State v. Coley

• Decision Date: 04 November 2008
• Docket Number: No. COA07-645.,COA07-645.
• Citation: 668 S.E.2d 46
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Roger Earl COLEY.
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals

668 S.E.2d 46

STATE of North Carolina v. Roger Earl COLEY.

No. COA07-645.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

November 4, 2008.

Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 2 August 2006 by Judge W. Russell Duke, Jr., in Edgecombe County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 November 2007.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Joan M. Cunningham, for the State.

Rudolf Widenhouse & Fialko, by M. Gordon Widenhouse, Jr., Chapel Hill, for defendant appellant.

McCULLOUGH, Judge.

Defendant appeals judgment entered after a jury verdict of guilty of first-degree murder. We determine there was no prejudicial error.

FACTS

On 7 March 2005, Roger Earl Coley ("defendant") called 911 from his house at 410 Myrtle Avenue in Rocky Mount, North Carolina, and reported that he had stabbed his wife, Deborah Thompson Coley, with a butcher knife. When the operator inquired as to how many times he had stabbed his wife, defendant responded that he had stabbed her "about twenty times." Officer Brian Patrick Livecchi of the Rocky Mount Police Department arrived at defendant's house a short time later. At the time Officer Livecchi arrived, defendant was standing on the porch with blood on his clothes. Officer Livecchi then handcuffed defendant and asked him what happened. Defendant responded, "I stabbed her." After handcuffing defendant, Officer Livecchi entered the residence and found Mrs. Coley leaning against a sofa. She was bleeding from her chest. Officer Livecchi took her pulse, and after determining the scene was secure, called the dispatcher to alert the firemen and paramedics.

After other police officers arrived, Officer Livecchi placed defendant in the back of his police car and drove him to the Rocky Mount Police Department. On the way to the police department, defendant made several statements. Defendant stated that "he just simply couldn't take it anymore" and that "she never gave him any respect." At the police station, defendant was informed of his Miranda rights by Detective Thomas Seighman. Defendant responded that he wanted to speak to an attorney. Despite defendant's invocation of his right to silence, defendant continued to make statements. Defendant was then allowed to make several phone calls, which were recorded by a video camera set up inside the police station. During one of these phone calls, defendant described the circumstances surrounding Mrs. Coley's stabbing.

Kevin Bissette, a member of West Edgecombe Rescue Squad, arrived shortly after Officer Livecchi. Mr. Bissette examined Mrs. Coley and determined that she had no pulse. Mrs. Coley was then transported to the hospital as emergency personnel attempted to resuscitate her. These efforts proved unsuccessful, and Mrs. Coley died while being transported to the hospital.

A grand jury indicted defendant for first-degree murder on 23 May 2005. On 26 April 2006, a competency hearing was held before Judge Frank R. Brown in Edgecombe County Superior Court. After hearing the evidence, Judge Brown concluded defendant possessed sufficient capacity to proceed to trial. Defendant was tried before a jury for the murder of his wife, Deborah Coley, on 31 July 2006, in Edgecombe County Superior Court, Judge W. Russell Duke, Jr., presiding. On 2 August 2006, defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to a term of life in prison without the possibility of parole. Defendant now appeals.

I.

Defendant first argues the trial court erred by finding defendant competent to stand trial. We disagree.

"[T]he conviction of an accused person while he is legally incompetent violates due process[.]" State v. Taylor, 298 N.C. 405, 410, 259 S.E.2d 502, 505 (1979); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378, 86 S.Ct. 836, 838, 15 L.Ed.2d 815, 818 (1966). Our General Statutes expound on this notion, providing:

No person may be tried, convicted, sentenced, or punished for a crime when by reason of mental illness or defect he is unable to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to comprehend his own situation in reference to the proceedings, or to assist in his defense in a rational or reasonable manner. This condition is hereinafter referred to as "incapacity to proceed."

N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A-1001(a) (2007); see Taylor, 298 N.C. at 410-11, 259 S.E.2d at 505. The determination of whether a defendant is competent to stand trial rests within the trial court's discretion and the burden of persuasion falls upon the defendant. State v. Pratt, 152 N.C.App. 694, 697, 568 S.E.2d 276, 278 (2002), cert. denied, appeal dismissed, 357 N.C. 168, 581 S.E.2d 442 (2003). The trial court's findings of fact, as well as its final determination, will be upheld on appeal if supported by the evidence. Id. at 698, 568 S.E.2d at 279.

