State v. Collins

• Citation: 874 S.E.2d 210
• Decision Date: 17 May 2022
• Docket Number: COA21-404
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Todd Emerson COLLINS, Jr., Defendant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of North Carolina (US)

874 S.E.2d 210

STATE of North Carolina

v.Todd Emerson COLLINS, Jr., Defendant.

No. COA21-404

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed May 17, 2022

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General John R. Green, Jr., for the State.

Irons & Irons, P.A., Greenville, by Ben G. Irons, II, for Defendant-Appellant.

INMAN, Judge.

¶ 1 Defendant-Appellant Todd Emerson Collins, Jr., ("Defendant") was convicted by jury verdict of felony eluding arrest with a motor vehicle and felonious possession of stolen goods after he stole a pickup truck and led police on a high-speed chase. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to reopen its case before the trial court ruled on Defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence; (2) the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of felonious possession of stolen goods because the State failed to prove an essential element of the crime, namely the value of the vehicle; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion and demonstrated judicial bias against Defendant by permitting the State to reopen its case and allowing certain statements in the State's closing argument. After careful review of the record and our precedent, we hold Defendant's trial was free from error.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 The record below discloses the following:

¶ 3 Around 1:00 a.m. on 10 May 2020, Defendant drove a 2004 Nissan Titan pickup truck from Carroll County, Virginia into Mount Airy, North Carolina, leading Virginia police officers in a high-speed chase. A Surry County Sherriff's Deputy joined the pursuit of the vehicle, which Defendant drove without lights and at speeds of at least 90 mph on a stretch of highway where the speed limit was between 45 and 50 mph. Defendant twice drove the truck over stop sticks deployed by law enforcement. He did not attempt to stop the vehicle after the first set of stop sticks; the vehicle slowed to a stop on the median after the second stop sticks destroyed the truck's tires. Once the truck came to a stop, Defendant exited the vehicle and attempted to flee on foot. Police quickly apprehended and arrested him.

¶ 4 After detaining Defendant, law enforcement contacted the General Manager of Foothills Ford in Pilot Mountain, Robert Sutphin ("Mr. Sutphin"), and confirmed that earlier that same day, the 2004 Nissan Titan pickup truck driven by Defendant had been removed from the automotive dealership. No one at the dealership had given Defendant permission to take the vehicle.

¶ 5 Ten days later, on 20 May 2020, Defendant was convicted of driving while license revoked. He appealed to the Superior Court.

¶ 6 One month later, on 20 July 2020, while his appeal was pending in Superior Court, Defendant was indicted on charges of felony eluding arrest with a motor vehicle and felonious possession of stolen goods. Defendant's appeal and the felony charges came on for a jury trial on 15 February 2021.

¶ 7 At the close of the State's evidence, defense counsel moved to dismiss all charges against Defendant. In particular, counsel argued the State failed to present evidence of the value of the allegedly stolen vehicle pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-71.1 (2021) ("Possessing stolen goods") on the felonious possession of stolen goods charge. The trial court responded:

Then, [defense counsel], your motion—I see the argument that it would not be a felony. It would be a misdemeanor, it would not be a felony, as alleged, unless the item could be proved to—if it had been stolen, it would be more than $1,000.

The trial court asked for the prosecutor's retort and the prosecutor stated he "would ... simply move to reopen the evidence to put on that testimony, just in case it becomes an issue later down the road."¹ Defense counsel challenged the State's attempt to recall the witness, reasoning the purpose of the motion to dismiss was not to "signal a mulligan for the State." The trial court replied:

I do not take that as that. However, in this case, I think that in the Court's discretion, that there is no prejudice to the Defendant, and the Court will allow that motion. But we will note that.

The trial court allowed the State to reopen its case after a lunch break for the jury and delayed ruling on defense counsel's motion to dismiss until then.

¶ 8 The State recalled Mr. Sutphin for a second time. He testified the value of the stolen truck was $6,625 before it was damaged and that the truck had been sold at auction for $1,325 after the chase. The State again rested. Defense counsel renewed the motion to dismiss, and the trial court denied it before closing arguments and before the case was submitted to the jury.

¶ 9 At closing argument, the prosecutor began:

Truth be told, in a lot of ways, we're kind of lucky. Because this case could have turned out very differently. A car fleeing law enforcement across state lines, and pushing 100 miles an hour, is about the quickest way to get somebody killed on this road.

