State v. Conrad, 20160301
| Decision Date | 04 April 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 20160301,20160301 |
| Citation | 892 N.W.2d 200 |
| Parties | STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant v. Caroline CONRAD, a/k/a Caroline Marie Conrad Morrell, Defendant and Appellee |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Tristan J. Van de Streek (argued), Cherie L. Clark (on brief) and Reid A. Brady (on brief), Assistant State's Attorneys, P.O. Box 2806, Fargo, N.D. 58108–2806, for plaintiff and appellant.
Ariana D. Meyers, P.O. Box 6367, Grand Forks, N.D. 58206–6367, for defendant and appellee.
[¶ 1] The State appeals from a pretrial order dismissing criminal charges of theft of property and exploitation of a vulnerable adult against Caroline Conrad based on the civil dispute doctrine. We reverse and remand for further proceedings because the civil dispute doctrine does not apply in this case.
[¶ 2] In December 2015 the State charged Conrad with theft of property under N.D.C.C. § 12.1–23–02(1) and exploitation of a vulnerable adult under N.D.C.C. § 12.1–32–07.1(1)(b), alleging Conrad used for herself more than $50,000 in funds her elderly mother deposited in a joint bank account which listed the mother as the "member" and Conrad as a "joint owner." After the district court found probable cause at the preliminary hearing, Conrad, at the court's suggestion, brought a motion to dismiss the charges based on the civil dispute doctrine.
[¶ 3] In its 19–page decision on the motion the district court detailed our case law on the civil dispute doctrine. See State v. Herzig , 2012 ND 247, 825 N.W.2d 235 ; State v. Curtis , 2008 ND 108, 750 N.W.2d 438 ; State v. Perreault , 2002 ND 14, 638 N.W.2d 541 ; State v. Trosen , 547 N.W.2d 735 (N.D. 1996) ; State v. Brakke , 474 N.W.2d 878 (N.D. 1991) ; and State v. Meyer , 361 N.W.2d 221 (N.D. 1985). The district court correctly concluded the doctrine has two prongs: (1) "there is a legitimate dispute about a unique issue of property, contract, or civil law upon which an element of the charged offense turns;" or (2) "there is a legitimate dispute about an issue traditionally and more appropriately settled in a civil forum." The court found the second prong did not apply because "issues involving ownership interests in joint accounts are not so traditionally and appropriately resolved in a civil forum." However, the court found the first prong applied because there was "a legitimate dispute over a unique issue of contract, property [or] civil law which involves an element of the criminal offense."
[¶ 4] The district court began its analysis by noting under both charges the property stolen must belong to another, and it is long-settled law that Relying on In re Paulson's Estate , 219 N.W.2d 132, 134 (N.D. 1974), the court noted the three elements for a valid inter vivos gift "are: (1) intent to give; (2) delivery of the gift[;] and (3) acceptance by the donee." Based on the mother's joint account application and her account contract with the bank, the court found "a legitimate dispute exists" regarding the mother's donative intent in determining whether an inter vivos gift had been given by the mother to Conrad. The court found delivery occurred because the mother changed her sole ownership of the funds to joint ownership with Conrad and Conrad accepted the gift because she "used these funds herself." The court concluded Conrad met her burden of showing "a legitimate dispute on a fairly unique underlying issue of property or civil law," referring to donative intent for an inter vivos gift. The court therefore dismissed the charges based on the civil dispute doctrine.
[¶ 5] The State argues the district court erred in dismissing the criminal charges under the civil dispute doctrine.
[¶ 6] Under N.D.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(1), "[a] party may raise by pretrial motion any defense, objection, or request that the court can determine without a trial on the merits." In Perreault , 2002 ND 14, ¶ 7, 638 N.W.2d 541, we explained:
(quoting State v. Howe , 247 N.W.2d 647, 652 (N.D. 1976) (internal quotation marks omitted)). We have treated issues concerning the civil dispute doctrine as questions of law. See, e.g. , Herzig , 2012 ND 247, ¶ 19, 825 N.W.2d 235 ; Perreault , at ¶ 10 ; Meyer , 361 N.W.2d at 223.
[¶ 7] The district court appears to have implicitly ruled on the underlying issue in this case of whether a defendant who jointly owns a bank account can be prosecuted for theft based upon the withdrawal of funds for personal use. Although courts are divided over the question in other jurisdictions the issue is statutorily resolved in North Dakota. See, e.g. , K. Winbush, Annot., What is "property of another" within statute proscribing larceny, theft, or embezzlement of property of another , 57 A.L.R.6th 445, §§ 10–11 (2010), and cases collected therein.