In the case at bar, an inquiry was held prior to trial to determine defendant's competency. During this hearing, the trial court was presented with testimony from several expert witnesses. The State's expert witness, Dr. Charles Vance, an expert in forensic psychiatry, testified regarding his examination of defendant. According to Dr. Vance, defendant demonstrated an adequate knowledge of the nature and object of the proceedings against him, as well as of his position in relationship to these proceedings. Further, although Dr. Vance recognized that defendant suffered from dementia, which hindered him in his interactions with his lawyer, Dr. Vance opined that defendant's impairment was not so severe as to prevent him from working rationally and reasonably with his attorney. Thus, Dr. Vance was of the opinion that defendant was competent to stand trial. In response to the State's evidence, the defense proffered testimony from Dr. Katayoun Tabrizi, an expert in psychology. Dr. Tabrizi opined that in addition to suffering from dementia, defendant was also suffering from a psychotic mental illness that was not being treated. According to Dr. Tabrizi, these afflictions made defendant incapable of proceeding to trial.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered an order holding that defendant possessed the capacity to proceed to trial. In this order, the trial court adopted as its findings of fact defendant's Forensic Psychiatric History And Evaluation/Legal Assessment/Discharge Summary and Aftercare plan of Dorothea Dix Hospital for Roger Earl Coley ("evaluation"). Based on these findings, the trial court concluded that although defendant's mental defects "may complicate his interaction with his attorney" these defects "[were] not of sufficient magnitude to negate his capacity to stand trial[.]"

On appeal, defendant argues the trial court's determination of defendant's competency was in error. In support of his argument, defendant contends: (1) the trial court incorrectly adopted as its findings of fact defendant's evaluation; (2) the trial court was presented with no evidence at the preliminary hearing to support a conclusion that defendant was competent to stand trial; and (3) the defendant's trial testimony indicated that defendant did not possess the capacity to stand trial, regardless of the court's determination during the preliminary hearing.

1.

As noted above, the trial court was presented with testimony that supported the court's conclusion, which was:

THE COURT CONCLUDES from all the evidence presented; that the Defendant was cooperative with forensic interviews; that he knew he was charged with 1st Degree Murder and has a clear recollection of the events associated with his criminal acts; that he showed an understanding of the nature of the legal proceedings as well as the court room personnel; that he was aware of pleas available and the significance of the pleas; that he suffers some degree of intellectual deficiency, but his I.Q. falls in the range of the upper 70s to the low 80s; that he has difficulty understanding hypothetical or abstract situations, but when language is simplified, he has the ability to grasp concepts and understand them; that the Defendant became excessively emotional when discussing his wife, but did not display similar problems with modulation in other contexts; that he has the ability to restrain himself and control his behavior when advised that such structure was needed to be imposed on the conversation; that his mental defects may complicate his interaction with his attorney, but are not of sufficient magnitude to negate his capacity to stand trial.

The question then becomes whether the trial court can adopt the facts as set forth in the psychiatric report in lieu of listing the facts in the traditional manner. We can find no authority prohibiting the court from making findings of fact by incorporating a factual summary from a detailed report.

We note that the court's findings of fact, if supported by competent evidence, are conclusive on appeal. State v. Clark, 300 N.C. 116, 265 S.E.2d 204 (1980). While the better practice is to make independent detailed findings of fact, see State v. Aytche, 98 N.C.App. 358, 363, 391 S.E.2d 43, 46 (1990), adopting facts set forth in the report was not prejudicial in this instance.

2.

"The test for capacity to stand trial is whether a defendant has capacity to comprehend his position, to understand the nature of the proceedings against him, to conduct his defense in a rational manner and to cooperate with his counsel[.]" State v. Jackson, 302 N.C. 101, 104, 273 S.E.2d 666, 669 (1981). "Evidence that a defendant suffers from mental illness is not dispositive on the issue of competency." Pratt, 152 N.C.App. at 697, 568 S.E.2d at 278. Our Supreme Court has noted that

a defendant does not have to be at the highest stage of mental alertness to be competent to be tried. So long as a defendant can confer with his or her attorney so that the attorney may interpose any available defenses for him or her, the defendant is able to assist his or her defense in a rational manner. It is the attorney who must make the subtle...