Defense counsel objected to this portion of the closing, but the trial court overruled it. The State proceeded to illustrate for the jury the potential dangers that Defendant could have inflicted upon anyone on the roads that night:

All it would have taken is a power line being down and a road crew out there, and all of a sudden, you've got more people in harm's way out there trying to put a power line back up. What if you've got someone who's trying to get back home, and they've got a flat tire on the side of the road. Now they're in harm's way. What if you have people getting off of work at Lowe's Home Improvement, right there on 52. What if you've got people over there getting off work, Pizza Hut right there on 52. The Food Lion, the Roses, any of these stores or businesses that could have been closing, and these folks could be getting off work at that time of day or night. All it would have taken is one mistimed or unlucky swerve after his tires popped, and this could have been a much more tragic situation than it is now. And so, to a degree, we're lucky that we're just here with what we're at.

Defense counsel did not further object to the State's closing. However, in her own closing argument, defense counsel contended the State's arguments contained many "[w]hat[-]ifs."

¶ 10 The jury found Defendant guilty of felonious eluding arrest in a motor vehicle and felonious possession of stolen goods. Following the verdict, Defendant was tried for, and the jury found him guilty of, attaining habitual felon status. The trial court sentenced Defendant to two consecutive prison terms of 105 to 108 months. Defendant gave oral notice of appeal.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

1. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Reserving Ruling on the Motion to Dismiss to Allow the State to Reopen Its Case to Introduce New Evidence.

¶ 11 Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by delaying its ruling on Defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence and allowing the State to introduce new evidence. We disagree.

¶ 12 We will reverse a trial court's decision to permit a party to introduce additional evidence at any time prior to the verdict only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. State v. Wise , 178 N.C. App. 154, 163, 630 S.E.2d 732, 737 (2006) (citing State v. Riggins , 321 N.C. 107, 109, 361 S.E.2d 558, 559 (1987) ).

¶ 13 Our General Statutes provide: "The judge in his [or her] discretion may permit any party to introduce additional evidence at any time prior to verdict. " N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1226(b) (2021) (emphasis added). Subsection 15A-1227(c) further provides: "The judge must rule on a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence before the trial may proceed." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1227(c) (2021). Defendant interprets Subsection 15A-1227(c) to preclude the trial court from postponing ruling on Defendant's motion for insufficiency of evidence to allow the State to reopen the case and introduce new evidence. Though these sections deal with different procedural mechanisms at trial, assuming arguendo they conflict in some way, they "must be construed in pari materia, and harmonized, if possible, to give effect to each." Hoffman v. Edwards , 48 N.C. App. 559, 564, 269 S.E.2d 311, 313 (1980) (citation omitted).

¶ 14 In general, "[i]t is the trial judge's duty to supervise and control the trial, including the manner and presentation of evidence, matters which are largely left to his [or her] discretion." State v. Lowery , 318 N.C. 54, 70, 347 S.E.2d 729, 740 (1986). Our appellate courts have repeatedly held Subsection 15A-1226(b) allows a trial court to exercise its discretion to permit a party to reopen its case and present evidence—even after the parties have rested—before the case is submitted to the jury. See, e.g., Riggins , 321 N.C. at 109, 361 S.E.2d at 559 ("Pursuant to N.C. [Gen. Stat.] § 15A-1226(b), the trial judge is authorized in his [or her] discretion to permit any party to introduce additional evidence at any time prior to verdict."); Wise , 178 N.C. App. at 163, 630 S.E.2d at 737 (holding the trial court did not err by allowing the State to reopen its case and present additional evidence of the defendant's release date after the parties had rested but before the case was presented to the jury). "This Court has long recognized that the trial court has the discretion to allow either party to recall witnesses to offer additional evidence, even after jury arguments." State v. Goldman , 311 N.C. 338, 350, 317 S.E.2d 361, 368 (1984) (citation omitted); see also State v. Revelle , 301 N.C. 153, 161, 270 S.E.2d 476, 481 (1980) ("[N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 15A-1226(b) specifically provides the trial judge may exercise his [or her] discretion to permit any party to introduce additional evidence at any time prior to the verdict. This is so even after arguments to the jury have begun and even if the additional evidence is testimony...