[¶ 8] Theft requires knowingly "tak[ing]" the "property of another with intent to deprive the owner thereof." N.D.C.C. § 12.1–23–02(1). Exploitation of a vulnerable adult requires that the defendant "obtains or uses ... the disabled adult's or vulnerable elderly adult's funds." N.D.C.C. § 12.1–31–07.1(1)(b). Both charges require that the defendant take, obtain or use another's property. The "property of another" is defined by N.D.C.C. § 12.1–23–10(8) as "property in which a person other than the actor or in which a government has an interest which the actor is not privileged to infringe without consent, regardless of the fact that the actor also has an interest in the property ." (Emphasis added.) Therefore, a joint account holder may be charged with theft and exploitation of a vulnerable adult for misuse of joint account funds. See State v. Cox , 325 N.W.2d 181, 183 (N.D. 1982) (). "Thus, the State must establish that someone other than the defendant had an interest in the property which the defendant was not privileged to infringe without consent in order to support a conviction." State v. Kaufman , 310 N.W.2d 709, 713 (N.D. 1981).
[¶ 9] Although the district court appears to have agreed that Conrad, as a joint account holder, could be charged in this case, Conrad argued her mother essentially consented to her use of the funds in the joint account because her mother gave or gifted those funds to her. The court determined this issue involved "a legitimate dispute on a fairly unique underlying issue of property or civil law," and therefore dismissed the criminal charges under the civil dispute doctrine.
[¶ 10] The civil dispute doctrine bars criminal prosecution if the case presents a "legitimate dispute ... on a unique issue of property, contract, or other civil law, and the issues in th[e] case would ... be more appropriately settled in a civil forum." Curtis , 2008 ND 108, ¶ 24, 750 N.W.2d 438. As the district court noted, our six cases addressing the civil dispute doctrine "did not provide much of an analytical framework."
[¶ 11] Defendants have successfully invoked the civil dispute doctrine in three cases. In Meyer , 361 N.W.2d at 222, the seminal case on the subject, the defendant was convicted of obstructing a public road. The defendant did not dispute obstructing the road, but asserted the road was not open to the public when he obstructed it. Id. A plurality of this Court said the only issue in the criminal case was whether the road was a public road under the necessary statutory requirements for a road by prescription, and a "legitimate dispute" existed on that question. Id. at 222–23. This Court concluded "a criminal action is ill-suited to a settlement of that dispute," and added: "If the State's Attorney deems it appropriate that the State institute an action on behalf of the public who presumably would travel the road, the State may institute a civil action to have the road declared a public road." Id. (footnote omitted).
[¶ 12] Defendants also prevailed in Brakke , 474 N.W.2d at 878, where they were convicted of theft and attempted theft of crops from a bank. One of the defendants planted crops on the property when the bank and the other defendant each owned an undivided one-half interest in that property and before the property was partitioned by court order. Id. at 879. Noting "[t]his court has never addressed whether a cotenant who plants crops on land which is subsequently lost through partition also loses entitlement to the growing crops, and authority from other jurisdictions on the question is sparse," we concluded a legitimate dispute existed over ownership of the crops and a "criminal theft trial is not the proper vehicle for resolving property law questions of this nature." Id. at 880, 882.
[¶ 13] Most recently, in Herzig , 2012 ND 247, ¶¶ 1, 18, 825 N.W.2d 235, we reversed the defendant's conviction for criminal trespass where he admitted driving on the road in question, but argued the road was a public road by prescription which would preclude trespasser status. Relying on Meyer , we said "[w]hen there is a legitimate dispute as to whether a road is a public road by prescription, the prosecutor should not bring charges based on the nonexistence of such a road." Id. at ¶ 21.
[¶ 14] Defendants have unsuccessfully...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Houkom
...trial of the evidence, and facts not appearing on the face of the information cannot be considered." State v. Conrad , 2017 ND 79, ¶ 6, 892 N.W.2d 200 (quoting State v. Perreault , 2002 ND 14, ¶ 7, 638 N.W.2d 541 ). "Further, for purposes of the motion, all well-pleaded facts are taken to b......
-
State v. Gratton
...and exploitation of a vulnerable adult for using $50,000 from a joint bank account she shared with her elderly mother. 2017 ND 79, ¶ 2, 892 N.W.2d 200. The district court dismissed the criminal charges, reasoning Conrad, as a joint account holder, could not be charged and the civil dispute ......