclusive, such as a written and signed agreed stipulation of evidence or ‘indisputable visual evidence,’ then any trial-court findings inconsistent with that conclusive evidence may be disregarded as unsupported...